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Terrorist organizations are groups and therefore 
subject to norm processes in order to operate.  These norms 
form a core component of the organizations’ command and 
control environment.  Unique group norm processes develop 
according to the needs and conditions under which a group 
operates.  As conditions change, both internally and 
externally, groups adopt norming strategies, whether 
cognizant of them or not, to fit the constraints of the 
group’s environment.  If a group is unable to maintain a 
type of norming structure that facilitates group cohesion 
and a clear understanding of the group’s mission, then that 
group will likely fail to meet its objective or eventually 
cease to exist. 
Coalition operations in Afghanistan following September 
11, 2001, demonstrated the ability for terrorist 
organizations to continue to flourish without a clear 
structure.  The availability of current technology also aids 
groups without well-defined structure.  Organizations with 
these constraints are likely to adopt a missionary and/or 
adhocracy structure.  Under these conditions, terrorist 
organizations are increasingly difficult to categorize and 
study in terms of their structure.   
The ability of a terrorist organization to continue its 
existence and successful operations is partially dependent 
upon its ability to influence, either directly or 
indirectly, the society in which it operates so that the 
group’s network and operations may be maintained.  Terrorist 
organizations that span several years or those that exist  
 vi
for specific operations continue to entice people to 
willingly join a group that assumingly does not value the 
same norms as those of society.   
For these brief reasons, this study offers a framework 
of how such organizations affect societies. The intent is to 
develop hypotheses that will potentially enable future 
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Terrorist organizations are groups and therefore 
subject to norm processes in order to operate.  These norms 
form a core component of the organizations’ command and 
control environment.  Unique group norm processes develop 
according to the needs and conditions under which a group 
operates.  As conditions change, both internally and 
externally, groups adopt norming strategies, whether 
cognizant of them or not, to fit the constraints of the 
group’s environment.  If a group is unable to maintain a 
type of norming structure that facilitates group cohesion 
and a clear understanding of the group’s mission, then that 
group will likely fail to meet its objective or eventually 
cease to exist. 
Coalition operations in Afghanistan following September 
11, 2001, demonstrated the ability for terrorist 
organizations to continue to flourish without a clear 
structure.  The availability of current technology also aids 
groups without well-defined structure.  Organizations with 
these constraints are likely to adopt a missionary and/or 
adhocracy structure.  Under these conditions, terrorist 
organizations are increasingly difficult to categorize and 
study in terms of their structure.   
The ability of a terrorist organization to continue its 
existence and successful operations is partially dependent 
upon its ability to influence, either directly or 
indirectly, the society in which it operates so that the 
group’s network and operations may be maintained.  Terrorist 
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organizations that span several years or those that exist 
for specific operations continue to entice people to 
willingly join a group that assumingly does not value the 
same norms as those of society.   
For these brief reasons, this study offers a framework 
of how such organizations affect societies. The intent is to 
develop hypotheses that will potentially enable future 
agents of peace to disrupt the norming process of these 
groups. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
Richard Scott contends that command and control 
activities within organizations can be categorized as 
regulatory (written rules, procedures and policies), 
normative (collective meaning systems applied to actions and 
symbols), and cultural-cognitive (processes that reinforce 
collective cultural mores and bounded cognition) in nature.1  
The literature on terrorist organizations, however, has yet 
to benefit from this conceptual framework.  Current 
terrorism studies focus upon societal-level factors instead 
of organizational-level factors.  These studies postulate 
frameworks for understanding the conditions allowing the 
formation and continuation of terrorist organizations. 
Organizational-level factors examine how organizations 
themselves or their members create processes and sustain 
these organizations.  In particular, given the ideological 
impetus cited by many terrorist recruits as a reason for 
joining, the paucity of theoretical and empirical work for 
                     
1 W. Richard Scott, Organizations:  Rational, Natural and Open 
Systems, 5th ed., (Saddle River, New Jersey:  Pearson Education, 2003.), 
15. 
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exploring the normative command and control processes that 
create and sustain terrorist organizations needs further 
work.2   
Societal norms affect the conditions under which 
terrorist organizations come into existence, operate and 
become reflected with the terrorist organization’s normative 
command and control processes.  However, assuming that such 
influences are uni-directional is premature; from an open 
systems perspective, societal norms both influence and are 
influenced by terrorist groups.  Abundant theories exist and 
explain the conditions suitable for the formation of 
terrorist organizations.  Now that these organizations 
exist, studies need to explore how these organizations 
influence the societies in which they operate through 
normative influences.  In this vein, this thesis explores 
the normative command and control processes of terrorist 
organizations.  It begins with a review of the group norming 
literature, and then specifically applies these theoretical 
concepts to terrorist organizations.  Its aim is to identify 
how terrorist organizations, which are situated within a 
broader society, use normative command and control processes 
to create and sustain themselves via an open systems 
framework.  Thus the following research questions are 
particularly relevant to this endeavor: 
(1) How do terrorist organizations use normative 
command and control to actively seek and influence possible 
recruits from the general public? 
                     
2 Scott, 15. 
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(2) How do terrorist organizations use normative 
command and control to maintain cohesion among current 
members within their organizational structure?  
Normative command and control, however, does not exist 
within a vacuum.  Terrorist groups use other means, such as 
sharing information or indoctrination techniques, in order 
to create, exchange, and sustain their normative command and 
control processes.  This thesis, thus, also explores how 
normative command and control structures within terrorist 
organizations vary with the information sharing and 
communication structures of these groups.  
(3) What methods of command and control influence are 
used by terrorist organizations to maintain group cohesion 
that society also accepts or does not actively persecute? 
Since terrorist groups are contextually situated, this 
thesis recognizes that the objective, location, and 
acceptance level of the local society will necessitate the 
need for different types of command and control systems from 
an open systems perspective.3  How these groups use norming 
processes to interact with society, however, is somewhat 
fragmented in the literature.  This thesis begins to 
synthesize these processes through exploring:   
 (4)  Do terrorist groups actively seek to establish 
group norms congruent with the norms of societies in which 
they operate in order to bolster support and recruit future 
members? 
                     
3 Martha Crenshaw, “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical 
Contexts,” in Terrorism in Context. (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 8. 
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Using historical vignettes, this thesis highlights the 
process by which organizations institute norm forming from 
an empirical basis.  This thesis demonstrates that members 
embedded within the structure of an organization adapt to 
the norms of the organization rather than society because of 
the strong cohesive forces within an organization that 
replace the norms of society. 
(5)  How do the norms of terrorist organizations relate 
to those norms of the societies in which they operate?   
(6)  Is there a relationship between peer, perceived, 
and societal norms of the terrorist organizations as they 
relate those of society? 
By discussing the various types of audiences a 
terrorist organization seeks to influence, different norms 
and how they relate to the norms of the terrorist 
organization are discussed.  These audiences largely fall 
into three groups: uncommitted, sympathetic, or active 
members.  Each set of people must be treated and approached 
differently. 
C. BACKGROUND 
In order to study terrorism and its components, basic 
definitions must be accepted.  For the purpose of this 
thesis, the following definitions are used: 
1. Definitions 
A group is a collection of individuals, to include 
numbers of two or more, who have interactions with one 
another making the individuals interdependent to some 
degree.  A group is not defined by similar characteristics 
 6
amongst its parts but by its dynamic characteristics based 
on the interactions between its members.  Interaction is 
further defined by behavior of one person that directly 
affects the behavior of another.4 
Group norms are the sets of informal rules that groups 
adopt to regulate and regularize group members’ behavior.  
These norms are not necessarily written but each member of 
the group is aware of them.  Norms establish the behavior 
that ought to occur.  Norms differ from values which are the 
beliefs of an individual or collection of individuals who 
share a common view of what is considered desirable.5  A 
belief can belong to an individual or group, but a norm only 
belongs to a group.  Beliefs do not regularize behavior as 
do norms.  Members of the same group may hold different 
beliefs but adhere to a common set of norms.6 
Ideology is defined as a “common and broadly agreed set 
of rules to which an individual subscribes which help to 
regulate and determine behavior.”7  A religious 
fundamentalist for the purpose of this thesis then is one 
who has consistency not only in the religion’s ideology but  
                     
4 Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, “Groups and Group Membership: 
Introduction,” in Group Dynamics, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1968), 46. 
5 Richard T. Morris, “A Typology of Norms,” American Sociological 
Review 21, no. 5 (1956), http://www.jstor.org (accessed October 2006). 
6 Daniel C. Feldman, “The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms” 
The Academy of Management Review 9, no. 1 (1984), http://www.jstor.org 
(accessed October 2006).  
7 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “The Psychological and Behavioural 
Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 12, 
no. 4 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 55. 
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in its prescribed behavior.  The particular ideology adhered 
to depends upon which sect of a religion an individual 
believes.8 
The term terrorism was initially used to describe the 
systematic inducement of fear and anxiety used to control 
and direct the actions of a civilian population during the 
mass uprisings of the French Revolution.  Terrorism then 
described the challenges state leadership incurred due to 
revolutionaries trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the 
French Revolution.9  For the purpose of this thesis, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) definition of terrorism will be 
used: “The unlawful use of-or threatened use of-force or 
violence against individuals or property to coerce or 
intimidate governments or societies often to achieve 
political, religious, or ideological objectives.”10  This 
definition amongst others is chosen because it includes a 
cultural context and is the entity for which this thesis is 
written.   
2. Causes of Terrorism 
a. Situational Variables 
This thesis does not attempt to explain the causes 
of terrorism but a brief overview of various theories is 
presented in order to provide a context for how these 
organizations develop.  The way in which an organization 
                     
8 Horgan and Taylor, 37. 
9 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 
13, no. 4 (1981), 380. http://www.jstor.org. (accessed October 2006).  
10 Bruce Hoffman, “Defining Terrorism,” in Inside Terrorism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 38. 
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develops often indicates its operations.  Terrorism and the 
formation of terrorist groups are not spontaneous.  
Organizations with long-term goals grow from a set of 
preconditions which set the stage for violent actions.  
These preconditions include permissive factors of society 
that provide opportunity for action and situations that 
inspire terrorist campaigns.  For these reasons, tightly 
policed states, such as Iraq before the removal of Saddam 
Hussein or Cuba under Fidel Castro, generally do not 
experience terrorist attacks.  Opportunities to take action 
against the government do not exist because the state takes 
action against the people before they have time to organize. 
Conversely, states which are more open, while allowing their 
citizens more freedoms, also allow opportunity for the 
people to express their grievances against the state.  As 
people gather around a specific issue without fear of 
immediate state retribution, organized violence is more 
likely to occur.11 
Terrorism scholar, Martha Crenshaw, states that, 
“Terrorism occurs when governments use unexpected force in 
response to protest.”12  Once a previously open and tolerant 
state attempts to tighten security and takes action against 
protestors, acts of terrorism are more likely in retaliation 
to the freedoms recently taken away.  Crenshaw states, 
“Terrorism occurs where mass passivity and elite 
dissatisfaction coincide.”13  Organizations in these 
situations will coalesce around specific grievances to 
                     
11 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 381. 
12 Ibid., 384. 
13 Ibid., 384. 
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incite the population to action.  This explanation is a 
factor of the social movement theory.   
Terrorism itself is more achievable due to the 
urbanization beginning in the late nineteenth century 
resulting in more densely populated areas.  Dense areas of 
civilian populations increase the number of interactions and 
subsequently mean that fear caused by violent attacks will 
travel further and faster.14  Attacks are conducted to 
incite fear and to force state leadership to change its 
policies, laws, or conduct.  A single, unpredictable violent 
attack may have more effect than drawn out military 
campaigns.  Along with urbanization, modernization 
introduced complexity to society affording people the 
opportunity to focus on objectives other than providing for 
basic necessities.  As modernization creates complexity, 
physical opportunities and vulnerabilities for potential 
attacks emerge.15  Command and control systems, increasingly 
mechanized since the time of Napoleon, introduce new 
vulnerabilities for attack.  Spying can now be accomplished 
from a distance, using technology instead of physically 
needing to send scouts ahead of a marching army.  
Information flows faster, allowing terrorists to organize 
and exchange information knowledge more quickly and in 
secret.  Modernization resulted in mass transportation, but 
mass transportation enabled terrorists to quickly and 
covertly move from one region to another.16  Additionally, 
                     
14 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 381. 
15 Ibid., 381. 
16 Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which 
Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities,” Comparative Politics 
23, no. 4 (1991): 424. http://www.jstor.org. (accessed October 2006). 
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the modern mass media provides an outlet for terrorists to 
communicate their message to other populations.17  This 
avenue of communication provides opportunity for terrorists 
to communicate and pass information among each other as well 
as potentially recruiting future terrorists.  Media coverage 
of successful terrorist attacks also decreases the people’s 
confidence in their governments. 
b. Strategy 
The strategy of a terrorist organization varies 
depending on the mission of the organization.  The 
strategies employed by organizations though, rest on the 
idea that terrorism involves a group of actors, generally 
utilizing a small core of personnel who have intimate 
relationships.  Since the violent nature of terrorism 
presupposes that the norms adopted by these groups oppose 
those of society, the interactions between group members may 
be more important to understanding normative command and 
control relationships and the ability of organizations to 
flourish under adverse circumstances versus the 
psychological predispositions of individual members.18  Once 
a terrorist organization exists though, leaders may be 
reluctant to achieve the group’s objectives and end the 
purpose for the group’s existence. Terrorist organizations 
are likely to “seek incremental gains sufficient to sustain 
group morale but not to end members’ dependence on the 
organization.”19  For this reason, a group’s goal may expand 
                     
17 Weinberg, 424. 
18 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 393.  
19 David C. Rapoport, Inside Terrorist Organizations (Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass, 2001), 22. 
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over time in order to necessitate continued support.  For 
example, al Qaeda initially sought to remove infidels from 
traditionally Muslim lands, but overtime, the objective 
expanded to include spreading their sect of Islam to secular 
Muslim states and beyond. 
c. Terrorist Psychology 
In the past, psychological problems were thought 
to play a part in members of society who resort to violent 
means.  While some members of organizations may display 
psychological problems, this occurrence is not a main factor 
in documented terrorism.  Instead, the path to terrorism is 
usually more gradual such that indoctrination replaces the 
norms of society and the person involved in terrorism is a 
rational actor.  One model of terrorism by Kent Layne Oots 
and Thomas C. Wiegle explains that an individual who commits 
a terrorist act must have an attitude accepting of violence.  
More importantly, “the potential terrorist need only see 
that terrorism has worked for others in order to become 
aggressively aroused.”20 This paper is not focused on 
psychology, but one component of counter-terrorism studies 
is that of the psychological aspects of terrorism which are 
concerned with “their recruitment and induction into 
terrorist groups, their personalities, beliefs, attitudes, 
motivations, and careers as terrorist[s].”21  In order for a 
group to commit an act of terrorism, the members of the 
group must reach “collective decisions based on commonly 
                     
20 Rex A. Hudson et al., Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 
Government Report on Profiling Terrorists (Guilford, Connecticut: The 
Lyons Press, 2002), 27. 
21 Ibid., 28. 
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held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to 
the group and its beliefs varies.”22  This thesis looks at 
these topics in order to understand the cohesiveness of the 
group as it possibly relates to the normative command and 
control aspects of an organization. 
D. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis studies the internal processes of terrorism 
inside an organization to develop a framework for 
terrorism’s effects on society.  This study is relevant as 
demonstrated by coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
following September 11, 2001.  After initial coalition 
operations, al Qaeda displayed a capability to continue 
operating despite lacking a formal, recognizable structure.  
The Global War on Terrorism faces challenges as terrorist 
organization members demonstrate a willingness to inflict 
mass casualties against members of their own society as well 
as others.  This thesis uses a variety of historical 
terrorist groups to study the internal processes of cohesion 
and normative command and control but recognizes that the 
current Global War on Terrorism is focusing on 
fundamentalist groups.  Different types of terrorism will be 
discussed, but in developing the problem statement for this 
thesis, concern is given to fundamentalist groups because 
unlike politically motivated terrorist groups, 
fundamentalist groups are not constrained by the fear that 
excessive violence will offend a constituency.  For this 
reason, understanding the internal processes of terrorist 
organizations becomes more imperative to understanding what 
                     
22 Hudson, 25. 
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causes these groups to continue operating and attracting 
additional members.  For these groups, persuasion is not an 
objective because religious fundamentalists find 
justification for their actions based on their specific 
interpretation of religious works.23   
As the international community has generally taken more 
active stances against terrorism, terrorist organizations 
have become less structured than before September 11, 2001.  
The current insurgency in Iraq demonstrates the ability of 
persons not belonging to specific organizations to commit 
acts of terror.  Furthermore, the “diffusion of lethal 
technologies, the erosion of taboos against the use of 
weapons of mass destruction, the absence of restraint in 
amateur terrorists who, having no organization or sponsor to 
protect, see no reason to limit extreme violence that might 
generate backlash, and the continuing need of terrorists to 
find new ways to attract attention are reasons this topic 
must be studied.”24 
E. JUSTIFICATION FOR APPROACH 
Following coalition operations in Afghanistan, many 
noted the ability of terrorist groups to adapt to new 
organizational structures.  Even before the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 occurred, the U.S. State Department 
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in April 
2000, noted in Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999,  
                     
23 David Tucker, “What is New about the New Terrorism and How 
Dangerous is It?” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 3 (Autumn 
2001): 3. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
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U.S. counterterrorist policies are tailored to 
combat what experts believe to be the shifting 
trends in terrorism.  One trend is the shift from 
well-organized, localized groups supported by 
state sponsors to loosely organized, international 
networks of terrorists.  Such a network supported 
the failed attempt to smuggle explosives material 
and detonating devices into Seattle in December.  
With the decrease of state funding, these loosely 
networked individuals and groups have turned 
increasingly to other sources of funding, 
including private sponsorship, narcotrafficking, 
crime, and illegal trade.25 
Command and control of an organization is largely 
responsible for shaping the norms of a group.  This thesis 
asserts that understanding the mechanisms of norm influence 
through aspects of cohesion will enable strategists and 
policy makers to develop a framework for identifying key 
command and control concepts either to employ or defend 
against.   
This thesis rests on the idea that terrorist 
organizations, regardless of their structural 
characteristics, are groups and therefore subject to group 
dynamics.  One component of group dynamics is cohesion and 
how group norms affect that cohesion.  Assuming that “social 
norms are learned, they can be modified over time; and if 
they are truly a causal link to behavior and interaction 
patterns, then normative modifications may account for 
certain social changes.  Along this line, normative conflict 
and normative ambiguity also may lead to social changes such 
                     
25 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “What Next for Networks and 
Netwars?” in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 
2001), 343, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007). 
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as a breakdown in the social order.”26  While policy 
advocates may search for causal links to group behavior, 
this thesis maintains that no single component of group 
dynamics can be truly causal.  By understanding the dynamics 
of the group, including its shared ideological commitment 
and group identity, analysts can isolate the means of ending 
terrorist attacks.  The focus of this thesis is thus on the 
dynamic relationships between members as a way of gaining 
insight into the vulnerability of the group’s organizational 
structure, the group’s ideology and the worldview, which may 
lead to a framework for more effectively combating 
asymmetrical terrorism threats.27 
F. ASSUMPTIONS 
First, this thesis assumes that terrorist organizations 
are groups and subject to the norm processes of groups.  As 
groups, this thesis does not study terrorism as composed of 
individuals or in terms of the leading personalities in 
terrorist organizations.   
Second, in order to study terrorist organizations and 
to develop a framework for their command and control 
processes overseeing cohesion-building forces, they must be 
analyzed as rational actors.  This is based on the 
assumption that terrorist organizations possess internally 
consistent sets of values, beliefs, and norms.  In this  
                     
26 Robert Hagedorn and Sanford Labovitz, “Measuring Social Norms” The 
Pacific Sociological Review 16, no. 3 (1973), http://www.jstor.org 
(accessed October 2006). 
27 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of 
Terrorist Groups,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 12. 
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respect, terrorism is a means to an end.  Making this 
assumption allows analysts to study the decision-making 
processes.28 
Third, this thesis does not attempt to profile 
terrorists.  Trends have existed depending on the type of 
organization concerning individual characteristics (age, 
gender, education, income), but these trends have changed 
over time.  Often, data collected about individual 
terrorists is not representative of the organization as a 
whole because studies tend to talk to terrorists who are 
detained.  These individuals are more likely to be leaders 
of groups, who authorities have a greater interest in, and 
since they are being detained, may not always have responses 
representative of the rest of the organization. 
Fourth, this thesis looks at the behavior of the group 
and the processes by which command and control is carried 
out to a degree that individuals no longer feel they are 
acting against the norms of society.  For this reason, this 
thesis assumes that terrorism is not individual aberrant 
behavior, but rather as the “product of the beliefs, 
mindsets, traditions, and operational code of a group.”29  
Using this assumption, an individual’s behavior is 
understandable within the context of the organization. 
                     
28 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 385.  
29 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Knowing our Enemy,” in Unconquerable 
Nation (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2006), 57.  
http://www.rand.org. (accessed February 2007).  
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G. METHODOLOGY 
First, this thesis reviews current literature 
concerning the process of group norms.  This focuses on 
methods employed to create group norms and the types of 
group norms established to maintain a group’s existence.  
Norms of influence will be the key component of this 
literature review. Second, this thesis incorporates 
organizational structure theory as a means of assessing the 
types of norms a terrorist group operating in adverse 
conditions needs to continue its existence.  This portion of 
the research focuses on the characteristics of various types 
of possible terrorist organizations in support of the 
working assumption that terrorist organizations are 
increasingly utilizing missionary/adhocracy structures.  
Third, this thesis focuses on different influencing methods 
that terrorist organizations used in the past and currently 
employ to foster an environment conducive to the continued 
existence of these organizations.  This portion of the 
research is enriched by cited examples of terrorist 
organizations’ use of these methods in the past.  Finally, 
my thesis will summarize these findings in a concise 
framework with hypotheses as to how terrorist organizations 
influence societies as a product.   
Quantifiable analysis of the internal dynamics led by a 
group’s command and control processes is neither cost nor 
time effective in this brief analysis.  As such, primary and 
secondary resources will be used as techniques for 
measurement.  These resources will be approached under the 
categories of (1) questioning people as other researchers 
have questioned them in interviews, (2) inferring norms from 
 18
behavior, (3) postulated effects—that is, measuring the 
implication of hypothetical norms (largely covered in the 
literature review), and (4) written documents from group 
members to include electronic communications.30 
H. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
Since no original empirical data is collected for this 
thesis, the following problems with the methodology may 
arise from secondary data: the purpose of each study is 
slightly different, and therefore, the questions asked of 
detained terrorists may be worded to evoke different 
answers.  A researcher is less likely to publish findings 
incongruent to the thesis statement of the research which 
may skew the published results.  The respondents themselves 
have potential biases.  Some respondents may lie or have 
incomplete recollections of events or people.  Detained 
terrorists may not have been top leaders and therefore do 
not have the answers.  Also, persons interviewed may provide 
the responses they think the researches wants to hear in 
order to win favor and to improve their personal situation.  
Written documents from terrorists and scholars alike must be 
viewed with caution.  Since a time delay exists between the 
time of writing and dissemination of scholarly works, the 
conclusions drawn from a set of documents may be outdated 
for the current time period.31 
When attempting to develop a framework describing the 
norms an organization uses to maintain internal cohesion as 
well as to influence members of society, research must avoid 
                     
30 Hagedorn and Labovitz, (accessed October 2006). 
31 Ibid. 
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drawing general conclusions from specific examples.  For 
this reason, single case studies will not be used in this 
thesis.  Instead, short examples drawn from terrorist 
organizations with varied origins will be used to illustrate 
command and control principles using cohesion to affect 
society.  The norms discovered through research may not 
actually be norms of the organization being studied but 
caused by other factors.  If norms are correctly identified, 
other influences for an organizations behavior should not be 
ruled out because the norm that one example cites might be 
generally overshadowed by another group norm.32   
 
 
                     
32 Hagedorn and Labovitz, (accessed October 2006). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF GROUP NORMS 
This section describes the formation of groups, some of 
the processes through which groups establish and facilitate 
norms, and how these norms contribute to group cohesion, 
particularly for missionary organizations such as terrorist 
groups. 
A. THEORY OF NORM FORMATION 
1. Planned Groups 
Groups form for a variety of reasons.  Only those with 
relevancy to this thesis will be shortly described.  One or 
more persons may form a group to accomplish a specific 
objective: work, problem-solving, social-action, mediating, 
legislative, and client groups.  Work groups use 
coordination of behavior and resources from a collection of 
people in order to perform a task more efficiently.  
Terrorist groups fit this category through their need to 
coordinate behavior in an efficient manner to complete an 
operation.  Problem-solving groups are those which 
strategize to deliver solutions.  Terrorist group leadership 
may fit this category.  Social-action groups “desire to 
influence the course of events in society.”33  These groups 
press state leadership or business leadership for more 
rights, freedoms, or power.  Social-action groups fit 
terrorist groups which seek to influence the actions of 
states.  Mediating groups apply to today’s evolving 
organizational structure of terrorist groups because these 
                     
33 Cartwright and Zander, 54. 
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groups coordinate activities and resources across other 
groups.  Al Qaeda has its own mission but also works with 
other groups to maintain open channels of communication as 
well as potential future conduits for resources.  
Legislative groups formulate rules and regulations.  Since 
terrorist organizations are often not the authority figures 
in the state, this type of group does not apply to this 
study.  Note though, the Taliban did play this role.  Client 
groups want to improve members’ lives by being a part of the 
group.  These groups are akin to the various group-help 
programs, such as Alcoholics Anonymous.  Since terrorist 
groups will sacrifice members or punish group members for 
not adhering to their norms, terrorist groups do not fit 
this category either.34 
2. Spontaneous Groups 
Groups may also form spontaneously.  The formation of 
the Hamburg cell may be an example of this group formation.  
Formation of the group is based on each member’s that other 
possible members share the same values.  Members must have 
sufficient contact with one another for this formation, but 
with the advent of the Internet, chat rooms, and email, this 
contact does not have to be in physical proximity.  Finally, 
this type of group formation occurs when potential members 
perceive others as wanting to relieve their internal 
conflicts using the same methods, in this case, violence.35 
 
                     
34 Cartwright and Zander, 54. 
35 Ibid. 
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3. Attraction to Groups 
An individual’s attraction to a group will depend upon 
his assessment of the desirable and undesirable consequences 
attendant upon membership: “Each participant will continue 
his participation in an organization only so long as the 
inducements offered him are as great or greater [measured in 
terms of his values and in terms of the alternatives open to 
him] than the contribution he is asked to make.”36  A 
person’s attraction to a group is not simply determined by 
the characteristics of the group but also by his view of how 
these characteristics relate to his own personal needs and 
values. 
Four factors of attraction to a group include: 1) 
motive-based, 2) incentives, 3) expectancy, and 4) 
comparison level.  Motive-based attraction includes the need 
to belong, recognition, security, money, or other values a 
person feels a group potentially provides.37  These are 
exchange-based motives.  Incentive-based attraction consists 
of an alignment between the goal of the group and the 
individual to include types of activities undertaken by the 
group, or prestige connected to membership with the group.  
Expectancy-based attraction is the thought that group 
membership will have beneficial consequences for the 
individual.  Comparison level-based attraction occurs when 
an individual feels that membership to a particular group 
will have greater benefits than membership to a second 
group.  This feeling may be based on past or theoretical 
                     
36 Dorwin Cartwright, “The Nature of Group Cohesiveness,” in Group 
Dynamics, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 95. 
37 Ibid, 96. 
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experiences.  This concept should be implemented when 
fighting in an unstable area where the population is 
undecided as to which side to support.  Individuals 
attracted to a group may be enticed when the group lures 
members into the group promising certain benefits.  
Following membership, the group may then proceed to 
influence the needs and interests of the member to those  
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Table 1.   Types of Groups and Relationship to Terrorist 
Organizations 
B. GROUP NORMS 
Group norms are the sets of informal rules that groups 
adopt to regulate and regularize group members’ behavior 
based on collective systems.  These norms are generally not 
                     
38 Cartwright, 96. 
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written but each member of the group is aware of them.  
Norms define the boundaries of acceptable behavior.  Norms 
differ from values which are the beliefs of an individual or 
collection of individuals who share a common view of what is 
considered desirable.39  Thus norms focus on behaviors, 
while beliefs focus on worldview or ideology.  Norms are 
formed and enforced only with respect to the behaviors that 
are important for the group and can diverge widely from the 
written rules, regulations, and policies of the group or 
organization.  For example, a group may have a rule against 
smoking, but if enough of the members ignore this rule or do 
not care about it, then the no smoking policy will not be 
enforced and will not exist as a group norm.     
Norms develop over time after being reinforced through 
“explicit statements by supervisors or co-workers, critical 
events in the group’s history, primacy, or carry-over 
behaviors from past situations.”40  The degree and methods 
used to create and sustain group cohesion are a subset of 
the group’s norms.  A belief can belong to an individual or 
group, but a norm only belongs to a group.  Moreover, 
beliefs do not regularize behavior as do norms, particularly 
in a group context.  Members of the same group may hold 
different beliefs but adhere to a common set of norms.41 
Groups are likely to enforce only those norms which 
increase the group’s likelihood of survival, increase group 
member predictability, avoid embarrassing situations for the 
group, or directly support central beliefs of the group.  
                     
39 Morris, (accessed October 2006). 
40 Feldman, 47.  
41 Ibid. 
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For some groups, the norms of the group may seem to conflict 
with those of society.  Contracultural norms occur when an 
individual understands, and at some level, accepts the 
standards of society but recognizes a personal inability to 
meet them.  Instead, the individual represses his sense of 
identity with society and seeks out others who feel the 
same.  By forming a group with others with the same set of 
norms, the result is a group which welcomes and encourages 
the suppression of society’s norms.  This concept is 
applicable to the formation of locally formed terrorist 
groups or those cells that form from within a state.42 
1. Normative Conflict 
a. Moral Versus Behavioral Norms 
Difficulties in profiling terrorists arise 
partially due to the moral versus behavior norm conflict.  
Moral norms refer to ideal forms of behavior whereas 
behavior norms refer to the real conduct that actually 
occurs regardless of what ought to take place.  Members of a 
terrorist group may be involved family and community members 
whose moral norms are congruous to those of society, but the 
behavioral norms of the terrorist group member deviate from 
the moral norms of his broader social network.  If these 
individuals see others whose behavior norms are not aligned 
with society’s moral norms, then the individual is more 
                     
42 Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, “Pressures to Uniformity in 
Groups: Introduction,” in Group Dynamics, (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1968), 144. 
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likely to see his own behavioral norms as aligning more 
closely with those of society.43 
b. Absolute Versus Conditional Norms 
The difference between absolute and conditional 
norms and the varying degree of their application can cause 
confusion and disintegration of group cohesion.  Absolute 
norms are known and supported by all members of the group.  
These norms apply to everyone under all conditions.  
Deviances from these norms result in harsh sanctions.  
Conditional norms have a more limited application and 
sporadic enforcement.44  These norms may only be enforced 
during times of great stress for the group.  The difference 
in these two norms could be leveraged to design counter-
terrorism strategies if the inner-workings of an 
organization’s internal dynamics are understood.  Forcing 
command and control situations which call for the terrorist 
organization to enforce conditional norms may cause support 
for the group to erode. 
c. Laws of Society Versus Social Norms 
Laws of society are much more likely to be 
enforced if the social norms of that society are congruent 
to those laws.  Social norms are enforced in order to ensure 
satisfaction of group members and to prevent as much 
interpersonal discomfort as possible.  Counter-terrorism 
strategies need to be mindful of social norms in order to 
                     
43 M.D. Buffalo and Joseph W. Rodgers, “Behavioral Norms, Moral 
Norms, and Attachment: Problems of Deviance and Conformity,” Social 
Problems 19, no. 1(1971), http://www.jstor.org. (accessed October 2006). 
44 Morris, (accessed October 2006). 
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stifle support from sympathetic audiences of the terrorist 
groups and to avoid one-solution-fits-all policies.   
2. Group Polarization 
Once a group is formed and its norms are established, 
the individual members of the group may not notice that 
their own views shift to meet those of the group.  When the 
views of the group shift toward greater risk-taking compared 
with the common view of the group before discussions and 
membership, this is known as group polarization.  Even 
though it is the group that becomes more risky in its 
decisions, individuals tend to adopt the more risky views as 
well, shifting toward greater risk-taking decisions after 
the group shifts.  Conversely, individuals who are not part 
of the decision-making and discussion process do not exhibit 
a shift in their personal views.45  This dichotomy could 
potentially be used to exploit terrorist group members on 
the fringe of the organization by encouraging fringe members 
to forego highly risky behavior with which they disagree.  
Amnesty programs for terrorist groups, for example, are 
posited to work on this principle.  They provide an 
incentive for individuals with lesser commitment to the 
group, such as fringe members, to remove themselves from the 
ideology and behavior of the more hardened core membership. 
3. Norm Erosion 
In order to combat terrorist organization operations at 
the deepest level, erosion of the group’s norms must take 
                     
45 Daryl J. Bem, Nathan Kogan, and Michael A. Wallach, “Group 
Influence on Individual Risk-Taking,” in Group Dynamics, ed. Dorwn 
Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 
442. 
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place.  A person who follows the required rules and routine 
of a group but no longer subscribes to the ethical and moral 
content of the group displays compliance.  This is a first 
step in luring a group member away from a terrorist 
organization by encouraging the member away from the rules 
and routine of the group.  Emancipation and complete norm 
erosion occur when an individual no longer even complies 
with the regulations of a group because they no longer fit 
his own moral code.  Few people though, less than five 
percent of those interviewed are fully emancipated.46  This 
phenomenon helps to explain why terrorists interviewed in 
prison still display feelings of support and respect for 
their respective terrorist organizations.  If norms cannot 
be eroded, then they can be neutralized.  If an individual 
is aware that his behavioral and moral norms do not match 
those of society, then this person is likely to take steps 
to avoid being singled out for deviance.  For this reason, 
terrorists in a cellular organization structure may be more 
difficult to detect because they might recognize that their 
norms deviate from those of society.  In order to protect 
themselves, they will try to blend as much as possible.  For 
example, the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks 
tried to appear as if their behavior and moral norms matched 
those of society.  They were seen out at bars before 
undertaking their mission.47 
                     
46 Bem, Kogan, and Wallach, 448. 
47 Buffalo and Rodgers, (accessed October 2006). 
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Table 2.   Characteristics of Group Norms and Conflicting 
Norms 
C. NORMS OF GROUP COHESION 
The following chart summarizes the forces of cohesion 
as they relate to group dynamics.48 
 
Figure 1.    Forces of Cohesion Related to Group Dynamics.  
(After: Daryl J. Bem, Nathan Kogan, and Michael A. 
Wallach, “Group Influence on Individual Risk-Taking,” 
in Group Dynamics, 92.) 
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Group cohesiveness describes the extent to which 
members of a group desire to remain in the group and how 
willing they are to rely on one another.  The degree of 
cohesion in a terrorist organization is important to study 
because members of a more cohesive group should more readily 
accept the group’s goals, decisions, and assignment to tasks 
and roles.49  Cohesiveness is not always increased by 
homogeneity.  Evidence suggests, however, that some 
dissimilarity enhances cohesion.  Differences among group 
members lead to a varied pool of resources and experiences.  
If various members possess different skills, then the group 
will need to retain these members in order to have access to 
their skills and resources.  This concept is another reason 
why profiling terrorist personalities is difficult, 
especially on an international level and across network 
organizations that require the use of varied skills and 
resources. 
1. Co-action and Facilitation 
The degree of interaction between members is another 
factor of cohesion.  Members of close-knit groups will 
indirectly encourage one another to participate in 
cooperative behavior acceptable to the group.  In an 
international network, this component of cohesion may not 
exist to the degree it does in a traditional hierarchy.  
Close cooperation may exist within each cell of the network, 
but unless leaders of the cells have a clear overview of the 
organization’s ideology, developing strong group cohesion 
will rely on factors other than interaction.  Interactions 
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aiding group cohesion include the types of relationships 
between members of the group such as kinship, marriage, 
former comrades, schooling, and training. Interactions also 
include the degree and type of communications achieved 
through technology, through email, chat rooms, newsgroups, 
blogs, and websites.50 
2. Presence of Others 
The presence of others in a group environment increases 
cohesion.  Due to co-action, individuals perform the 
dominant task (according the group norm) better when in 
front of the group.  Individuals naturally begin to compete 
for resources, position, recognition, and power in a group 
setting.  If a group has norms of violence, then individuals 
of that group will be more likely to perform these violent 
acts immediately following group celebrations.51  Social 
facilitation is a permissive factor of violence.  This 
concept refers to social habits and historical traditions 
that sanction the use of violence against the government, 
making it morally and politically justifiable.  Social 
facilitation incorporates the idea of contra cultural norms 
and the presence of others to allow individuals to commit 
acts of violence and to feel as if they are acting in 
accordance with desired norms.52   
                     
50 Amitai Etzioni, “Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and 
History” Law & Society Review 34, no. 1 (2000), http://www.jstor.org 
(accessed October 16, 2006). 
51 Robert B. Zajonc, “Social Facilitation,” in Group Dynamics, ed. 
Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin ZAnder (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1968), 65. 
52 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 382.   
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a. The Presence of Others Induces Psychological 
Effects 
The presence of other group members has 
physiological effects which may lead to action more quickly 
than an individual acting alone.  The endocrine system and 
adrenal cortex are highly sensitive to changes in emotional 
arousal.  Experiments show that organisms such as mice, in 
crowded areas display increased amphetamine toxicity—in 
other words, the mice have a heightened response to the 
effects of amphetamines.  This experiment parallels reports 
of Islamic jihadists being sent to the front lines in the 
Afghan war and the current Iraq insurgency while taking 
amphetamine supplements.  If people also have the same 
physiological result in large groups, heightened sensitivity 
to amphetamines, then large groups are more easily excited 
to action.  Individuals on the fringe of a group may also 
imitate the actions of the core group, trying to blend in 
with the group.  In the process, the individuals actually 
begin to take on the emotions and beliefs of the group.  
Training camps for this reason are highly effective in 
indoctrinating individuals.53 
3. Group Identity 
a. External Danger 
Most individuals belong to more than one group.  
Identity with a particular group, however, can be increased 
when one group is exposed to an external danger.  External 
danger provides motivation to retain affiliation with a 
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group and individuals will consciously avoid actions which 
deviate from the group’s norms.  This phenomenon was 
witnessed following the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and 
the attack of September 11, 2001.  Americans from diverse 
backgrounds, including government, displayed increased 
solidarity in the face of external danger.  In combat, 
soldiers put themselves at risk in order to maintain group 
integrity.54  For this reason, counter-terrorism strategies 
must be careful to avoid attacking entire segments of a 
population or classifying all citizens of an area or 
background as part of one homogenous group.  Doing so 
increases group cohesion. 
b. Transference Reactions 
Individuals who are isolated from society will 
look to increase their ties to the group.  This action is 
known as a transference reaction which occurs when an 
idealized leader takes the place of a surrogate-like parent 
and provides the main forum for sharing common ideals and 
norms.  Osama bin Laden takes this role in al Qaeda as 
supporters and even sympathizers of terrorist organizations 
look to him as more of an entity than a person who provides 
them with praise, acceptance, and an over-arching ideology.  
This phenomenon especially holds true for individuals 
educated and trained far from their families in places such  
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as mosques or madrassas. Isolation from society increases 
this transference reaction as other societal influences are 
farther removed.55 
c. Reassurance Needs 
Once a terrorist group exists, convincing its 
members that other options exist is difficult because of the 
reassurance that groups provide to its members.  For 
example, it is possible that locals recruited in Iraq to 
join the insurgency do not trust the new Iraqi leadership 
and are not ready to transfer their allegiance.  Likewise, 
convincing current insurgent members to leave their current 
groups and lay down their arms is difficult.  As insurgents, 
they have the means to protect themselves.  If they 
surrender, they have no guarantee of protection.  For groups 
already organized, breaking the bonds of cohesion is more 
difficult because individuals in a group feel that they 
share the same concerns, desires, sufferings, and remaining 
in the group provides a support system for these shared 
feelings.  Members of the group reassure individuals who 
express concern.  This peer pressure relieves the 
individual’s concerns, and instead, encourages the person to 
continuing conforming to the group’s norms.  The group also 
reassures the individual’s feeling of personal danger by 
exposing the person to moderate danger in moderate degrees.  
This way, fears are discussed within the group and the 
individual is better equipped to handle the stress once 
called to action and real danger.56  This reassurance need 
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of the group is facilitated in hierarchical terrorist 
organizations with physical bases of operation and high 
levels of physical interaction.  In networks though, 
individuals may not receive this same level of reassurance 
and rely on strong values, ideology, and ties of friendship 
and kinship within each cell to achieve the same effect. 
4. Shared Grievances 
Shared grievances increase cohesion in a group.  The 
chart on the following pages outlines the various types of 
grievances a person may experience that lead to increased 
cohesion in a group.  In a world of rising prosperity and 
material possessions, the likelihood of rebellion and 
revolution actually increase as people have more material 
wealth.  Their expectations rise faster and they compare 
their position in life to others and feel they are deprived.  
The theory of Relative Deprivation states that terrorism may 
arise when people, especially young people, “feel they have 
no voice, no hope, and no possibilities for a brighter 
future.”57  As people compare their position in life to that 
of others, they will remain in their current group if and 
only if their comparison groups do not offer better options.  
Combating terrorist groups that advocate eternal life in 
paradise increases the difficulty in providing a better 
comparison group.  These grievances range from economics, 
discrimination to legal and political depravities.  In 
countries where the wealth is not evenly spread, frustration 
increases furthermore because individuals have access to 
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telecommunications to see others in the world experiencing 
the material wealth they desire.  They see their states 
hording resources and distributing them unevenly, leading to 
feelings of hostility.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Grievances Leading to Group Cohesion. (After: 
Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional 
Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model,” Journal 
of Peace Research, 325.) 
 
A collection of individuals who belong to a group 
establish their own set of norms.  If this group is a subset 
of a national or state entity, the norms of the group may or 
may not support those of the nation-state group, especially 
if the subgroup has grievances against the nation-state 
group.  In this case, the smaller group, especially with 
leadership advocating opposing values, may develop norms 
that do not align with those of the nation-state norms.  In 
this case, the members of the group will begin to take on 
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the norms and roles of the subgroup because this is the 
group with which they have more interaction and stronger 
bonds of cohesion.  When the leadership advocates deviating 
standards of behavior from those of society, the members of 
the group are more likely adapt these deviant norms.  This 
informal code of opposing the nation-state norms will 
eventually become a solid part of the group’s norms during 
the storming, norming, forming and performing stages of 
group formation.  If a group feels they have no avenue for 
addressing their grievances with the nation-state leadership 
or the group feels that the nation-state does not have the 
means to detect deviant behavior, then the deviant behavior 
is reinforced.58 
5. Internalization of Group Norms 
The process by which an individual personally adopts a 
normative system is internalization.  Following 
internalization of a set of norms, an individual is likely 
to suffer guilt when failing to meet the established norms, 
regardless of whether others notice the failure or not.59  
This process is lengthy, usually beginning with external 
group reinforcement and culminating with internalization.  
Slowly indoctrinating recruits from their local areas and 
teaching them initially in madrassas or mosques is the first 
step of external reinforcement for Islamic terrorist 
organizations.  When the recruit is taken to a training camp 
and then takes on his own missions and pledges himself 
personally to a cause, he internalizes those norms.  
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Recognizing the two different stages provides insight in to 
how groups approach potential members of society and their 
overall aims for society.  For example, Islamic 
fundamentalists hope one day to have a Pan-Islamic state.  
By openly expressing this overarching desire and teaching it 
in schools, these groups are slowly planting the seeds of 
future internalization of group norms.  Once members of 
society internalize these norms, these members will seek out 
the extremist groups to further their commitment.  This 
strategy of internalization by extremist groups serves two 
purposes: creates a more sympathetic audience to operate 
within as a base of operations and provides the group with 
potential future members. 
 
Norms of Group Cohesion 
Co-action and facilitation 







Table 3.   Norms of Group Cohesion 
D. NORMS OF INFLUENCE TO MAINTAIN COHESION 
Influence occurs when a person’s attitude, beliefs, or 
behavior are changed by the indirect or direct actions by 
another entity.  Social network  analysis studies show  that 
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influence does not require face-to-face 
interaction; indeed, the only precondition for 
social influence is information (which allows 
social comparison) about the attitudes or 
behaviors of other actors.  Influence does not 
require deliberate or conscious attempts to 
modify actors’ behaviors.  It encompasses 
behavioral contagion involving ‘the spontaneous 
pickup or imitation by other…[actors] of a 
behavior initiated by one member of the group 
where the initiator did not display any intention 
of getting the others to do what he did’ as well  
as direct influence ‘in which the actor initiates 
behavior which has the manifest objective of 
affecting the behavior of another member of the 
group.’60 
1. Initiation and Reference Groups 
Initiation into a group or organization is one of the 
first steps of creating and maintaining cohesion by 
accepting norms of the group.  When the initiation is public 
or involves personal sacrifice, an individual tends to 
reduce internal conflicts against demands of the group by 
focusing on potential benefits of group membership.61   
One reason already discussed for joining a group 
involves referencing another group and comparing benefits of 
each group membership.  For some groups, one method of 
maintaining cohesion is to continuously reference a 
secondary group to which the current group members aspire to 
join.  In order to join this second group, an individual 
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benefits by maintaining membership in the original group.  
For example, certain sects of Islam preach that martyrs for 
Islam will obtain paradise and seventy-two virgins.  This 
promise of paradise is the reference group to which some 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorists aspire.  In order to meet 
the qualifications for this paradise group, membership 
within a terrorist organization is favorable.62  
2. Persuasion 
Techniques of persuasion are employed on group members 
in order to maintain cohesion and induce internalization of 
norms.  It is involved in religious conversions, people 
joining social movements, cult membership, mass hysteria, 
mob rule, propaganda, and coercive leadership.  Persuasion 
is not always positive and is often negatively reinforced 
through guilt and shame.  Guilt is internal and occurs when 
a person accepts a group’s norms but does not behave 
accordingly.  This individual will seek to change his 
behavior to match the norms of the group.  Shame occurs when 
a person fails to meet a group norm and does not accept the 
norm.  Shame is externally derived from others and causes 
the person to either evade the norm or to change it.  A 
group desiring to convert its members or recruits to its own 
ideology and to develop strong bonds of cohesion should 
focus on fostering a sense of guilt within members rather 
than shame.  Education and peer groups should be used versus 
punishment which may induce feelings of shame.  Members who 
have already committed themselves to a group may be punished 
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for violating norm standards, but this often happens when a 
group is already experiencing difficulties maintaining 
cohesion.  Counter-terrorist strategies should focus on 
creating a sense of shame about one’s commitment to the 
greater society instead of commitment to a group.63 
3. Historical Traditions 
Historical traditions influence norms maintaining 
cohesion.  As traditions pass from one generation to the 
next, norms stretching across generations develop based on 
those traditions. Authority accompanies the norm as it 
passes to future generations rather than a norm developing 
from intense deliberation and constant reinforcement.  A 
tradition of celebrating victories over other societies or 
religions is one way of passing along these norms.  Though 
these traditions may not have a direct connection to 
extremist groups, they serve as a mechanism of future 
sympathy and subsequently internalization of more extreme 
norms.  These traditions coalesce regions around basic 
principles that provide a common baseline in future 
conflicts. 
4. Contagion of Norm Deviance 
a. Four Factors of Deviant Behavior 
A group or organization opposed to the norms of 
its surrounding greater society establishes a set of norms 
that replace those of society for members of the group.  
Sigmund Freud explains that the group is the entity  
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which is the wielder of authority, whose 
punishments the individual fears, and for whose 
sake he (a group members’) has submitted to so 
many inhibitions.  It is clearly perilous for him 
to put himself in opposition to it (the group) 
and it will be sager to follow the example of 
those around him and perhaps even to ‘hunt with 
the pack.’ In obedience to the new authority he 
put his former ‘conscience’ out of action, and so 
surrenders to the attraction of the increased 
pleasure that is certainly obtained from the 
removal of inhibitions.64   
In this context, pleasure depends on the objectives of the 
group.  Pleasure may involve sacrifice in order to obtain a 
higher goal.  In order for other members of the group to 
violate the norms of society and replace them with those of 
the group, an individual must begin initiating this act 
without display of anxiety of repercussion from society.  A 
perception of fearlessness and guiltlessness will persuade 
others to also engage in delinquent societal behavior 
conforming to the group.65  External praise for this type of 
behavior increases the likelihood of it continuing.  This 
concept can be utilized in combating terrorist groups.  
Those organizations operating as networks might not 
experience this same contagion of delinquent behavior and 
subsequent praise if their cells are small (two to three 
people) or interactions are infrequent. 
b. Guilt 
Potential feelings of guilt may be shared in group 
settings.  Frequent interactions in a group allow numerous 
situations to arise where members may speak candidly and 
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nonchalantly about the immoral (according to society) acts 
in which they have participated.  These small confessions 
lighten their own internal struggle and encourage others who 
share doubt.  For those questioning certain norms of the 
group, hearing these stories instills a sense of the moral 
correctness of the group since others are willingly 
participating.  Simultaneously, the fear of punishment by 
society is diminished upon hearing others’ tales.  If a set 
of people collectively violates a norm of society in favor 
of a group norm, that set of people may encourage each other 
to rationalize their acts.  Stories of their physical acts 
can be tailored to fit both the norms of the group and 
society.  When each person involved in the act accepts an 
explanation for the act, this unanimity fosters authenticity 
of the rationale behind the group’s norms.66   
c. Effects of Reference Groups 
Finally, individuals may recognize that society 
calls for different standards of behavior, but because the 
individual belongs to a group advocating opposition to these 
standards, this person experiences others who also fail to 
meet the norms of society.  This environment engenders 
behavioral norms that differ from moral norms.  In this way, 
an individual does not feel that his norms are deviant but 
more aligned with those of the people around him, also known 
as the technique of neutralization.67  This technique uses 
reference groups, but in a different way than as previously 
defined.  In this instance, the reference group is still the 
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group a person seeks to gain status with, but this group is 
also a group which requires deviant social behavior.  In 
order to maintain membership, a person must continue to 
violate the norms of society in order to conform to those of 
the group.  Once a part of this group, membership criteria 
continues obligating a person to violate society’s norms.  A 
person will do so in order to avoid rejection by the group 
and a lowering of self-esteem due to being unable to meet 
the group standards.  For this reason, defections from 
terrorist organizations are difficult to fully achieve 
because of the desire to conform and be accepted by the 
group.68 
5. Punishing Delinquent Behavior 
Once delinquent behavior from the greater society is 
understood, delinquency within the group must be understood 
as a means of maintaining cohesion.  Delinquent behavior 
within the group is punished in order to remind others of 
the range of acceptable behavior and to demonstrate the 
authority of the group.  Widespread deviant behavior within 
a group is problematic.  Harsh punishment of all delinquents 
often exposes deep seated problems within the group and may 
alienate members if they feel the leadership no longer has 
the same ideology as the majority of the group.  At this 
point, the group may seek to redefine group practices and 
what is acceptable behavior that will later develop into 
established and tolerated norms.  In some cases, this 
deviant behavior already is the behavioral norm for the 
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group but not yet the moral norm.  An example of this would 
be when women initially began wearing pants.  At first, any 
woman wearing pants was considered deviant, but over time, 
such a large proportion of women were behaving in a way 
inconsistent with the moral norms of western society that 
moral norms eventually changed to accept women in pants.  
Gradually the definition of unacceptable pants narrowed 
further and further.   
A group which is meeting its objectives is more likely 
to overlook small norm infractions since the mission is 
still being achieved.  When a group is not being 
operationally successful, leadership looks for potential 
problems with the group and norm infractions are more likely 
punished.  Counterterrorist strategies should make note of 
these concepts when studying the life cycle of 
organizations.  Groups that tend to purge their members are 
likely experiencing internal strife and may be taken as a 
positive sign of their eventual collapse, or the group may 
begin leaning in a more extreme direction after purging its 
non-conforming members.69   
6. Greater Threat 
When examining terrorist organizations, an important 
norm of influence maintaining cohesion is that of a greater 
threat.  Individuals’ attraction to one another is likely to 
increase when “their common threat stems from an external 
source (not their own lack of skill), when there exists the 
possibility that cooperative behavior may reduce or 
eliminate the threat, and when single individuals cannot 
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escape from either the group or the threat.”70  In relation 
to combat operations and terrorist organizations, norms of 
cohesion increase under circumstances of shared adversity 
creating a sense of fraternity based on common 
experiences.71  
7. Competition 
Competition between groups for resources evokes similar 
reactions as those of a greater threat.  Inter-group 
competition heightens members’ awareness of the group’s 
objectives leading to greater cooperation and increased 
commitment and cohesion.  Greater cooperation improves 
interpersonal relations within the group, leading to a 
greater confidence in the abilities of the group and a 
decrease in anxiety about acting counter to society.72  
Network organizations leverage this factor when different 
cells compete to display which cell has the greatest 
commitment to the larger organization.  Violence in 
terrorist groups may increase too, as groups compete with 
one another for publicity, praise, and resources.73  
Counterterrorist strategies should leverage the increased 
violent activity as a means of penetrating organizations and 
subgroups which take large risks and result in 
counterproductive reactions from the greater organization 
and the general public.74 
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8. Cyclical Cohesiveness 
Cohesiveness itself increases cohesiveness.  Members 
feel comfortable with their group and are willing to share 
more of themselves with the group.  As this occurs, members 
are more active participants, allowing group leadership to 
slowly increase demands of members and to allow 
internalization to occur.75  Group leadership may use 
rewards as one method for praising increased acts of 
commitment and increasing cohesion.  As group members 
willing participate in activities, praise and esteem serve 
as rewards.  Material rewards often aid in reducing members’ 
lingering hesitance to conform to group standards.76   
9. Rewards 
Rewards may be collective or exchange based.  A group 
is more likely to increase its cohesion when members are 
more interested in the collective benefits to being an 
active member of the group and seeing the group succeed.77  
Collective rewards may be more useful in network situations 
where physical interactions between members are fewer and 
ideology is the overwhelming norm enforcement.  Exchange 
based rewards are beneficial for luring potential recruits 
to the group but this method is difficult to continue and 
threatens the group’s resources.  A traditional hierarchy 
may rely more on exchange rewards to increase conformance to 
norms and cohesion so that members recognize where the 
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rewards originate.  This type of reward increases the 
allegiance of members to the group’s leadership instead of 
the cause.  A group that only relies on this method is 
subject to norm erosion when better comparison or reference 
groups appear with exchange based rewards as well.  The 
methods of command and control must balance competing 
rewards needs with available resources. 
Norms of Influence to Maintain Cohesion 
Initiation Contagion of Norm Deviance 




   -Guilt 
   -Shame Existing Cohesion 
Historical Traditions Rewards 
Table 4.   Norms of Influence to Maintain Group Cohesion 
E.   SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed how groups form, establish, 
and use these norms to facilitate group cohesion.  Group 
cohesion is an important characteristic for creating and 
sustaining illicit groups such as terrorist organizations.  
Indeed, group cohesion forms a core characteristic of the 
normative command and control mechanisms used by terrorist 
groups.  Counterterrorism specialists, if seeking to reduce 
the productive output of terrorist groups, should consider 
degrading the normative command and control processes used 
by terrorist groups.  As missionary organizations, terrorist 
organizations could prove particularly susceptible to 
efforts that reduce group cohesion through attacks on the 
groups’ normative command and control technical.  Given the 
theoretical and empirical findings outlined above, 
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counterterrorism specialists have a range of options for 
reducing group cohesion, such as: 
 Limiting the degree of interaction between members 
so that cohesion processes of co-action and 
facilitation are less likely to occur 
 Limiting the audience for actions of terrorist group 
membership, so the influence of the presence of 
others on group cohesion is reduced 
 Avoiding actions that would contribute to stronger 
group identity by 1) reducing the external danger 
facing group members with lesser commitment than 
others, 2) reducing societal isolation of group 
members, 3) frustrating groups efforts to convince 
group members that the group provides a sufficient 
social, ideological and financial resources, and 4) 
negating the ability of group members to develop a 
shared grievance, and 
 Interdicting the recruitment process so that 
internalization processes are stymied. 
While these recommendations are of a general nature, 
specific examples of how the normative command and 
control processes of terrorist organizations are 
vulnerable to counterterrorism intervention follow in 





III. LITERATURE REVIEW OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
STRUCTURE 
This section discusses organizational structures in use 
by contemporary terrorist organizations: hierarchy, network, 
adhocracy and leaderless resistance.  It posits advantages 
and disadvantages of each organizational form relative to 
norm creation and sustainment, as well as group cohesion. 
A. TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES USED BY 
CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST GROUPS 
Terrorist organizations evolve and change their 
structure depending on the environmental factors, goals of 
the group, and capabilities of the group.  Three dominant 
structures are hierarchies, networks, and adhocracies.  Each 
has been implemented in terrorist organizations successfully 
and not so successfully. The location and operating area of 
an organization also determines what type of structure is 
best for the organization.  For example, the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was initially organized as a 
military unity with battalions and brigades.  This large, 
hierarchical structure was successful so long as the PIRA 
operated and controlled areas of support or sympathy.  In 
this situation, PIRA was able to operate openly.  As 
pressures mounted from authorities though, this level of 
openness could not be upheld and this structure was 
eventually replaced by a compartmented, cellular 
organization discussed later.78  
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1. Hierarchies 
States combating terrorist organizations are the most 
comfortable with hierarchies.  An organization structured 
around a central authority gives enemies a central point of 
gravity to target.  Hierarchies have a clear chain of 
command and information flow.   
a.  Relationship to Group Cohesion 
Members of terrorist organizations must live in a 
certain degree of secrecy even if they live embedded with 
society but most of their affiliations are with the 
terrorist organization.  This secrecy leads to eventual 
isolation from others who do not share the same views.  If a 
group’s members are located in the same geographical area, 
then “isolation and the perception of a hostile environment 
intensify shared beliefs and commitments, making faith in 
the cause imperative.”79  Hierarchical organizations focused 
in a physical location may have increased cohesion because 
of the real threat of danger from operating in a clandestine 
unit.  Closeness in a hierarchy draws on the reassurance 
needs of the group caused by high levels of interaction.  
Bruce Hoffman explains that terrorist organizations which 
are tightly organized around an authoritative center and 
also secret are “likely to be the least tolerant of dissent.  
For ideological or redemptive organizations, dissent may 
equal heresy.”80  Isolation of a group also helps to account 
for the reason why organizations can adhere to a set of 
norms vastly different than those of society. 
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b. Disadvantages of Hierarchies 
Clandestine, hierarchical organizations rely on 
their leadership for ideological and operational guidance.  
The group is highly dependent on its leadership for 
decision-making.  Therefore, in hierarchies, the removal of 
a leader is detrimental to the group even when a clear 
succession plan exists.  The United Red Army (URA) in Japan 
experienced problems during an operation when the leader was 
killed by an accidental explosion from the grenade she was 
carrying.  The other members of the operation were confused 
and did not know how to proceed with their mission without 
her leadership.81 
Conversely, hierarchical organizations struggle to 
survive when the leadership makes all of the decisions 
without listening to advice from lower echelons.  In a 
hierarchy, the group’s leader can lead the group astray.  
Aum Shinrikyo’s organizational structure centered around 
such a leader, Shoko Asahara, in a tightly controlled 
hierarchy.  The danger of this structure was that members 
were unable to counteract the unproductive decisions by 
Asahara that led to the group’s demise.  The group’s 
learning process was constrained, allowing for no 
experimentation of methods.82  Though the group did have 
excellent operational security because of the nature of a 
small, hierarchical organization, but without 
experimentation, this type of group can become stagnant.  In 
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Aum Shinrikyo, the core leadership utilized the group’s own 
talents but never sought outside expertise.  As a result, 
the group was not effective at unconventional warfare 
methods because only a small group put the time and effort 
into reading manuals and practicing instead of seeking help 
from others in the terrorist world who were already 
successful.83 
The closed nature of hierarchies inhibits their 
ability to gain new membership without actively recruiting.  
Whereas looser organizations with high levels of interaction 
with society act like tentacles reaching out to new 
resources, hierarchies must maintain themselves.  The 
structure of a hierarchy inhibits the flow of information as 
different superiors feel that their subordinates do not need 
access to certain operational or strategic decisions.  
Innovation is hindered in small hierarchies despite strong 
bonds of cohesion from close proximity to the group as 
members.   
c. Advantages in Hierarchies 
The flow of communications and information down 
the chain of command in a hierarchy is tightly controlled 
resulting in excellent operational security by preventing 
leaks to authorities.  This command and control style of 
communications though is slower and removing one link in the 
chain of command can inhibit the entire structure.  
Furthermore, if all of the information in the organization 
flows either up or down, leadership may be inundated with 
copious amounts of information that is not useful.  For 
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example, the central planning staff in al Qaeda could become 
overwhelmed with communications from lower levels, hindering 
adaptability and flexibility of the organization.  Thus, in 
a hierarchy organization, the command and control process is 
less able to handle unexpected situations because the high 
tasking level of senior leadership.  Micromanagement is a 
likely and negative effect of hierarchical organizations.84  
Additionally, the bi-directional flow of information in a 
terrorist organization utilizing compartmentalization of 
information to maintain secrecy and only sharing information 
on a need to know basis leads to slower communications.  
Each level in the hierarchy must wait to gain access to 
information and it must travel up and down different chains 
of command in order for two lower level persons working in 
different areas to have access to one another.  While this 
prevents information leaks, the command and control 
decision-making process is slowed because of a slower OODA 
loop.  New information takes too much time to be processed 
by the various compartments in order to act effectively.  
The group leadership with an overall strategy and view of 
the organization can easily make decisions, but risks 
alienating the remainder of the hierarchy who will 
eventually feel that they are not contributing.  These 
individuals may seek extreme groups in which they can have a 
more active role. 
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Networked organizations by their nature are more 
open-structured.  A network is “an informal community of 
individuals who share common norms or values.”85  A network 
is a structure consisting of both physical and nonphysical 
aspects.  Physical qualities of networks include the people 
and equipment used to operate the network.  The nonphysical 
attributes are the relationships and interactions between 
the nodes that maintain the network.  A node in a network is 
a cluster of individuals in closer proximity to one another, 
a subset of the organization.86  Social network analysts 
view a network as a systemic whole that is greater and 
different than its parts.  An essential aim is to show how 
the networked interactions, and how a network itself 
functions to create opportunities or constraints for the 
individual.  Once these aspects are understood, then 
understanding the different types of command and control 
systems available to the group will be more possible.87 
Martha Crenshaw advocates that social networks 
play an important role in terrorist organizations by 
explaining that terrorists do not necessarily seek a sense 
of belonging or personal integration through ideological 
commitment.  The ideological commitment itself may be enough 
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to sustain ideological terrorists, but once on the path of 
terrorism, due to its clandestine nature, these individuals 
need the structure of an organization and the reinforced 
idea of the cause to continue their activity.  This is one 
reason why committed terrorists need some kind of 
affiliation with a group, and the loose, open structure of a 
network organization is sufficient to meet this need.  These 
individuals do not need the group for the sake of hierarchal 
decision-making and resource allocation; rather, they turn 
to their network for ideological reinforcement.88 
In the tentacle-like structure of a network, the 
building of nodes is not evenly balanced.  A larger node, 
because it has more people who have more connections to 
other possible supporters, will attract more new nodes to it 
than nodes with fewer connections.  Most likely, the 
structure will center itself around a few central hubs that 
disseminate the ideology for the group.89  The growth of a 
network may be exponential because dispersed members have 
the ability to admit more members to distant nodes unlike 
hierarchies requiring recruits to join through the same 
entry point.  
b. Size 
Terrorist networks can be large or small 
organizations consisting of numerous organizations inside 
the greater network.  These sub-organizations can even be 
hierarchical in nature and work together with other groups 
without a common hierarchical structure or central command 
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and control.  The absence of an absolute authority is the 
key component allowing innovation and recruiting of outside 
expertise and resources leading to success.90  Without a 
central command and control structure though, members of a 
network must isolate the norms of the group from those of 
society in order to maintain a clear view of the group’s 
mission.  Ideological isolation and network consensus of the 
overarching aim explain how terrorist networks adopt norm 
structures different from those of society without immediate 
physical interactions.  Ideas about how to achieve the 
mission may differ but internal cohesion concerning the 
objective of the mission itself must be consistent across 
the network in order to maintain the network’s structural 
integrity.91 
c. Communications 
Communications in a network differ from those in a 
hierarchy.  The information revolution of the twentieth 
century lowered the cost of communications, allowing 
organizations to stray from tightly structured hierarchical 
command and control processes.  Due to the flattened nature 
of the network, the components of the organization are able 
to be geographically dispersed.  Command and control is 
maintained through communication systems such as satellite 
radio, the internet, and a common ideology.92   
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d. Advantages 
The physical structure of a network is more 
flexible, adaptive, and resilient because each of its 
components acts in loose association with one another.  
Networks consisting of a small number of highly connected, 
larger nodes, called hubs are resilient to systemic shock 
unless a key hub is disrupted or destroyed.93  The network 
allows for multiple learning and innovation opportunities in 
different locations.  The removal of the network’s leader is 
less damaging to the organization than in a hierarchy since 
nodes are accustomed to operating autonomously with less 
oversight.  An example is the ability of al Qaeda to 
continue operations despite no physical contact and limited 
communications with Osama bin Laden.  Command and control is 
dispersed and loosely controlled allowing for innovation but 
also requiring greater coordination to control assets and 
make timely decisions because each node may also have other 
organizations to report to.94 
A cellular structured network also has the 
capacity to carry out more ruthless attacks without fear of 
retribution by authorities because of a lack of central 
authority to attack.  Cells in a network may also feel that 
guilt can be transferred and spread to other cells instead 
of focused on a specific component within a hierarchy.95 
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e. Types of Networks 
Depending on the type of mission, the type of 
network may also vary its structure.  Three types of 
networks are the chain, hub, and all-channel networks.   
In a chain network, information flows along a line 
of separated contacts.  End-to-end communication must travel 
through intermediate nodes.  This type of network is based 
on a who-you-know concept and used in smuggling operations.  
In a hub, distant nodes are tied to a central 
point of communication.  This is not a hierarchy, but in 
order for different, unconnected nodes to communicate, they 
must do so through the central node.  This type of network 
has a way of controlling the flow of information and a 
tighter command and control process than a chain or all-
channel network.  The hub of the network is characterized by 
dense communications.  The members of the core are often 
highly cohesive and reinforce their ties through friendship 
or kinship as well as ethnicity and common experience.  
Innovation, flexibility, and survivability are achieved 
through the more distant nodes which are less likely to be 
damaged in the event of a hub being removed.  Some networks 
insulate the core nodes or hubs from the most distant nodes 
for protection and operational security.  This is a good 
strategy if the core nodes do not partake in tactical 
operations.  Then the authorities have a more difficult time 
pinpointing the group’s leadership and persecuting 
individuals for terrorist actions.  Distant nodes often 
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operate from within communities of support, further 
concealing and protecting their activities.96 
An all-channel network resembles a matrix 
organization because each node has direct connections to all 
other nodes.  This type of network is used in militant, 
decentralized groups.  This type of network is the most 
difficult to organize and sustain because it requires heavy 
communications.  Ideally, an all-channel network 
organization has no central authority to target.  Decision-
making is decentralized, operating on a common ideology.  An 
all-channel network organization may have a slower OODA loop 
because of a lack of central planning authority.  At least a 
hub network has a central point of balance and reference 
point for ideology and overarching strategy.  An all-channel 
network also imposes security risks for the organization 
because each person has access to more information that can 
be leaked to outside authorities.97 
3. The Hybrid Model; Intersection of Networks and 
Hierarchy 
Some social network analysts theorize that networks are 
not really an alternative to hierarchical structures because 
general ideas must originate from some component of the 
organization.  Networks are frequently overlaid on top of 
hierarchical structures.  The U.S. government following 
September 11, 2001, restructured its intelligence community 
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to more closely resemble a network overlaid on a hierarchy 
to allow the cross-flow and coordination of information.98  
4. Adhocracies 
An adhocracy, at least as observed in the terrorism 
domain, more closely resembles a network because of its 
reliance on an overarching ideology.  These terrorist groups 
are sometimes composed of amateurs with little training who 
come together with like-minded others to conduct a terrorist 
attack and then immediately disband following the attack.  
No formal support system exists for these groups.  They rely 
on a network of supporters and sympathizers for resources 
but learn largely from written publications, the Internet, 
or former terrorist group members or demobilized soldiers 
with tactical knowledge.  Without a formal structure, these 
groups are difficult to identify and target.  Their 
membership often consists of kin or close friends and only 
for brief periods of time.99  These groups may not be an 
official part of the larger, more formalized organization 
but still aid the cause of the larger organization.  When 
these smaller groups attack, the large organizations may 
point to their acts as evidence of growing support for the 
cause of the larger organization or they may take credit for 
the attacks themselves.  Adhocracies may signify an early 
stage in the life cycle of a terrorist organization.  As 
members of similar ideologies gain experience and develop a 
need for increased weapons and technology, the world may see 
fewer adhocracies and more formal organizations.   
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5. Disadvantages of Networks and Adhocracies 
a. Command and Control 
While networks are burgeoning in a world of 
increased communications systems, they do have their 
disadvantages.  Command and control is diminished in network 
organizations which can increase the difficulty in 
completing complex tasks requiring vast coordination from a 
distance.  Looser command and control also opens the door 
for interpretation of the organizations ideology and 
interpretation of group norms.  This varied interpretation 
if not monitored increases the likelihood for wide 
experimentation that may invigorate an organization but also 
possibly undermine the organization’s goals.  For example, 
the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) suffered a 
serious setback in 1970, when one of its independent cells 
kidnapped and murdered Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister 
of Labor.  The organization was not prepared for this type 
of action or publicity and had to quickly alter its tactics 
to again establish dominant power over the independently 
operating cell and to maintain its desired image in the 
public.  Divisions resulting from the loose structure of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) have also caused 
setbacks in the peace process as one division or cell 
decides that the main thrust of the organization is settling 
and not adhering to the right principles.  Without a tight 
command and control structure, these autonomous cells have 
more power by being able to disrupt tenuous negotiations 
with a single unauthorized attack.   
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The PIRA has also experienced difficulties because 
of a cellular structure and loose command and control.  A 
coherent strategy is difficult to make acceptable to all 
units of a network, but agreeing on tactics is even more 
arduous.  For example, at times, when the overall leadership 
of PIRA was involved in negotiations or other political 
activity aimed at advancing the group’s agenda by means 
other than violence, individual cells carried out attacks, 
effectively ending the leadership’s efforts.  These 
sectarian actions undermined the group’s attempt to be 
viewed as a legitimate military organization.  Terrorist 
organizations also leverage this feature of their structure 
by refusing to claim responsibility for the actions of 
cellular units in public but secretly supporting them.100 
As a subset of command and control, the control of 
communications in a network is diminished as leadership has 
less control over what kinds of interactions occur.  
Increased interactions provide access points for counter-
terrorist activities.  For example, Ramzi Yousef, organizer 
of the World Trade Center bombing was undone by a new 
component of his terrorist network that turned him in to 
authorities.  Looser command and control processes, like 
those of bin Laden’s operations in Africa in 1998, at U.S. 
embassies allowed outsiders the opportunity to gather 
information about the attacks and pinpoint who ordered 
them.101 
Dismantling the command and control structure of a 
network is a lengthy process because of the resiliency of 
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the nodes.  Yet, if the key nodes can be targeted and 
damaged enough at once, then the command and control process 
may be severed and the organization will temporarily 
struggle to re-establish itself.  Immediately following the 
coalition campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, allied forces 
“dispersed the leadership, eliminated the training camps, 
and greatly reduced the means of communication among 
members, their leaders and the central office, which handled 
logistical support for local operations.”102  These 
operations were an example of a terrorist organization 
exhibiting vulnerability at its main hubs.  Isolating the 
hubs results in non-communicating nodes and a lack of 
coordination.  The initial campaign in Afghanistan seemed 
successful because the global jihad suddenly lacked a 
central command and control structure necessary to 
coordinate large attacks.  Instead, attacks following the 
dismantling of the Taliban and al Qaeda infrastructure in 
Afghanistan have been relegated to attacks conducted by 
singletons or adhocracy groups.103  The subsequent increase 
in terrorist activity though is a demonstration of the 
survivability of a network.  In order to break the 
resiliency of a network, the hubs must be targeted because 
most communications pass through them.  These attacks must 
be simultaneous to prevent new hubs from emerging and 
restoring the network’s capabilities. 
An example of a less robust network hub is the 
Jemaah Islamiyah which proved vulnerable to removal of its 
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leadership.  Local cells not used to autonomous operations 
without specific orders from organizational leadership are 
unable to continue large-scale, coordinated operations.  The 
arrests in 2002-2003, of the group’s leadership, including 
its emir, Baasyir hindered future operations.  As of late 
2003, only central technical bomb experts remain at large, 
and so far, unable to rebuild the network.  Academic analyst 
Marc Sageman predicts the ultimate demise of Jemaah 
Islamiyah as of 2003, but his views should also be taken in 
context of the year and noted for an optimistic tendency.104  
Other plots hampered after the dismantling of the central 
command and control center for al Qaeda include a plot in 
2002, to strike a U.S. or British naval vessel in the 
Straits of Gibraltar.  The plot was discovered before 
implementation as it was unraveling because disconnects 
between the field commander and central control authorities.   
Their decision-making and implementation cycle, or OODA loop 
was slower than their enemies (allies) allowing detection of 
the plot.  Due to these command, control, and communications 
(C3) difficulties, most targets during the period 
immediately following the invasion of Afghanistan were soft 
targets and initiated locally.105 
b. Amateurs and Lack of Formal Support 
Structures 
Amateurs have the advantage of being difficult to 
identify by counter-terrorist forces, but they also lack the 
training and expertise of structured organizations’ members.  
They are liable to make costly mistakes which can tarnish 
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the image of the greater network, like Ramzi Yousef’s group 
responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 
1993.  A lack of formal support structure, especially in 
adhocracies can be a deterrent to organizing larger attacks.  
For example, Ramzi Yousef claimed he was not able to use a 
chemical agent in his attack on the World Trade Center 
because he did not have enough money to buy the required 
amount of cyanide.106 
c. Personal Loyalty 
The basic components of cohesion are more 
difficult to recreate in network organizations which do not 
meet physically with one another.  Creating a sense of 
personal loyalty to the group is difficult without formal 
indoctrination. Large networks can become informal to the 
individual members.107  Networks rely on the fact that the 
individual nodes in a network are often smaller and exhibit 
the norm influences of cohesion found in most groups.  
Difficulties arise in coordinating and ensuring a similar 
interpretation of ideology across a large network consisting 
of hundreds or thousands of small nodes.108 
6. Leaderless Resistance 
Leaderless resistance is “a system of organization that 
is based upon the cell organization, but does not have any 
central control or direction…[A]ll individuals and groups 
operate independently of each other, and never report to a 
                     
106 Tucker, 11. 
107 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 342. 
108 Moghaddam, 30. 
 68
central headquarters or single leader for direction or 
instruction.”109  No single personality or leader stands out 
from the group.  Instead, decisions are consensus-based.  
Most major terrorist organizations require a high degree of 
cooperation, coordination, and support structure 
necessitating a need for trust that is difficult to 
establish using the Internet.110  For this reason, this 
thesis defines this type of organizational structure and 
provides an example of its use but does not focus on it.  
These organizations focus on ideology rather than action, 
lowering the threat level of these types of organizations.  
Note, though, organizations, such as the Earth Liberation 
Front (ELF) once established as a group possesses the 
potential to elevate their aims to those of action instead 
of simply spreading their ideology.  The ELF is radical 
environmental group of unclear origins but consists of cells 
lacking a chain of command or record of membership.  This 
organization is held together by a shared ideology and 
philosophy.111  A relatively small number of the members are 
actual activists.  Most are sympathizers willing to donate 
financial resources for campaigns and transportation to 
stage protests.  Evidence suggests little communication  
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between the cells that do take active measures.  Most acts 
are carried out autonomously with no guidance from other 
members.112 
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Table 5.   Advantages and Disadvantages to Different Types of 
Organizational Structures 
B. DISSEMINATION OF NORMS 
Terrorist organizations use for main channels for 
disseminating its norms externally to society.  These 
channels expose society to the shared social, cultural and 
historical norms of the group. 
1. External 
a. Media Coverage 
The type of organization employed by terrorist 
organizations affects their methods of norm dissemination.  
Organizational leadership and members, scholars, 
journalists, and enemy leadership each implement different 
forms of command and control to communicate, educate, or 
expose shared social, cultural, and historical norms through 
four main channels.  Terrorist organization leadership and 
the mass media’s focus on successful terrorist attacks 
reinforce the perception that the risks of committing 
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terrorist acts are relatively small.  Witnessing the success 
of one group inspires another to also take action.  These 
successes increase cohesion to the overarching organization 
and ideology.  The media’s coverage of attacks allows groups 
to project a feeling of collective grievance and 
perseverance.  Leadership can capitalize on this collective 
feeling to recreate events of the past by conducting attacks 
on the anniversaries of significant events in the group’s 
history.  This action further increases cohesion within the 
group by providing continuity which the media will knowingly 
discuss.113 
b. International Travel 
International travel allows individuals who 
formerly felt disconnected from an organization to meet with 
others with the same feelings and values.  International 
travel spreads a group’s norms when meeting with potential 
recruits while simultaneously creating new potential 
resource pools.   
2. Internal 
a. Education 
Education is used to decide doctrinal debates, 
prevent factions and defections, mitigate fear, and dissuade 
growing resistance to leaders’ demands and political 
agendas. 
 
                     
113 Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional  Political 
Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 
(1993), http://www.jstor.org. (accessed on October 2006). 
 72
b. Dissemination of Intellectual Knowledge 
Dissemination of intellectual knowledge spreads 
group norms.  By carefully controlling the information which 
group members have access to, leadership can expose members 
and potential members to information that will incite 
violent action by justifying the group’s grievances.  Just 
as attacks committed on significant anniversaries will be 
publicized to the general media, these anniversary attacks 
provide opportunity for leadership to educate the group and 
sympathetic audiences on the justification for the group’s 
actions.  Similarly, “naming terrorist cells after leaders 
who have died or people who rebelled under similar 
circumstances in the past” is another opportunity to spread 
intellectual knowledge about the group’s past activities, 
providing continuity and increasing group cohesion.114 
C. TECHNOLOGY ENABLING DISPERSED COHESION 
The increasing availability of technology and 
improvements in secure networking technology are enabling 
terrorist organizations to maintain cohesion despite the 
physical dispersion of their organizations.  The term, 
netwar, is used to describe the developing trend of command, 
control, and communications in terrorist operations.  Netwar 
enables smaller groups to communicate with one another, to 
coordinate operations, and to maintain ideology without the 
input of a central command authority.115  New technologies 
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save organizations both time and money.  Reduced 
transmission time allows communications to travel greater 
distances in less time so that numerous nodes may be 
informed at once.  Increasing availability and the increased 
compatibility between different types of technology allow 
the organization to focus resources elsewhere other than on 
communications.  Communications are becoming robust through 
technology as graphics, voice communications, and streaming 
video are easily passed through secure Internet connections.  
Robust communications allow for a decentralized command and 
control system suited to a network organization because 
information sharing is possible across almost all nodes.  
These communications allow for more detailed and explicit 
cooperation and verification of operational planning.116 
1. Internet Technology 
Terrorist networks are increasingly relying on 
technology for administrative tasks, coordination of 
operations, publicity, recruitment, and communication.  
Before the September 11 2001, attacks, al Qaeda members used 
Yahoo email to communicate.  Mohammad Atta, the alleged 
leader of the operational cell made hotel and airline 
reservations online.  Research on chemical-dispersing powers 
of crop dusters was accomplished online by cell members.117  
The Internet is available in most regions of the world and 
online programs can assist with language translation if 
necessary.  Internet cafes allow terrorists to move and use 
                     
116 Edwards and Zanini, 35-36.  
117 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and 
International Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 
2002/03): 47. 
 74
different IP addresses in order to avoid detection.  These 
factors contribute to the geographical expansion of 
terrorist organizations and their range of operations 
despite tighter travel restrictions in most countries.  
Ramzi Yousef as early as 1995, was using computers to store 
information such as contact lists, potential targets, and 
casing information on the simultaneous hijacking of eleven 
commercial airliners.  Communication through simple email 
enabled the synchronized attacks on the U.S. embassies in 
1998, and New York and the Pentagon in 2001.118 
Al Qaeda uses the Internet to disseminate knowledge 
about the organization to its members and potential 
sympathizers.  The training manual, nicknamed the 
Encyclopedia of Jihad, details how to organize and maintain 
a cell as well as guidelines for executing operations.  The 
organization maintains websites that offer practical advice 
and allow members to connect with one another despite 
distance.119  Manuals with specific guidance are important 
to a network organization’s ability to maintain cohesion and 
a sense of group identity.  This manual is similar to 
handbooks that U.S. military members receive throughout 
their training to provide a reference and a reminder of the 
culture of beliefs within the organization.   
The website, al Neda, is another conduit of information 
propaganda and means of communication for al Qaeda.  Three 
basic themes are emphasized on the website: The West is 
implacably hostile to Islam, the only way to address this 
threat and the only language that the West understands is 
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the logic of violence, and jihad is the only option.120  The 
website provides detailed justifications for the September 
11, 2001, attacks including video clips and messages 
praising the operation.  Besides purely ideological and 
emotional justifications, the website cites specific Islamic 
legal documents to support the organization’s acts and 
killing of civilians.  Poetry is posted on the websites, 
praising the organization’s martyrs and the importance of 
continuing the fight against supposed enemies of Islam.  
These varied written and visual forms of communication 
appeal to a wide range of audiences.121   
In addition to justifying the violence of the 
organization, the website encourages current members of the 
organization by highlighting the group’s successes.  The 
website draws conclusions between the group’s attacks and 
subsequent setbacks to the organization’s enemies, claiming 
responsibility for those setbacks.  These connections 
include the setback to the American economy following the 
attacks as evidenced by the weakening U.S. dollar, the 
downturn of the stock market, and the strain between America 
and her traditional allies.  Additionally, comparisons are 
made between historical successes of jihad seekers and the 
current campaign.  The Islamic mujahedin in the 1980’s were 
invigorated after their defeat of one of the world’s 
superpowers, Russia.  The website strengthens morale by 
drawing parallels between the ultimate collapse of the 
Soviet Union after entering war against the mujahedin and 
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the unwillingness of the American public and government to 
remain in a state of war.122 
Besides maintaining internal cohesion, increasing 
morale, and distributing vital information and allowing 
coordination, the Internet decreases the reliance of 
terrorist organizations on the media for press coverage of 
attacks.  The Internet allows streaming video of attacks to 
be aired immediately and in raw form to group members and 
public websites posting personal videos.  These videos 
enforce ideology, demonstrate the commitment of others in 
the organization, increase morale when operations are 
successful, and provide examples of effective methods of 
attack.  No longer do terrorists need to wait for the media 
to be alerted to an operation by an onlooker or place the 
call themselves to a local media station.  Groups such as 
Aum Shinrikyo, Israel’s Kahane Chai, the Popular front for 
the Liberation of Palestine, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, 
and Peru’s Shining Path maintain user-friendly official or 
unofficial websites, and almost all are accessible in 
English.  Maintaining these websites allows messages of 
ideology and long-term goals to be disseminated to any part 
of the world with access to the internet.  This access does 
not need to be permanent and can be accomplished in most 
coffee internet shops.  Command and control is accomplished 
by disseminating information to large numbers of individuals 
and hoping that ideology is strong enough to keep the group 
heading in the same direction.  This is a looser form of 
command and control but in a network organization is an 
efficient means of communication. This method would also 
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allow members to write back and communicate up the chain of 
command for clarification or support in organizing 
operations.123 
Websites with posted of videos and messages provide 
organizations with a way to communicate their ideology and 
ultimate desires without being filtered or staged by the 
media.124  This allows the groups to focus on their ideology 
and own justifications for violence rather than only 
focusing on the violent actions taken to achieve the group’s 
goals. Email was routine among the members of the Hamburg 
clique and helped them sustain emotional closeness and 
common beliefs despite physical separation by communicating 
shared meanings, past events, and internal jokes.125  The 
LTTE website highlights attacks by the Sri Lanken army on 
Tamil civilians but does not show images of the LTTE suicide 
bombings.126  The LTTE uses the Internet to such an extent 
that Sri Lanken Tamils around the world have access to Eelam 
newspapers, radio, and propaganda in the form of electronic 
messages filled with maps, flags, and other symbols of the 
group.  Internet sites supported by the LTTE even include an 
online yellow pages for contact information about other 
Eelam Tamils.  Online chat rooms, discussion forums, and 
blogs now provide further avenues for diaspora to connect 
and to discuss their common issues and desires.127  The 
Internet is proving to be more useful than just a forum for 
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discussion.  Its uses are being incorporated into procedures 
used to plan, execute, and review attacks.  The LTTE, 
reportedly carries out specific after-action reviews of 
operational successes and failures to strengthen their 
group.  These after-action reviews can then be transformed 
into knowledge shared when publications and training manuals 
are also incorporated.128   
The LTTE is not the only organization effectively 
utilizing the Internet. As al Qaeda has been forced to 
decentralize its leadership and training facilities, the 
Internet has increasingly filled the void left by the 
destruction of the organization’s physical command and 
control center of operations.  The May 16, 2003, attacks in 
Casablanca are a testament to the ability of a network using 
technology, specifically the internet to continue learning 
and to disseminate information. Members of the operating 
cell took part in training conducted in nearby caves one 
weekend shortly before the operation.  As a result of the 
hasty training, the cell experienced difficulty 
manufacturing bombs of the correct weight and reliability.  
The operation was postponed, and in an effort to save the 
operation, the Internet was used to research a lighter and 
more reliable formula for the construction of the bombs.  
Using the dispersion of technology information, the bombs 
were quickly built the day before the operation took place.  
This scenario highlights both advantages and disadvantages 
to network organizations.  Formal training is difficult to 
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achieve and may result in shoddy operations.  On the other 
hand, the use of the Internet and subsequent technology 
enables a quick preparation for an operation increasing the 
difficulty of locating and preventing an operation.   
2. Other than Internet Technology 
The Internet is not the only means of technology 
enabling organizations to maintain cohesion through 
dispersion.  Al Qaeda is known to use cellular telephones, 
text messages, instant messaging online, encrypted websites, 
blog discussions, email, and chat rooms.  These types of 
technologies are more difficult to discover and to trace in 
a timely manner if well-encrypted.  Administrative tasks, 
research, information sharing, coordination, and ideological 
reinforcement are possible through these means of 
communication.  Cells that are geographically isolated have 
methods of daily communication with central leadership or 
other cells in order to maintain a sense of group identity.  
Jemaah Islamiyah uses the Internet and text messages with 
code words to pass instructions.  For example, the 
“suspected suicide bomber in the attack on the J.W. Marriot 
Hotel in 2003, a JI operative known as Asmal, reportedly 
sent a coded email message expressing an intention to ‘marry 
as soon as possible,’ which Indonesian police interpreted to 
mean he was ready to launch the suicide attack.”129 
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Between September 11, 2001 and April 2006, Osama bin 
Laden issued at least twenty-four known statements.130  
These statements to the public and the organization were 
possible through technology.  With basic knowledge of 
satellite communication systems, Osama bin Laden “allegedly 
uses satellite phone terminals to coordinate the activities 
of the group’s dispersed operative and has even devised 
countermeasures to ensure his safety while using such 
communications systems.”  One physical countermeasure 
devised is to have the satellite phones travel in separate 
convoys from bin Laden and to operate them from varying 
locations in order to prevent the tracking of the signal and 
discovery of Osama bin Laden’s location.131 
3. Disadvantages of Relying on Technology 
Relying too much on technology does have its 
disadvantages for terrorist organizations.  Regardless of 
the quality of technical communications, the element of 
personal interaction is still missing when all 
communications are handled through the Internet or other 
means of technology.  Spoken conversations are difficult to 
capture or prove, but technology, regardless of how well 
encrypted it is, leaves a trail of information.  For 
example, the computer captured in Manila in January 1995, 
belonged to Abdul Basit Karim and provided the outline of 
the Bojinka plot.  Discarded computers, damaged computers, 
or captured computers, even if information is thought to 
have been protected and encrypted still exists on the 
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computers’ hard drive.  The organizational structure and 
links between nodes of the global salafi jihad led by al 
Qaeda is understood greatly in part to data collected from 
the hard drives of captured computers in Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East.132  By relying on technology 
for all command and control objectives in a dispersed 
organization, the organization is committing itself to 
continually upgrading its technology resources which may 
divert too many of the organization’s overall resources to 
continue effective operations in the field.133 
If an organization does not continually upgrade its 
technology, the group’s command and control systems will 
become vulnerable to outside attack.  As both sides of the 
War on Terrorism improve their means of surveillance and 
code-breaking, if a terrorist organization loses the 
resources to continue upgrades, interception and monitoring 
of communications is likely.  Already, anti-terrorist 
entities have been able to use intercepted cell phone calls 
to track and capture leaders of the global jihad.  Anti-
terrorist organizations must be careful not to allow 
notification of terrorist organizations that their 
communications are being intercepted.  For example, when 
Osama bin Laden discovered his satellite communications were 
being intercepted, he abruptly stopped utilizing this form 
of communication.  While scholar Marc Sageman suggests that 
bin Laden’s forced hiding and reluctance to use satellite 
communications is hindering his ability as a leader, this 
thesis proposes that a robust organization will eventually 
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find other means of communication utilizing technology 
upgrades.134  The important take away from this example is 
the necessity of state governments fighting terrorists such 
as Osama bin Laden to be able to conduct their operations 
without the media reporting their successes or failures to 
the public and subsequently the terrorists themselves. 
Other examples of anti-terrorist successes include the 
FBI’s use of the program, Carnivore, to track email 
correspondence at least twenty-five times reported by 
“Newsweek.”  This tracking of email is allegedly responsible 
for thwarting various attacks.  Now that the terrorists know 
which program was being used though, they may be able to 
find other means around the program’s capabilities.135  If 
an organization’s resources can be depleted or the focus 
shifted to other items besides maintaining secure command 
and control systems, then anti-terrorist organizations may 
be able to continue tracking their messages.  Already, the 
increasing difficulty in the use of satellite phones due to 
monitoring may be causing a gradual breakdown in direct 
communications between al Qaeda’s leadership and smaller 
nodes.  This breakdown of communications may result in a 
splintering of the organization and increases in attacks as 
nodes undertake their own operations without guidance from 
the Central Staff.136 
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D. SUMMARY  
A final note addressing the specific components leading 
to different types of terrorist organizational structures 
and command and control schemes is the idea that command and 
control functions within organizations are evolving 
structures.  They change according to the task at hand, 
making categorizing and generalization of terrorist groups 
more difficult. The style of command and control that works 
for one hierarchy may not work for another hierarchical 
group and likewise for network organizations.  The 
mechanisms used to maintain cohesion in each type of 
organizational structure also vary.  Hierarchies maintain 
cohesion through exchange-based relationships.  Punishments 
and rewards reinforce group norms.  Networks maintain 
cohesion through personal ties of kin and friendship to 
overcome physical separation.  Networks cannot use exchange-
based mechanisms to maintain cohesion, and instead, rely on 
strong ideological foundations.  Adhocracies and leaderless 
resistance groups are similar to networks but lack a formal 
command and control architecture to disseminate a common 
ideology.  Cohesion is ideologically-based for these groups 
but is more likely to have a shorter life-span.  Instead of 
counter-terrorism studies focusing on developing a formula 
for the life cycle of a terrorist group, the focus should 
include the cultural context of each potential terrorist 
organization.137  
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: HISTORICAL NETWORKS 
This section of the thesis examines historical network 
organizations.  The emphasis rests on networks, as these are 
the emergent types of organizations in today’s world.  These 
organizations are studied in order to provide examples of 
their structure and mechanisms for creating cohesion.  The 
final chapter of this thesis discusses how these terrorist 
groups use their influence on society. 
A. PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) 
1. Pre-1977 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRA) 
activities were mostly conducted out without direct 
intervention or control by the General Headquarters’ 
leadership.  Individual PIRA units had significant 
operational freedom even before the group reorganized into a 
cell-based structure in the 1970’s, although the 
reorganization further strengthened that independence.138  
Until 1977, the PIRA was organized similarly to a 
traditional military organization with brigades, battalions, 
and companies.  Despite a clear hierarchy, maintaining 
internal security was difficult because information was not 
compartmentalized enough.  The flow of information was not 
inhibited at any point.  This fact is a reflection of the 
organization’s leadership and social context because other 
military organizations implement “need-to-know” policies.  
Inside informers had too much access to information 
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resulting in authorities often hampering their operations 
with arrests.  This lack of internal security is mentioned 
in the 1977 reorganization document.  Until reorganization, 
the PIRAs attempted to establish control over their units 
using intimidation tactics or even dressing up as the 
police.139  According to the norm influences of cohesion, a 
group using punishment to keep its members in line with its 
norms is a sign of internal division. Furthermore, too much 
violence against one’s own group members can result in 
disillusionment with the group’s cause and result in further 
internal problems.  Reorganization loomed imminent as 
security forces became more skillful at leveraging internal 
weaknesses in the organization and its communications 
processes.  As this penetration threatened the success and 
validity of the organization, reorganization was 
implemented.  Instead of conducting meetings in the open and 
using well-known methods of communication, the group was 
forced to become more decentralized, minimizing the level of 
communications in order to prevent authorities from pre-
empting operations.140 
2. Post-1977 Reorganization 
Following the reorganization of 1977, PIRA was based on 
a cellular network structure.  These cells were built around 
individual service units comprised of four or five 
Volunteers establishing a family-like group.  Each cell 
contained a quartermaster responsible for weapons and 
explosives, an intelligence officer, and at least two 
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operators responsible for conducting shootings and bombings.  
Communication between cells was minimal as it was with the 
leadership, based on a need-to-know basis.141  The 
leadership of PIRA recognized it could no longer attempt 
strong oversight of the individual conduct of its members.  
The leadership took the opposite approach after the 
reorganization and seldom criticized actions by individual 
cells.  They were now aware that too much negative 
reinforcement leads to dissent.  This is an example of 
deviant group behavior leading to a narrowing and refocusing 
of the group’s norms as a whole.”142 
This network organization was largely successful though 
it did highlight some challenges to network organizations.  
One year after reorganization in 1978, there were 465 fewer 
charges against the group than in 1977.  One explanation for 
this might be that the reorganization cut the core 
membership to about three hundred activists.  While this 
reduction increased operational and internal security, it 
diminished some of the group’s capabilities.  Command and 
control structure is a balance that must evolve according to 
the group’s needs.  In this instance, the organization 
reduced its capabilities in order to survive.143 
B. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is an 
umbrella group for various factions that compete and 
cooperate with one another at different times.  Factional 
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fighting characterizes the Palestinian resistance movement 
as Fatah, the dominant group does not have a monopoly of 
power. As many as twenty-one smaller factions comprise the 
PLO and alternate between competition and cooperation. Even 
though the victims of each competing group’s violence are 
indiscernible, the idea is to influence other groups within 
the movement.  The PLO is an example of competition between 
groups leading to increased cohesion for the larger 
organization and within each smaller faction.144  
1. Cooperation 
The PLO does not reserve its resources only for the 
factions within the PLO.  The PLO in the 1980’s actively 
participated in the training of at least forty different 
terrorist groups.  These groups were located in Asia, 
Africa, North America, Europe, and the Middle-East.  
Training took place in the PLO’s camps located in Jordan, 
Lebanon, and the Yemen.  The PLO assisted these groups with 
training, weapons supply, and logistical support in exchange 
for their members’ services in the future.  The advantage of 
this type of cooperation between terrorist groups is the 
combining of assets and creation of ties of loyalty.  The 
disadvantage, though, is potentially arming a group’s next 
adversary.  As groups compete for power and resources 
including the support of the people, alliances between 
groups that previously aided one another can become 
muddled.145 
                     
144 Tucker, 4. 
145 Bruce Hoffman,  “The Internationalization of Terrorism,” in 
Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 84. 
 89
2. Competition 
The rise of terrorist attacks abroad began in 1968 as 
the PFLP challenged the power of the Fatah.  These attacks 
included hijackings and airport attacks which received a 
large amount of publicity.  The attacks had to be large to 
call for attention and change. Until this point, no serious 
contenders existed within the PLO.  Few opportunities 
existed for individuals or factions to distinguish 
themselves.  Once a spree of terrorism began, even the 
smallest factions were able to capitalize by claiming 
responsibility or plotting an attack of their own.  An 
apparent lack of risk and a high level of publicity 
encouraged the attacks to continue as factions competed for 
power within the PLO.  Even the Fatah at times, was 
compelled to participate in this struggle for power.  
Examples include the Black September Group led by Salah 
Khalaf and operations of Group 17 responsible for murders in 
Barcelona and Cyprus in September and October of 1985.146 
3. Media Coverage 
The factional fighting was successful because of media 
coverage.  Without this coverage, the utility of the attack 
is largely wasted.  The attack impacts the direct victims 
but the wider audience is largely left uninformed.  In order 
for a terrorist group to impose change in society, the 
masses must be influenced to pressure their leadership for 
change.  Without media coverage of terrorist attacks, the 
terrorist groups lose their ability to influence large 
audiences.  Limiting the media’s coverage of terrorist 
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attacks seems like an easy solution to combating terrorists, 
but in free societies, media coverage is a component of that 
freedom.147 
4. Structure 
The PLO provides an example of a long-term terrorist 
organization structured in a hub network configuration.  
Each major faction comprises a different hub with its 
respective supporters forming more distant nodes.  The PLO 
is also an example of inter-group competition leading to 
increased cohesion within a group as each faction wants to 
prove its commitment to the overarching cause and that its 
particular tactics are the best.  The PLO is successful 
because of its network structure overlaid a hierarchy of 
common principles.  Furthermore, the PLO is at times 
directly and others indirectly supported by neighboring Arab 
states.  While state supported terrorist organizations have 
more resources, backing by more than one competing state may 
eventually cause problems for the PLO if these supporting 
states disagree about the use of the organization.  Not 
having its own territory and relying on state support 
hinders the group’s flexibility and could even redirect the 
group’s goals at times depending on political situations of 
the neighboring Arab states.  The various factions within 
the PLO and varying support from other states hamper peace 
process attempts with Israel.148 
 
                     
147 Bruce Hoffman,  “Terrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion,” in 
Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 132. 
148 Rapoport, 53. 
 91
C. HEZBOLLAH 
The Hezbollah is another umbrella terrorist 
organization.  Created by Ayatollah Khomeini, Hezbollah’s 
organization evolved from a series of favors between 
Khomeini and others such as Hafez al-Assad who was 
considered a secular Muslim.  Khomeini supported Assad by 
having Moussa Sadr proclaim Assad’s sect of Islam part of 
the Shi’ite faith.  This support helped stabilize Assad’s 
dictatorship in Syria.  Conversely, Khomeini called on Assad 
for favors such as receiving help training terrorists in 
Lebanon and by giving Khomeini’s friends and allies Syrian 
passports to avoid surveillance or capture by the Iranian 
intelligence service.  Khomeini also collaborated with other 
terrorists like Arafat and the PFLP.  These collaborations 
began a network of favors that would eventually converge 
into a more formal organization.149   
1. Structure 
Hezbollah’s structure evolved according to its needs.  
It is governed by a seventeen-member Supreme Shura Council 
with both a political and a military wing.  The military 
wing is referred to as Islamic Resistance, controlled by 
regional commanders.150  The group is segmented according to 
skill, stemming from the organization’s early structure of  
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loosely networked militias.  These segments consist of 
fifty-man units organized along lines of geography and 
skill-task.151 
Hezbollah is an example of a network maintaining strong 
cohesion without rigid structure.  The command and control 
structure of Hezbollah is a network with an integrated 
hierarchy overlaid on it.  Though not institutionalized 
until later, the “small, clique-like nature of Hezbollah’s 
core of skilled operatives is also the likely explanation 
for the highly effective command and control of the group 
evidenced even in the early 1980’s.”152  Fighting clerics 
are assigned to each unit.  These clerics receive their 
authority from the Shura Council and to an extent, Iran.  
They do not hold political positions within the 
organization.  Instead, they are trained in guerilla-warfare 
tactics and serve as the horizontal cross-unit links as well 
as reporting up the chain of command to the Shura Council.  
This structure resembles a matrix network combined with the 
integrated hierarchy and network structure.  This mixture 
allows the smaller units to quickly translate strategic 
decisions into tactical operations.153   
2. Security 
Despite its network structure with many horizontal 
links between units, Hezbollah implements a tighter command 
and control structure over its components than the PLO.  
Security in a matrix organization is a potential hazard, but 
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the tighter command and control structure help prevent 
opportunity for security leaks.  Operational security is 
maintained because leaders do not disseminate plans until 
operationally necessary.154  The command and control system 
is layered enough that the organization does not rely on the 
top level leadership to provide the strategic initiative for 
the group in the event of the loss of that leadership.  In 
1992, then leader of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, was killed, 
yet the organization maintained its campaign against 
Israel.155 
D. MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS 
Other organizations that are examples of historical 
networks include Marxist revolutionary groups.  Marxist 
revolutionary groups advocated the rise of the proletariat 
against the bourgeoisie.  This type of mass uprising 
necessitates widespread and fast flow of information.  The 
Red Army Faction, for example, was part of a larger 
organizational network, receiving support from Warsaw Pact 
members and training from Middle Eastern terrorist groups.  
Marxist revolutionary groups cooperated with one another 
because they had a common cause.  The links between each of 
these smaller groups, like the RAF, designate the existence 
of a larger network structure.  Marxist revolutionary groups 
ultimately did not succeed because each group had a slightly 
differing ideology than the next group. Splintering of 
ideology led to structural complexity as the network had to 
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evolve according to which groups ventured too far from the 
main groups’ focus.  As a result, cohesion between the 
groups eventually decreased.  This example demonstrates the 
need for large network organizations comprised of smaller 
groups to maintain a strong, overarching ideology.156 
E. LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) 
1. Supportive Population 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
demonstrates two principles of cohesion. First, a network 
can succeed when based amongst a supportive population based 
on family ties.  Second, a dispersed population of 
supporters in the form of a diaspora can increase resources 
and capabilities for an organization.  The LTTE, located in 
Sri Lanka, is held together by the bonds of cohesion between 
family members and those between castes in Sri Lanken 
society.  A terrorist organization based out of a community 
where most members have family and friends creates a 
community of protection for the organization.  For example, 
the Vvt Township have connections between the town’s 
smugglers, fishermen, and tradesmen.  Local law enforcement 
connected to the criminals have links to the criminals 
either through kin or close friends, and therefore, 
tolerance is given to many of their activities.  Likewise, 
the criminals respectfully do not hassle the law enforcement 
personnel.157 
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2. Diaspora Constituency 
The second principle that the LTTE demonstrates is a 
network drawing support from a diaspora constituency.  The 
LTTE’s external organizational support originates from 
migrant communities in Europe, North America, and Australia.  
This diaspora allows the LTTE to expand its network globally 
by opening offices and subsequent cells around the world.  
These widespread offices operate deep sea-going ships used 
for drug trafficking and weapons procurement.  Migrant 
communities provide an opportunity for these organizations 
to gain resources because migrants often move to countries 
or regions of more affluence such as Europe and North 
America.158  Widespread diaspora also provide an opportunity 
for potential recruits or supporters.  The LTTE used its 
diaspora effectively and had offices and cells in at least 
fifty-four countries by 1998.159  
F. SHINING PATH (SENDEROSO LUMINOSO, SL) 
A Latin America terrorist organization, the Shining 
Path (SL) is composed of loose, autonomous cells in the 
countryside.  This group demonstrates the ability for a 
strong leader to maintain a group’s cohesion.  A second 
principle the SL demonstrates is the weakness a network 
exhibits when the group is focused more on the leadership 
instead of ideology.  This group was primarily located in 
the countryside and gained strength from its isolation.  A 
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group with little to no outside resources is more likely to 
accept the ideology of a leader when no competing influences 
exist. This group coalesced around Abimael Guzman for 
guidance and ideology.  With Guzman’s guidance, SL enjoyed 
success due to his detailed writings and ideologies.160   
1. Structure 
The SL was organized as a network overlaid on a 
hierarchy.  The hierarchy was composed of a National 
Directorate and a Central Committee.  Guzman derived his 
authority from these two entities which oversee the 
organization’s operations.  Rank and file members of the 
organization executed operations as autonomous units after 
receiving operational orders from the two central decision-
making units.  Recruitment and target selection is handled 
in a centralized manner by regional commands, National 
Directorate, and Central Committee.161  This was a more 
tightly controlled command and control structure for the 
strategic operations of the organization than the PLO, PIRA, 
Hezbollah, or Marxist organizations.  The benefits of target 
selection handled by centralized command include the ability 
of a central authority to prevent autonomous cells from 
choosing targets that may hurt the image or cause of the 
organization.  One disadvantage of this style of command and 
control is the central decision-making entities can become 
overburdened with target selection and do not have access to 
current, in-the-field information. 
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2. Local Support 
The SL carried out numerous campaigns to increase local 
support.  The SL, at times, used brutal tactics that may 
have alienated potential support instead of increasing it.  
In order to reach the local masses, the SL rounded up and 
executed local landowners before distributing the lands to 
the peasantry.162  In a more direct tactic, the SL seized 
schools, holding the officials at gunpoint while members of 
the SL lectured students on the aims of the revolution.163 
3. Cohesion 
In the 1980’s, the group suffered after some of 
Guzman’s top advisers were arrested by authorities, but 
cohesion was maintained within the group.  This strong 
cohesion was maintained because of Guzman’s requirement of 
absolute commitment to the organization in order to become a 
member.  Another factor of the group’s cohesion is that 
members of the group do not have competing influences for 
their loyalties.  Since the group operated in isolation and 
Guzman largely avoided contact with the media, the SL was 
able to operate according to its own standards.  This 
isolation, though, proved to decrease the group’s membership 
over the long-run because of the group’s rigid standards.  
Since the group refused to affiliate itself with any other 
group, its influence was restricted only to its own members 
and the immediate victims of its attacks.   
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4. Isolation 
Problems of isolation will be highlighted later when 
discussing the role of the media and removal of the group’s 
leadership.164  Before the capture or death of Guzman, 
terrorism scholars hypothesized that the group’s solid 
commitment to its principles would enable the group to 
maintain its operations after the removal of Guzman.  
Scholars theorized his removal would create a legend or 
martyr for his followers to use as ideological guidance.  
When Guzman was later captured by authorities and displayed 
to the public as a man struggling to stay alive, the group 
actually lost much of its momentum because the public no 
longer feared the organization, making its operations 
ineffective.  The isolation of the group also proved to be 
ultimately detrimental to the group’s survival because 
members had begun to worship Guzman instead of his actual 
ideology. As a result, the organization began to crumble.165 
G. LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC (FLQ) 
Le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) operating out of 
Canada is historically organized in a network fashion.  
Cells within the network are comprised of five to seven 
members.  These units operate largely independently under 
the ideological banner of creating a separate Quebec.  
Various cells competed for power throughout the lifecycle of 
the organization.  At times, when a dominant cell existed, 
the organization seemed to have a more central command 
style.  As Canadian authorities tracked these cells and 
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forced them to remain underground in hiding, other cells 
were provided the opportunity to compete for power.  This 
competition for power created conflict between different 
cells about the best tactics to use to reach a common goal.  
This conflict is highlighted by the kidnapping and death of 
La Pierre.    Compartmentalization of cells was not enforced 
but determined by the various initiatives undertaken by 
different cells.  The looseness of the organization allowed 
for the group to reorganize itself quickly but also led to 
problems of which particular cell other units should follow 
during times of crisis.166 
H. ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) 
1. Structure 
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorist organization 
operates in the Philippines.  This organization is a network 
overlaid on a hierarchy.  The organization lacks a clearly 
defined ideological or religious motivation.  The stated 
goal of the group is to establish an independent, theocratic 
Islamic state within the Philippines.  The ASG relies on 
loose affiliation with other like-minded individuals or 
groups such as al Qaeda.167  For example, Osama bin Laden 
dedicated resources to working with the ASG.  He sent 
mujahideen to the Philippines to train selected ASG members.  
Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, 
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established training networks in the Philippines through 
Islamic charities.  Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani was the 
group’s initial leader.  Under his guidance, the group was 
organized in a hierarchical fashion.  The organization had 
an Islamic Executive Council (IEC) comprised of fifteen 
leaders of different branches within the organization.  Two 
special committees existed under the IEC; “first committee 
was the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group, in 
charge of fund-raising and Islamic education, and the second 
was the Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee, in charge of 
agitation and propaganda.”168 The military component of the 
ASG was comprised of three different branches: the 
Demolition Team, the Mobile Force Team, and the Campaign 
Propaganda Team.  The Demolition Team was responsible for 
building weapons and actual mission implementation.  The 
Mobile Force Team was responsible for command and control 
aspects of military operations, such as planning, 
communication, and coordination.  The Campaign Propaganda 
Team was responsible for gathering information necessary to 
the mujahideen and educating others about the mission of the 
group.  This organizational structure succeeded under the 
leadership of Janjalani, but after his death in 1998, the 
group suffered severe setbacks. 
2. Operations 
Following the loss of Janjalani, the group’s IEC no 
longer functioned and the group became highly factional.  
The two main factions now operate out of Basilan and Sulu.  
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After the organization’s disintegration of the cohesion, the 
group’s tactics changed.  No longer did the group focus on 
intricate operations.  Instead, the organization resorted to 
kidnappings and piracy in the region.  Operations are 
carried out by smaller units and not necessarily approved 
beforehand by a central authority.  The cooperation of the 
government of the Philippines in the War on terrorism has 
resulted in a further lockdown of the group’s activities and 
a decrease in the amount of support it receives from other 
organizations such as al Qaeda and the MNLF.169 
I. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI) 
1. Structure 
The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a terrorist organization 
based in Indonesia and is a combination of a hierarchy with 
cellular components.  The JI has four different regional 
branches that consist of several branches known as mantiqis 
and wakalahs (districts and sub-distrcits).  These branches 
contain operational units of four or five members per unit.  
The organization is similar to that of al Qaeda in that it 
separates its operational cells from its planning, 
intelligence, and surveillance cells.170   
2. Cooperation 
This organization works with other terrorist 
organizations to acquire training and resources.  These 
groups include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
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which JI worked with from 1996 to 2000 in a Mindanao 
training camp.  At the camp, recruits were provided with 
weapons training and sharp-shooting skills and worked with 
other regional terrorist organizations.171   
3. Cohesion 
In order to maintain cohesion in a large network, the 
leadership of the organization relies on close ties of 
family and friends. This organization does not rely solely 
on a strong ideology to create cohesion, but “by an 
intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seems 
like a giant extended family. In many cases, senior JI 
leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to 
their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network 
secure.”172 Though, in an organization this large, dissent 
is visible. Internal differences are rising due to 
disagreement over the selection of targets, such as the 
Marriot Hotel bombing on August 5, 2003, which killed 
numerous Indonesian workers.  Other disagreements about the 
type of jihad to pursue may also lead to a deterioration of 
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J. BEGINNINGS OF MODERN ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS: EGYPT 
1. Structure 
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, small, clandestine 
groups in Egypt were beginning to emerge.  These groups in 
Cairo were “autonomous, but their leaders met regularly to 
[detail] a general strategy.”174  The origin of Tanzim al-
Jihad in Egypt was based on these loose associations of 
local groups from Cairo and Upper Egypt.  They did not 
necessarily agree on tactics but on strategy. 
Operating in the context of their environment, we see 
that current terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda organized 
as networks are not new phenomenon, but an extension of 
their original structure.  The members of these first 
networked groups in the 1970’s and 1980’s later became 
mujahideen in the Soviet Union-Afghanistan War of the 
1980’s, and then some stayed to become the next generation 
of jihad trainers in al Qaeda.  
2. Operations 
The tanzim al-Jihad in Egypt demonstrates the 
advantages and disadvantages of network organizations in 
terrorist groups.  The assassination of Egyptian President, 
Anwar Sadat was a target of opportunity and chosen out of 
revenge for the death of a blood relative.  This 
assassination highlights the ability of networks to act 
quickly and to negate the need for rigid command and 
control.  Leaders of the various groups met on September 26, 
1981, to discuss the possibility of assassinating the 
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president.  The operation was carried out on October 6, 
1981.  The four members of the commando unit met for the 
first time shortly before the operation.175 
The aftermath of the assassination highlights potential 
difficulties that networked organizations may face after an 
operation not unanimously supported by leaders or not 
instigated by a hierarchy’s top leadership.  Members of 
Tanzim al-Jihad sentenced to jail experienced cleavages.  
The Cairo branch under al-Zumur advocated a violent coup 
whereas the Saidi group desired mobilization of the masses 
to overthrow the government.176  Regardless of cleavages 
about the specific tactics involved, the members of the 
group were largely united in their overarching mission.  
After being released from prison, most went to Afghanistan 
to continue the jihad against the Soviets.  This 
demonstrates both the strength and weaknesses of a 
hierarchy.  Cohesion was maintained amongst these members 
even in prison and despite factional differences about how 
to fight. 
K. SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL NETWORKS 
Terrorist organizations now face difficulty in 
establishing a central command and control center.  The 
countries these organizations historically operate from are 
increasingly coming under international pressure to better 
police their own territories.  As a result, organizations 
are finding training opportunities more difficult.  In turn, 
the structure of these groups is evolving to meet the 
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changing environments from which they are operating.  As 
security measures increase against these groups, terrorist 
organizations across the board display a capability to 
evolve into flattened organizations operating as networks. 
Often, these organizations began as loose networks, evolved 
into groups with central command and authority, and are now 
evolving again into network-like structures, utilizing 
technology in order to maintain a command and control 
system. 
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Table 6.   Summary of Terrorist Organizations: Strengths, 
Weaknesses, and Mechanism of Cohesion.   
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Note that groups relying on strong leadership encounter 
difficulties maintaining cohesion after leadership changes.  
Organizations with strong, cohesiveness are able to continue 
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V. CURRENT TERRORIST NETWORKS: AL QAEDA 
A. AL QAEDA AS AN EVOLVING ORGANIZATION 
Following the U.S. led coalition operations in 
Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the organizational 
structure of al Qaeda was forced to change.  Academic 
scholar, Marc Sageman, argues that al Qaeda since September 
2001, has more closely resembled a “global jihad 
movement.”177  The term movement and comparing al Qaeda to a 
social movement is not fully accepted by the entire academic 
community, but Marc Sageman’s concept of an evolving 
organization is widely agreed upon.  Without looking at the 
origins of al Qaeda, scholars discuss the change of 
structure from a highly centralized, hierarchical 
organization to a flatter, more loosely connected network.  
This current network is possible through technology using 
the internet to connect units and to develop a command and 
control system.  By looking at the origins of this 
organization, another network is discovered.  The first al 
Qaeda network relied upon personal relationships cemented 
through marriages and past combat experience.   
B. POST-SOVIET UNION-AFGHANISTAN WAR 
1. Structure 
The end of the Cold War resulted in states toning down 
their support for terrorist groups.  Terrorist organizations 
were no longer able to depend on protection and aide from 
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state sponsors, and instead, restructured in order to learn 
how to operate independently.178  Following the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, traditionalist jihadists 
returned home, not wanting to continue a jihad against 
traditionally Western-held lands nor secular Muslim lands. 
The mujahideen that remained in Afghanistan were the 
Salafists, the extremists who wanted to purge Muslim lands 
of non-believers and secular Muslims.  In 1992, the militant 
Islamic movement was not formally organized.179  Growing 
sentiments were expressed among smaller, local jihadist 
groups.  Osama bin Laden, outraged by infidels protecting 
Islamic holy sites in his home country of Saudi Arabia, 
began to coalesce these smaller, local jihads under a new 
banner of al Qaeda.  He provided these smaller groups with 
training, financial, and logistical support.  Gradually, al 
Qaeda became a formal organization with a cluster of 
dedicated members centered around the leadership and the 
resources of Osama bin Laden.  This organization supported 
the global Salafi jihad.  While smaller jihad groups 
received resources from Osama bin Laden, he did not fully 
provide for these groups.  He advocated a network structure 
during this time period by only giving these groups the 
necessary seed money to begin their operations.  He then 
expected these groups to take on the responsibility of 
organizing and financing themselves with either their own 
money or through Muslim charity organizations.180 
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As training facilities became more focal to the 
resources provided by al Qaeda, the organization developed a 
more centralized structure.  During the mid-1990’s, high 
ranking members such as the chair of al Qaeda’s military 
committee, the trainer of bin Laden’s personal bodyguards, 
and his personal secretary had hands-on influence with day-
to-day operations.  This inner group developed into what is 
known as the Central Staff cluster.  Owing to the close, 
personal relationships developed during the Soviet Union-
Afghanistan war, the Central Staff organized finances, 
handled logistics, and surveyed potential targets without 
documented organizational rules and procedures.181  Personal 
handling of operations by the Central Staff ceased in 1998. 
2. Far Jihad 
On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda simultaneously bombed U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.  This operation 
began a new phase in al Qaeda operations.  First, these 
targets represented a far jihad versus a near jihad.  They 
took place outside of Muslim lands, and the victims were 
mostly noncombatants.  Osama bin Laden sent a clear message 
with this offensive operation.  No longer would al Qaeda 
focus its energy on defending Muslim lands from infidel 
presence.  The goal was to take the fight to the enemy.182 
3. Command and Control: Hierarchy 
From a command and control perspective, these attacks 
are unique to al Qaeda’s trend in operations.  They were the 
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last attacks planned by the full-time Central Staff.  These 
two bombings followed bin Laden’s 1998 declaration to the 
world of an intent to pursue offensive operations.  Al Qaeda 
thus shifted its focus to a global presence, demanding more 
of its fringe members in order to complete the mission.  
From this point forward, the Central Staff would no longer 
have absolute control over target selection, except for the 
case of the 2001 attacks.  Even in this event, the 
operational units operated for long periods of times 
(years), largely autonomous from the rest of the 
organization.  Al Qaeda uses its Central Staff to plan large 
operations that have significant meaning for the group, such 
as switching from defensive to offensive operations, or 
attacks likely to elicit strong responses from victims such 
as September 11, 2001.  Furthermore, this attack set a 
precedent for future al Qaeda cells.  This attack was one of 
leadership by example.  The group’s leader issued a 
statement about the expectations of the organization 
followed by a clear example of those expectations.  Outside 
of these large-scale operations though, following the 1998 
bombings, al Qaeda shifted its command and control system to 
a looser, network style.  This shift facilitates the 
organization’s structural change following the 2001 invasion 
of its training camps in Afghanistan. 
C. PROPOSED STRUCTURE IN 2004 
Marc Sageman’s idea of clustering within a network is 
used to describe a proposed current structure of al Qaeda. 
His concept also ties into the previously discussed idea of 
the growth of a network depending on the number of nodes in 
one location.  Currently, al Qaeda is comprised of four 
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large regional cells that are further divided into 
operational cells.  These cells are the Central Staff, the 
Maghreb cell in Europe, the Core Arabs in the Middle East 
and North Africa, and the Southeast Asian core.  Clusters 
are largely independent of one another with few horizontal 
links.  The Maghren and Core Arab clusters intersect through 
their common Syrian members.  The Core Arabs intersect with 
the Southeast Asian core through the bonds of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammad and Riduan Isamuddin.  The separation of clusters 
is important to the operational and informational security 
of the organization.  The arrest of one member cannot bring 
down the entire organization but at the most one cluster.183 
Networks built upon personal relationships have more 
potential for growth at more populated nodes.  Nodes that 
are completely isolated from society or contain members with 
few important relationships outside of the organization are 
less likely to expand as quickly as nodes with highly 
connected individuals.  The most connected nodes in a 
network are referred to as the hubs of the organization.  
Within al Qaeda, Marc Sageman identifies the Central Staff, 
Core Arabs, Maghreb Arabs, and the Southeast Asian nodes as 
the key hubs.184 
Just as other organizations mentioned in this thesis, 
al Qaeda is a network overlaid on a hierarchy.  The Central 
Staff is the central unit of authority connecting the other 
clusters.  This core is formed and held together through a 
network of friendships initially formed during combat 
against the Soviet Union.  Osama bin Laden heads the 
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hierarchy and is supported by a shura council of about a 
dozen members, mostly Egyptian.  The Central Staff also has 
four committees, divided into finances, military affairs, 
religious affairs, and public relations.  These four 
committees demonstrate the values of the organization: 
resources, operational execution, cohesion through ideology, 
and influence on the public.  Most large organizations would 
have other committees such as personnel, recruitment, 
intelligence, or logistics, but these items are handled at 
the local level of al Qaeda.185 
Within each cluster, a robust horizontal network of 
personal relationships exists.  These horizontal links 
enable Osama bin Laden to tap local resources for 
operational support and recruits.  Recruits sent to training 
camps then cement relationships with other individuals from 
varied regions.  As recruits leave the training camps, they 
will be able to draw upon their contacts within the training 
camps for years to come.  In short, the training facilities 
promote robust alumni organizations.186   
1. Command and Control: Network 
From 1998 onward, al Qaeda began to evolve into a 
command and control system encouraged by a network.  Until 
2001, though, the physical structure of al Qaeda did not 
change.  This order of change is counterintuitive as no 
external forces exerted pressure for this command and 
control style to occur.  Operations following the twin U.S. 
embassy bombings were decentralized and locally controlled.  
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Al Qaeda’s involvement focused on training, providing seed 
money, and logistical support.  Exact targets and details of 
the operations were planned by local cells.  Leadership 
within the Central Staff was made aware of the general 
outline of a plot but left out of the day-to-day 
planning.187  Operational field commanders took charge of 
specific operations and reported to Central Staff 
lieutenants.  Note though, that operational commanders were 
not necessarily underneath the staff lieutenant.  The staff 
the lieutenants provided a cross-link between the hubs and 
the operational units.  For example, in “the Los Angeles 
airport millennial plot, Ressam assumed the command of his 
operation when the appointed field commander Fodail was 
unable to come to Canada.  He reported to Makhlulif, who 
facilitated logistic support and kept al Qaeda aware of new 
developments.”188  Ressam, an operational unit member was 
able to take the place of the operational field commander 
and report to the cross-link staff lieutenant, Makhlulif.  
The September 11, 2001, plot was organized similarly.  The 
field commander, Atta, reported to bin al Shibh, who 
provided logistic support and kept al Qaeda leadership 
updated.  A final example is the Bali operation.  Abdul Aziz 
(Imam Samudra) acted as the operational commander.  In this 
operation, two staff lieutenants worked with the operational 
unit.  Isamuddin was the cross-link staff lieutenant who 
provided funding, and Ali Ghufron was the staff lieutenant 
keeping the Central Staff aware of new developments.189  In 
each of these instances, a horizontal cross-link member 
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provided the logistical and financial support to the group 
while separate members took operational leadership.   
From a command and control perspective, this dividing 
of responsibility increases the difficulty of organizing 
operations and maintaining accountability.  Likewise, from a 
cohesion perspective, with so many different players 
contributing who are not necessarily part of the operational 
unit, these more distant members may feel as if they are 
cogs in a wheel.  Conversely, by staff lieutenants handling 
the logistical and financial support, operational members 
might actually feel more connected to the larger 
organization.  Operational members within the smaller nodes 
might develop a sense of community because they feel that 
the operation is not theirs alone, but belongs to the entire 
organization.  Now, added pressures occur as these members 
want to perform well for the sake of the organization.  An 
added benefit of this loose command and control structure is 
the division of responsibility in the case of mission 
failure.  In this instance, individuals will feel less shame 
because they can point to other pieces of the puzzle for 
which they had no responsibility. 
2. Al Qaeda: Southeast Asian Node 
As the ideological leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden 
harnesses the strength of numerous terrorist organizations 
by allowing individuals dual membership in their local 
organizations and al Qaeda.  As a result, al Qaeda’s network 
varies by region.  Due to the cultural backdrop of the area, 
the Southeast Asian hub is more hierarchical than the other 
hubs.  For example, Abdulah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir 
appear to have intentionally designed Jemaah Islamiyah along 
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hierarchical lines.  The top level is formed by an amir and 
consultative council.  Similar to al Qaeda, the organization 
has four main hubs according to region: Singapore and 
Malaysia; Indonesia; Sabah, Suluwesu, and the Southern 
Philippines; and Australia.  These four divisions, known as 
mantiqis, have councils with staff units.  One of these 
staff units is the operational unit, comprised of four to 
five people.  Unlike al Qaeda, the initiative and detailed 
plans for operations in Jemaah Islamiyah, which has close 
connections with the Southeast Asian Core, originate with 
the organization’s leadership.  After the councils agree on 
operational plans, orders are passed down the chain of 
command to the operational units.190   
3. Changing Security 
The Core Arabs and Maghreb Arab Core following 
September 11, 2001, were under international scrutiny.  
Western European countries and other allied nations 
tightened security measures against terrorist organizations, 
increasing the difficulty for communications and explicit 
orders within a chain of command.  As a result of heightened 
security measures, attacks such as those in Bali, Istanbul, 
Madrid, and London were carried out by more locally formed 
units.  These operational cells acted more independently and 
had more distant ties to al Qaeda’s leadership.191  Even 
before the international arena focused on large-scale 
terrorist organizations, leadership within al Qaeda itself 
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recognized the need for networked structures in a changing 
environmental atmosphere. 
D. LEADERS’ SUPPORT FOR NETWORK 
A leader by the name Setmariam involved with the 
training of recruits in Afghanistan lectured about the need 
for al Qaeda to adopt a less hierarchical structure.  He 
explained to his class in the summer of 2000,  
We ask the Muslim youth to be a terrorist.  Why 
do we ask for such individual terrorism?  First, 
because secret hierarchical organizations failed 
to attract Muslims.  The youth fear joining such 
an organization because if there is a mistake 
then the authorities will reach them.  Second 
because we need to give the youth the change to 
play a role without being part of an 
organization.  Some youth don’t want to join an 
organization and don’t know how to act on their 
beliefs.  Third, due to pressure from the Jews, 
Crusaders, and lapse Muslim regimes.192   
This short excerpt from Setmariam’s lectures to terrorist 
recruits in Afghanistan demonstrates the leadership’s 
thinking about the direction of al Qaeda’s organization.  
The leadership clearly wants to appeal to the largest number 
of Muslim youth possible.  He understood strengths and 
weaknesses of various organizational structures to recognize 
that in hierarchies, blame is too easily assigned.  
Autonomous units provide protection not only to members of 
the operational units but also the central staff leadership 
of al Qaeda.  Autonomous units are more difficult to trace 
back to the central leadership, but these units may also 
attempt their own methods and techniques without fear of 
                     
192 Cruickshank and Ali, 8. 
 119
ruining the entire organization.  Experimentation and 
innovation are encouraged in this type of organizational 
structure. 
Setmariam also understood enough social network 
analysis to illustrate to his classes that a cellular 
structure in times of intense scrutiny was desirable.  He 
drew a diagram indicating how easy it was to 
round up a cell structure in which many cells are 
traced back to a leader.  ‘In the new stage,’ 
Setmariam told his [students], ‘You should form a 
brigade and work directly.  I advise your brigade 
doesn’t exceed ten members.  In case you are 
caught, they are all caught.’193   
In this quote, the cell structure he refers to is a 
compartmentalized yet hierarchical structure where each 
person understands their place in a direct chain of command 
leading to the Central Staff leadership.  The students 
Setmariam instructed were future recruiters and field 
lieutenants for al Qaeda.  By telling these future field 
lieutenants to work directly with their operational 
brigades, Setmariam is supporting the notion of a loose 
command and control structure that only provides ideological 
oversight to the operational units.   
 Setmariam’s principles are being put to work as 
evidenced by the structure of the Madrid and London attacks.  
He advocated operational leaders being active individuals 
with the ability to influence others in a broad circle of 
contacts.  Sarhane Fahket, a well-connected Tunisian 
immigrant, was a successful real estate agent. Moroccan 
immigrant, Jamal Zougam, managed a cellular telephone store.  
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These two individuals were in positions to meet numerous 
individuals and had the ability to influence a wide range of 
locals in association with the attacks in Madrid.  The 
attacks in London were under the leadership of a primary 
school teacher, Mohammad Siddique Khan.  As a schoolteacher, 
he automatically had the respect of his students, but he 
drew three into a special group that became the operational 
cell.194  These two cells, though augmented with experts 
from other areas, were formed according to the principles of 
Setmariam: small, autonomous groups working largely on their 
own initiative. 
E. SUMMARY OF AL QAEDA 
Al Qaeda has global influence due in part to its fluid 
operational style.  Since al Qaeda does not require each 
operational unit to operate under the same operational 
guidelines, individual units are able to use techniques best 
suited for their environment.  Al Qaeda relies on an 
overarching ideology to hold the various sub-organizations 
within al Qaeda together.  Each organization may pursue its 
own local initiatives so long as they do not interfere with 
those of al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda, in this respect, is really 
another umbrella organization like that of Hezbollah, 
providing funding and logistic support to regional 
organizations agreeing to cooperate with one another.  
Unlike Hezbollah though, al Qaeda has a more sound 
ideological base that allows other organizations to 
cooperate without vying for power.  Al Qaeda has cooperated 
with organizations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
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(MILF), Jemaah Islamiyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ merged 
with al Qaeda in 2001), al-Ansar Mujahidin, al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya, Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, and Harakat ul-
Mujahidin to name a few.195 
Scholar, Audrey Kurth Cronin, sees al Qaeda’s increased 
reliance on connections to other groups as a sign of 
weakness; others see it as a worrisome indicator of growing 
strength, especially with groups that formerly focused on 
local issues and now display evidence of convergence on al 
Qaeda’s Salafist, anti-U.S., anti-West agenda.196  Even if 
the physical organization of al Qaeda was losing power, the 
ideas the organization disseminated across the globe are 
more potent since al Qaeda allowed each region to develop 
its own unique approach.  The number of attacks occurring 
that are attributed to al Qaeda though indicate that al 
Qaeda is not losing its influence despite vast cooperation 
with other groups.  Fewer personnel are seeking overseas 
training in al Qaeda-run training camps due to tightened 
counter-terrorism measures and the use of the internet as a 
training tool.  Yet, the organization’s ideology continues 
to circulate through thousands of websites on the internet 
and within radically controlled mosques.  Potential 
terrorists, in addition to local insurgents, now may travel 
to Iraq to practice their attack methods.  Al Qaeda as an  
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organization may also be able to use Iraq as a new rallying 
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VI. COHESION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: LOOKING 
INTERNALLY 
This section applies the principles of cohesion in 
group dynamics as discussed in the literature review to 
terrorist organizations.  Individual influences of cohesion 
are the focus of this section.  These influences include the 
factors of members’ commitment, the effects of a greater 
threat, guilt, level of decision-making, and sacrifice and 
martyrdom.  
A. MEMBERS’ COMMITMENT 
For a terrorist to completely commit himself to the 
organization, the individual must feel that the terrorist 
organization is a better comparison group than other viable 
options.  Individuals belonging to ideological or religious 
terrorist organizations may base their comparisons off of 
the moral ideology espoused by society versus that of the 
organization.  Surprisingly, terrorists, according to 
scholar Martha Crenshaw, usually show “acute concern for 
morality, especially for sexual purity, and believe that 
they act in terms of a higher good.”198  The belief that one 
is acting in on behalf of a higher calling allows the 
individual to overlook the laws and norms of society by 
justifying the end objectives of the terrorist organization.  
Justifications for violation of society’s norms include 
emphasis on past grievances, the promise of a better future, 
and illegitimate and violent regimes to which acts of 
terrorism are the only viable action.  Social interactions 
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reinforce norms, values, and beliefs.  For example, Muslims 
attending private mosques, not supported by the secular 
state government, come to practice and believe in that 
mosque’s particular brand of Islamic ideology.  The mosques 
provide occasion for new acquaintances through which an 
ideological commitment to extremist thought can develop.  
This extremist thought can then lead, through further social 
interaction, to commitment to jihad and provide the members 
of the mosque with established links to the jihad.199  This 
process may take time so that members of the mosque do not 
realize the depth of their commitment that is developing 
over time. 
1. Fanatically Held Belief 
Members’ commitment to an organization increases when 
the members have a fanatically held belief that the 
organization is fighting not only for themselves as an 
organization but for an oppressed group of people.  The 
terrorists feel justified in what they see as their self-
sacrificing struggle against the oppressive state regimes.  
The concept of widespread, albeit secret, support by a 
population which is oppressed and unable to express its own 
views give terrorists the feeling that they will have a 
large base of support once they have gained enough 
influence.  A fanatical belief in the greater cause of an 
organization elicits a feeling of being an elite member of 
an organization responsible for opening the eyes of the  
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common person who will be grateful for the for the 
revolutionary change brought by the terrorist 
organization.200   
A fanatically held belief may be a concise concept or a 
broad idea.  Al Qaeda successfully coalesces the support of 
numerous and varied terrorist organizations by harnessing 
the desire for a pan-Islamic state and a commonly portrayed 
dislike for Israel.  Al-Zawahiri in 2001 expressed the idea 
that Muslims could be motivated by the call to jihad against 
Israel.  He, as a leader of al Qaeda, understood that such a 
diverse organization needed a rallying point.  Israel serves 
this purpose for al Qaeda.  Al-Zawahiri stated in 2001, “The 
fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of 
Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings 
of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 
fifty years.  In addition, it is a rallying point for all 
Arabs, be they believers or non-believers, good or evil.”201  
Al-Zawahiri unites al Qaeda under a common ideology by 
embracing these concepts.  This overarching ideology aides 
in providing cohesion and commitment to diverse extremist 
groups as well as providing guidance in their operations 
under a looser command and control structure. 
2. Overarching Ideology 
Osama bin Laden also embraces the concept of an 
overarching ideology uniting the various elements of al 
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Qaeda and providing an additional reason for members’ 
commitment to the organization.  He continues to espouse the 
view that Muslims have a duty to rise against invasions by 
infidels, Americans now occupying Iraq and Afghanistan.  He 
states  
all ulema are unanimous that it is an individual 
duty to fight an invading enemy…[J]ihad has 
become [obligatory] upon each and every 
Muslim…The time has come when all the Muslims of 
the world, especially the youth, should unite and 
soar against the kufr and continue jihad till 
these forces are crushed to naught, all the anti-
Islamic forces are wiped off the face of this 
earth and Islam takes over the whole world and 
all the other false religions.202   
Osama bin Laden once before gained influence by calling 
attention and uniting Muslims against United States presence 
on holy land during the first Gulf War.  Now, Osama bin 
Laden is once again calling on Muslims around the world to 
unite and examine their personal commitment to Islamic 
ideology by pointing out how easily infidels (Americans) 
were able to topple two governments, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
in the region. 
3. Sense of Belonging 
Belonging to any type of group provides the members of 
that group with a sense of belonging as discussed in the 
second section of this thesis.  A terrorist organization 
provides this function to its members as well as providing 
the members with a feeling of self-importance.  The 
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organization a member joins begins to replace the 
individual’s old belief system with new beliefs that morph 
into norms that “define the terrorism act as morally 
acceptable to the group’s goals…”203  The Egyptian terrorist 
organization, Sayyid Qutb, provides an example of a group 
providing an individual with a sense of belonging, identity, 
and norms that replace those of society.  Followers of 
Sayyid Qutb shaped their group norms in such a way that they 
felt their norms were actually concurrent with the 
overarching norms and rules of Islam.  They felt that the 
rest of Muslim society, especially Egypt, was in the wrong.  
Therefore, since these nominal Muslims were actually 
breaking the norms established by Mohammed the Prophet, Qutb 
followers were actually agreeing and abiding by the higher 
norms of Islamic rule.  Since these nominal Muslims were 
breaking the traditional norms of Islamic society, Qutb 
rationalized that violence directed against these nominal 
Muslims was allowable because they were not fighting other 
Muslims, but “idolaters.”204   
4. Isolation 
A follower of Qutb’s ideas, Shukri Mustafa, advocated 
separating himself and other true believes from the corrupt 
persons of Egyptian society.  He believed that withdrawal 
and isolation would protect the community from the impious 
society and allow it to grow strong enough to eventually 
conquer Egypt and establish a true Islamic society.  In 
order to belong to Mustafa’s sect, “one had to abandon one’s 
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ties to society, including family, former friends, state 
employment, and what was considered useless education.”205  
As a means of increasing cohesion within the group, communal 
living in city apartments was also open to women, and 
Mustafa encouraged early marriage among his members.206  
5. Family Ties 
Marriages create bonds of cohesion between families and 
may put the organization member in contact with potential 
supporters or other members.  Marriage to another family 
with links in a terrorist organization will increase the 
commitment the individual has to the principles of the 
organization as well as the family.  In addition to 
Mustafa’s sect of Sayyid Qutb, other organizations such as 
al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah also support the notion of 
marriages between families associated with the organization.  
Osama bin Laden personally created strong links by marrying 
his son to the daughter of his long-time aide and likely 
successor, Abu Hoffs al Masri, in January 2001.207  If an 
organization does not actively encourage marriage as a way 
of increasing commitment and cohesion amongst its members, 
the leadership may advocate members to completely cut ties 
with their former families.  Aum Shinrikyo’s highest ranking 
members cut ties with former family members as an act of 
demonstrating their commitment to the organization above all  
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other commitments.  In this sense, the individual is 
accepting the organization as a new family in place of a 
traditional family.208 
6. Public Proclamation of Commitment 
Another method that organizations and individuals alike 
use to increase commitment to a group is to establish a set 
of standards to measure a person’s level of commitment.  A   
visible level of commitment allows other members of the 
organization to see where on the totem pole of commitment 
they fall in relation to others.  This environment creates 
competition and desire to be recognized as the most 
committed member of an organization.  Members of Aum 
Shinrikyo displayed their commitment to the organization by 
donating different amounts of money in order to attend 
different levels of training.  After paying different levels 
of membership dues, a person could wear a different color of 
robe signifying that person’s level within the organization.  
This form of displaying each person’s commitment and rank 
within the hierarchy encouraged others to participate just 
as much or more than others.  This fueled the donation 
process to the organization.209 
7. Oppressive Measures by the State 
Actions by both the state government and the 
organization play a role in determining the level of 
commitment in potential terrorists and current organization 
members.  A state which uses oppressive measures to quiet 
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dissent and does not give a voice to its citizens is likely 
to see an increase in clandestine, organized violence.  The 
repression by some modern Muslim states, such as Iran in the 
late 1970’s, convinced radical Muslims that political 
reforms or statements would not have enough power to change 
the government and establish an Islamic state.  Lack of 
political voice led to violence.  Likewise, terrorist 
organizations must enforce their own norms.  At times, as 
previously mentioned, organizations need to punish members 
for deviant behavior.  Punishment that alienates popular 
support may erode potential and current members’ 
commitment.210  Though often at cross-purposes, both the 
state and the organization must find their own balance of 
enticement and punishment to reach their own goals. 
8. Oppressive Measures by the Group 
A group, even if successful in operations, may use too 
harsh of measures against its own members and lose 
influence.  Aum Shinrikyo’s most devoted followers killed 
one of their own members who witnessed the accidental death 
of a recruit and wished to leave the group.  The killing was 
justified as necessary to allow the group to flourish and 
fulfill its mission of salvation.  The group did not achieve 
a balance between punishment for cohesion and adherence to 
norms and the ability to attract new members.  The period 
following these killings witnessed a decline in new recruits 
joining the organization.211 
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9. Time in Prison 
Rather counter intuitively, terrorists who spend time 
in jail tend to show an increase in their commitment to 
their particular organization.  Prison focuses the identity 
of an individual on the aspect that led him to prison: 
association with a terrorist organization.  The type of 
organization influenced the way prison affected person’s 
commitment.  The following numbers are taken from a 
collection of thirty=five incarcerated terrorists in an 
Israeli prison. Seventy-seven percent of the Islamic 
terrorists in this collection felt that their prison 
experience brought them closer to the group, they learned 
more about the group, and were more committed to the cause 
following their sentence.  Conversely, only fifty-four 
percent of the secular terrorists interviewed felt this way.  
Eighty-four percent of the Islamic terrorists reported a 
desire to return to their organizations following their 
sentences versus sixty-two percent of the secular 
terrorists.212  Perhaps understandable while in custody of 
an Israeli prison, but the terrorists reported a sense of 
increased dislike toward Israel following their captivity.  
A higher level of increased commitment from the Islamic 
terrorists may be attributed to the ideological influences 
of their organizations versus desires for physical or 
material changes in secular organizations. 
 
                     
212 Laurita M. Denny, Jerrold M. Post, and Ehud Sprinzak, “The 
Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle 
Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (Spring 
2003): 174-175. 
 132
B. SHARED FATE AGAINST A GREATER THREAT 
Members of organizations acting against the norms of 
society understand they are taking risks and face punishment 
if apprehended.  This shared fate from a greater threat 
increases the cohesion within the organization.  Martha 
Crenshaw explains that “shared guilt and anxiety increase 
the group’s interdependence and mutual commitment and may 
also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the 
common ideology as sources of moral authority.”213  An 
increase in cohesion in adverse conditions leads to the 
development of a collective identity that continues to 
radicalize as the group identity takes the place of 
individual identity.  At this point, groupthink influences 
the thoughts and actions of the group, even leading to 
illusions of the organization’s omnipotence.214 
1. Organizational Level 
People who do not necessarily share common views may 
come together and cooperate if faced with a greater common 
enemy than each other.  This is the case with Arab states 
which fluctuate between competing with one another for 
regional power and supporting one another against Israel.  
Arab states often use the Palestinian cause as a method to 
unite Arab states against Israel.  By focusing negative 
energy against Israel as the cause for refugee problems in 
the area, Arab states are able to create more support for 
unity as well as an increase in dislike for Israel.  
Terrorist organizations harness this same energy in uniting 
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various factions together against a common enemy.  This 
method explains how Osama bin Laden was even at one point 
able to cooperate with the IRA.215 
Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, Setmariam 
challenged the absolute authoritative leadership of Osama 
bin Laden, urging him to a more radical stance against Saudi 
Arabia and to take the fight to the far enemy.  After the 
attacks though, Setmariam recognized that the cause did not 
need further criticism from him and others but needed unity. 
After the attacks, he praised bin Laden and the attacks as 
“heroic and glorious.”216  Setmariam realized that the U.S. 
and other coalition partners were intensely focused on 
dismantling terrorist organizations.  In order for the 
organization to survive, increased cohesion, especially 
among its leadership was paramount in the face of a greater 
threat. 
A greater threat may explain why at the time, Sunni and 
Shiite Muslim insurgents are working in cooperation in Iraq.  
Al Qaeda has provided a greater threat in the form of 
western nations to the various Muslim factions as David 
Wurmser notes, 
 For Syria, the…network had the virtue of 
absorbing and channeling Sunni fundamentalist 
fervor.  Energies that might have been turned 
against the regime were directed instead against 
American targets and into Saudi politics.  Within 
the terror network, Shi’ite and Sunni—who 
otherwise would never have countenanced working 
together—could join forces, as could secular 
Palestinians and Islamic extremists.  For Iraq, 
the network offered a way to defeat America.  It 
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would be a grave mistake to imagine that Saddam’s 
animus against Saudi Arabia or his secular 
disposition would prevent him from working with 
the Wahhabi religious establishment…Sure 
enough…Saddam’s regime has lately encouraged the 
rise, in Iraq’s northern safe haven, of salafism, 
a puritanical sect tied to Wahhabism that 
hitherto had been alien to Iraq…one of these 
Salafi movements turns out to be a front for bin 
Laden.217  
Note that this was written in October 2001, before the 
capture of Saddam Hussein or the invasion of Iraq. 
Other examples of unlikely cooperation abound.  In 
December 2001, The New York Times reported on classified 
documents showing that there had been contacts between 
members of al Qaeda and Iranian intelligence officers in 
1995 and 1996.  This contact is significant because Iranians 
tend to support Shi’ite extremist groups whereas al Qaeda is 
largely comprised of Sunni leadership, indicating the 
cooperation of Shi’as and Sunnis.218  In early 2002, Israeli 
Defense Forces transiting from Dubai, an operational base 
for Iran, intercepted a ship the KARINE A, ferrying 
explosives and weapons.  Iranians again, are mostly Shi’ites 
whereas Palestinians are mainly Sunni.  In this instance, 
cooperation exists between the two groups: the weapons were 
Iranian while the ship and its captain were both Sunni.219 
Recent operations are not the only times different 
Muslim factions have cooperated.  The Soviet Union provided 
a greater threat during and following the Afghan war.  
Various factions of Muslims met one another and cooperated 
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in an effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.  
This cooperation was intense and lengthy relative to today’s 
operations.  After the Soviets withdrew, the militants 
started to analyze their common problems with a global 
perspective.  Islamic extremists began to transcend national 
origins after forging bonds in combat with one another.220  
Infighting occurred after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.  
The remaining Afghan Arabs could not agree on the type and 
the extent of jihad they desired.  Just when infighting 
threatened to destroy the bonds formed in combat, Saddam 
Hussein invaded Kuwait. 
The most extreme mujahedin, the salafists who advocated 
a far jihad, despised Hussein since he was a secular ruler 
who did not advocate nor closely follow the tenants of 
Islam.  Initially, Salafists condemned the invasion of 
Kuwait.  Osama bin Laden offered to use his mujahedin to 
fight Hussein’s invasion.  The royal family of Saudi Arabia 
instead chose the United States and other non-Muslim forces 
to defend holy ground. Osama bin Laden and his followers 
were incensed by the presence of these infidels on sacred 
land.  Then, the Salafists chose to support Hussein as the 
lesser of two evils versus the United States as the Great 
Satan.221 
2. Individual Level 
The preceding examples showcase unity in adverse 
conditions on a grand scale.  Other factors of a shared fate 
also increase cohesion amongst terrorist group members.  
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Families who have lost members to an organization’s cause 
are often rewarded through a sense of heroism.  Members of 
an organization know that if they should become martyrs, 
their families will be rewarded through social status, 
financial, and material rewards from the organization and 
the community supporting or sympathizing with the 
organization.  In areas of extreme poverty or regions where 
status and pride are paramount, potential financial 
compensation and hero status entice members to personal 
sacrifice.  As younger or newer members of an organization 
witness praise for martyrs and see the rewards given to the 
families of those martyrs, the individual increasingly wants 
the organization to succeed and fuses his identity with that 
of the organization.  This fusion of identity decreases the 
need for individual ideas, identity, or decision-making.  
Thus, organizations rewarding the families of fallen members 
are also increasing the support for the organization of 
younger and potential members.222 
Finally, cohesion within terrorist organizations is 
possible even when members become disillusioned with the 
goals of the group.  An individual who has participated or 
supported a terrorist organization willfully understands the 
potential backlash from society, even if the individual 
leaves the group.  Absence of amnesty in most Western 
countries combined with the fear of retaliation by the 
organization itself prevents members from leaving the 
group.223  The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
(DHKP/C) was a more hierarchical organization and with an 
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internal security unit.  This unit investigated and 
uncovered members inside the organization who associated 
with law enforcement personnel, those who did not conform to 
the norms of the organization, and was responsible for the 
prosecution of guilty members.  The internal security unit 
coerced members to remain a part of the organization and 
interrogated those who have been in custody to ensure they 
had not been turned by the authorities as double agents. 224  
The existence of an internal security unit provides 
increased trouble for a group member desiring to leave the 
group.  Fear of retribution by this unit combined with 
punishment by state authorities forced some members to 
continue participating regardless of their personal desires. 
C. TYPES OF INFLUENCE ON CURRENT MEMBERS 
1. Guilt 
The more committed an individual is to a group, 
emotions of pride and guilt expressed by the individual will 
reflect group actions versus individual endeavors.225  Guilt 
has strong influences on the members of an organization.  
Feelings of strong internal guilt may lead members to feel 
the need to seek punishment.  This punishment may take the 
form of capture or sacrifice.  For example, nineteenth 
century Russian terrorist, Kaliayev, felt only his death 
could “atone for the murder he committed.”226  Capture by 
the enemy brings release to the strains incurred from life 
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in an underground organization daily opposing society’s 
standard of behavior.  Capture also provides a sense of 
fulfillment to a member.  If a person is captured in the 
name of acting on behalf of a terrorist organization, then 
that person feels they have sacrificed themselves for the 
good of the organization.227  Guilt, more than external 
shame, will produce these influences as discussed in the 
second section of this thesis. 
2. Level of Participation in Decision-making 
The level of participation in decision-making is 
described as empowerment in business organizations.  
Terrorist organizations and business organizations face the 
similar challenge of making subordinates feel included and 
part owners of the groups’ operations, but must also keep 
the organization on a desirable course of action.  Among 
thirty-five interviewed terrorists in Israeli prisons, both 
the Islamic and secular terrorists indicated they were free 
to ask questions and provide opinions about operational 
details.  Both groups noted that they were forbidden from 
questioning the validity of an act.  Differences amongst the 
terrorists included secular terrorists’ tendency to be 
organized in a more hierarchical fashion than Islamic 
terrorists.  Islamic terrorists were less tolerant of 
dissent than secular terrorists, but freer (Islamic 
terrorists) to act at a lower cell level.  From this 
information, this thesis theorizes that ideological 
terrorist groups have more cohesion and a greater 
understanding of the group’s objectives.  These groups 
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therefore, do not tolerate dissent about the validity of 
operations because such dissent essentially questions the 
ideology of the organization.  For example, one interviewee 
noted that a Hamas commander’s orders were binding and not 
to be questioned.228  Secular terrorist organizations do not 
have such strong ideology that includes a particular life 
after death, so their organization must be more structured 
in order to keep closer watch on their own members who have 
more potential outside influences. 
3. Cyclical Influence 
Another influence on members of a terrorist 
organization is the idea of cyclical influence.  Members who 
have fused their identity with the success of the group have 
a need to increase the power and prestige of the group 
through increasingly dramatic and violent operations.  Group 
goals become individual goals.229  This cyclical influence 
is fed by the need for a terrorist organization to 
continually make a statement that will be noticed.  As the 
general public becomes accustomed to one level of violence, 
the terrorist organization must up the ante. 
a. Media Coverage 
A basic necessity for the success of a terrorist 
operation is publicity in order to influence public opinion.  
Publicity combined with success and a personal feeling of 
accomplishment effectively creates an upward spiral for 
violence in order to maintain the media and public’s 
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attention.  For example, “Yousef planned to follow the World 
Trade Center bombing with the assassinations of Pope John 
Paul II and the then prime minister of Pakistan, Benzir 
Bhutto, and the near-simultaneous in-flight bombings of 
eleven US passenger airliners.”230  This increase in 
audacity of plans is due to the need to undertake more 
dramatic measures to receive the same amount of media 
coverage.  Dramatic attacks are also a way for organizations 
to introduce themselves to the world.  The Palestinian 
attacks during the Munich Olympics unfolded in about one 
hundred countries and in front of about nine hundred million 
people.  Suddenly, the Palestinian cause was the hot topic 
of conversation for people who previously did not know about 
the Palestinians or their cause.  Dramatic attacks receiving 
impressive coverage also bolster support for organizations.  
Fringe supporters seeing the publicity and success of the 
operation are swept up in the tide of emotions following an 
attack.  After the Munich Olympics, “thousands of 
Palestinians rushed to join the terrorist organization.”231 
Successful operations increase cohesion and morale 
within any type of organization, but especially a 
clandestine organization carefully planning the use of its 
resources.  Cohesion and morale are further increased when 
the media criticizes state governments for their 
ineffectiveness in combating terrorist attacks.  Support for 
the PIRA increased in the 1970’s when a top-secret British 
military assessment of PIRA was obtained by the terrorist 
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organization and released to the public.  The assessment 
stated that PIRA could not be defeated.  Not only did this 
cause the government to look ineffective but also gave 
courage to supporters of PIRA to take a more active role.232 
b. Declining Organizations 
Inactive terrorist organizations do not maintain 
active rosters nor do they attract new recruits.  As an 
organization faces possible decline, the group members who 
have vested interest in continuing the organization, may 
increase their violence in attempt to change the direction 
of the group’s decline.  Increasingly violent attacks 
demonstrate commitment to the cause and the need to maintain 
the organization.233  If operations are successful, the 
group may attract new recruits or at least sympathetic 
supporters.  For these reasons, al Qaeda must demonstrate an 
ability to continue operations despite its leadership 
remaining in hiding and the majority of its regional 
training camps disposed.  If al Qaeda does not continue to 
take credit for operations, then possible recruits will look 
to other organizations.  Al Qaeda must continue to 
demonstrate its ability to be the vanguard of the Salafist 
jihad.234 Counter-terrorist activities should monitor those 
organizations that increase the frequency of their attacks 
as well as the level of complexity and planning.  Those 
groups that seem to be increasing the rashness of their 
attacks without thoroughly covering their tracks may be 
signs of a group in decline. 
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4. Sacrifice and Martyrdom 
Organizations demanding sacrifice from their members 
often elevate those individuals to the status of martyrs for 
the cause.  Praise for martyrdom encourages members to take 
dangerous risks, knowing that if they should lose their 
lives completing an operation, their families will be 
rewarded and regarded with honor.  Praise for martyrdom is 
especially effective in ideological terrorist organizations 
or those that are religiously-based and teach about earning 
entrance into a greater afterlife.  In the words of an 
incarcerated terrorist in a Israeli prison,  
A martyrdom operation is the highest level of 
jihad, and highlights the depth of our faith. The 
bombers are holy fighters who carry out one of 
the more important articles of faith. It is 
attacks when a member gives his life that earn 
the most respect and elevate bombers to the 
highest possible level of martyrdom. I am not a 
murderer. A murderer is someone with a 
psychological problem; armed actions have a goal. 
Even if civilians are killed, it is not because 
we like it or are bloodthirsty.  It is a fact of 
life in a people’s struggle. The group doesn’t do 
it because it wants to kill civilians, but 
because the jihad must go on.235 
This mindset emboldens terrorists to new levels of 
violence but also justifies acts of terrorism in their 
minds.  Praise for martyrdom and treating martyrdom as the 
highest honor a member can achieve ensures a future supply 
of individuals willing to carry out the more dangerous 
operations.  The group must contain high elements of 
cohesion in order to encourage one another to die for the 
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cause and each other.  One interviewee explained his 
disappointment for not being chosen to participate in an 
operation as a martyr.  He respected and envied those who 
were selected to die for the cause but understood that his 
purpose in the organization was not yet over.236  The use of 
martyrs is an effective way to use terrorist organization 
members who are no longer beneficial to the organization or 
who pose a threat to the group’s operational security.  Just 
as cyclical violence and competition increase group cohesion 
and attract new members, the abundance of martyrs encourages 
others within the group to desire the same end. 
Organizational leadership must continually encourage 
its members to become martyrs.  Established doctrine 
praising martyrdom and justifying the act of sacrifice aids 
members in the process of accepting and desiring this fate.  
Al-Zawahiri of al Qaeda reinforces the need for martyrdom in 
his publications.  Part of al Qaeda’s goals includes the use 
of martyrdom as the most successful way of inflicting damage 
at the least cost to the organization.237  Structured groups 
with training facilities or central command centers where 
members of the organization congregate before large 
undertakings are conducive to enticing members to become 
martyrs.  As large organizations evolve into network 
organizations, the leadership will have to rely on 
publications and a strong, united ideology to continue 
encouraging martyrdom.  Therefore, as an individual’s 
identity merges with that of the group, and his goals  
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reflect the goals of the group, a committed individual will 
care more about the success of the organization than his own 
self-preservation. 
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VII. TYPES OF INFLUENCE ON MEMBERS OF SOCIETY: 
LOOKING EXTERNALLY 
Organizations, in order to continue their existence, 
must find a means of garnering support from outside sources.  
This support can be material, financial, or in terms of 
personnel.  The types of influence on the members of society 
are similar and different to the types of influence on 
current members of a terrorist organization.  A terrorist 
organization wishing to increase support must justify the 
group’s ideology as well as provide a better comparison 
group for the potential sympathizer to choose over other 
groups.  Often the methods employed to positively influence 
members of society require long periods of time in order to 
reap the benefits. 
A. INDOCTRINATION OF THE PUBLIC 
1. Purifying Ideology 
Continued public support is essential to the long-term 
survival of terrorist organizations.  Public support 
provides community protection, resources, and personnel.  
Islamic terrorist groups have been particularly successful 
in garnering the public’s support.  The leadership of such 
organizations, like al-Zawahiri, has introduced the idea of 
a cultural war into society.  Once the public feels that 
their culture is under siege by another society, the 
terrorist leadership can manipulate the public into thinking 
that active terrorist participation is a religious duty in 
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the name of self-defense.238  In order to initially gain 
support of the public by means other than through charitable 
organizations, ideological terrorist organizations must 
convince their targeted audiences that their particular 
brand of ideology or religion is the true way.  Currently, 
Islamic terrorist groups are succeeding by expressing the 
need to return to the earliest sources of Islam, regardless 
of a changed world contextually.  Interpretations are based 
on early Islamic scholars like Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah 
of the Middle Ages, and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab of the eighteenth 
century.  These scholars were the most resilient and 
unyielding in their own time.  Expressing the need to purify 
Islam allows terrorist organizations to maintain tight 
control over their constituents’ daily lives, eventually 
leading to submission and internalization of the group’s 
goals because members of society have little contact with 
other sources.  This is the most extreme case of gradual 
influence on members of society.239 
2. Class Distinction 
Other factors of public support include the rise of a 
middle class in Middle Eastern societies.  These individuals 
no longer want basic necessities, but the luxuries of the 
elites and those of the Western world.  This concept relates 
to group dynamics discussed in section two.  A person will 
not be content unless they feel they have better 
opportunities than their comparison group.  As television, 
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the Internet, and radio broadcast images of western society 
into conservative Middle Eastern societies, individuals 
begin to ask themselves why they cannot enjoy luxury items, 
like sports cars, mp3 players, etc.  At the same time, the 
middle class begins to blame their own governments on their 
current state of contempt for not being able to rise any 
higher.  This feeling develops into blame placed on the 
secular elements in life that have taken the emphasis away 
from religion.  This feeling combined with news stories the 
middle class hears about decadence in the West seemingly 
derived from a lack of religion and secular society gives 
rise to contempt for the West and secular governments.  Some 
members of the middle class then search elsewhere for 
answers to a more complete life, turning to religion, and in 
some cases, extremist groups.  Note, not all who turn to 
religion will become terrorists.240 
3. Oppression by the State 
Terrorist groups play on the frustrations of society.  
These organizations point out the misdeeds of society and 
point to the secular governments as tools of oppression of 
the true religion.  These organizations must be careful, as 
al-Zawahiri emphasizes, not to place the blame entirely on 
the government and risk alienation by society.  Terrorist 
groups portray the public as the weak victims and objects 
that need protection.  In this sense, the terrorist 
organizations view and portray themselves to the public as 
the protectors of their plight, engendering support.241   
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When states attempt to maintain order and to respond to 
terrorist actions with harsh or suppressive methods, the 
population will either support the heavy-handed actions or 
reject them in favor of the terrorist organization.242  The 
reaction of the public largely depends on how the terrorist 
group previously supported elements of society.  As the 
population wearies of seemingly senseless government 
searches and intrusions of privacy, the public sympathizes 
with the organization which it deems as the more promising 
of the two competing powers.  Public sympathy, and in some 
cases, support, increase the difficulty the state faces in 
its intelligence gathering process.  The public is more 
willing to cover for operatives and less likely to confess 
knowledge to the state for fear of guilt by association.  As 
states’ demand for information and action increases, the 
state is forced to use more sweeping, forceful measures.  
Intrusive actions are susceptible to abuse and scrutiny in 
the media, further leading the public away from support of 
the state government.  In this scenario, if the public is 
properly prepared, then the public may begin active support 
for the terrorist organization as the protector of the 
public.243  A successful example on behalf of the terrorist 
organization to gain the support of the public is the 
withdrawal of the British from the Suez Canal in 1954, 
following increased levels of terrorist violence.244 
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4. Dramatic Acts of Violence 
a. Draw Attention 
Violence itself may draw attention to the group 
and cause sympathizers to rally to active participation.  
Dramatic acts of violence attract attention, evoke alarm, 
instigate crisis, and force governments to divert resources 
to means of security.245  Violent attacks as previously 
mentioned bring attention to the cause.  The operation 
conducted during the Munich Olympics drew enough attention 
to the group to warrant the group a legitimate cause in the 
world.  Evidence of this is the invitation Yassir Arafat, 
the leader of the PLO, received to address the UN General 
Assembly eighteen months after the operation.  The PLO was 
given special observer status in the UN after Arafat’s 
speech.  Before the operation, much the of world did not 
know about or understand the cause of the PLO.246  Other 
groups, like the ASG, experienced an increase in membership 
and support following periods of increased violence despite 
the loss of leadership or pressure from authorities.247 
b. Effects on States Fighting Terrorism 
Violent acts of terrorism cause governments to 
redirect resources to preventing terrorism.  In the case of 
the U.S., the attacks of September 11, 2001, shaped the 
country’s foreign policy.  The attacks caused hundreds of 
billions of dollars in damage, caused a setback to the 
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economy, and are still influencing domestic politics.248  
The country initiated a new Global War on Terrorism, enacted 
the Patriot Act, reorganized the intelligence community, and 
initiated the invasion of Afghanistan followed by Iraq.  
These broad measures, while perhaps necessary for the 
protection of the country and its citizens, detract from 
resources providing for internal activities and reforms.  
Eventually citizens will tire of this state of affairs and 
lessen their support of their own government.  The people 
may not necessarily support the terrorist organizations by 
any means but are not necessarily vigilant for them nor 
proactive against them.   
In addition to affecting domestic policies, 
violent terrorist attacks can affect allied or coalition 
operations.  In Iraq in 2004, Iraqi insurgents kidnapped, 
beheaded, or threatened to behead foreign nationals who were 
noncombatants in the area helping to reconstruct Iraq.  
Countries felt pressure as body counts increased to remove 
themselves from an unstable region.  As a result, the 
Philippines pulled out of the coalition force and no new 
countries were willing to join.  The acts of violence forced 
aid organizations to suspend or reduce their activities, 
thereby slowing economic reconstruction and prolonging the 
misery that facilitated further recruiting by insurgents.  
The people of these war torn areas must choose to support 
the entity that will most ensure their survival.  If the 
people feel violence is continuing because of a foreign 
presence inciting insurgents and also feel abandoned by 
forces without the resources to provide for them, then their 
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support will fall to the insurgents.  A balance must be 
found between a large enough presence to make progress 
without inciting further violence.249 
c. Media Coverage 
Violent acts of terrorism result in widespread 
media coverage.  An effective terrorist organization knows 
how to take advantage of this media.  Immediate press 
reports and live coverage of the attack demonstrate the 
urgency and importance of the cause through the rash acts of 
violence. The media, regardless of each editor’s slant, 
produces a piece of propaganda for the terrorist 
organization.  This propaganda influences public opinion 
about the size, power, and ideology of a terrorist 
organization.  Effectively used, propaganda can incite 
members of society to passive and even active support.  
Media coverage also provides sympathetic members of society 
desiring a way to be more active an example of how to 
proceed with active participation.250   
5. Martrydom Evangelism 
Societies revere their heroes.  The Samurai of Japan 
were revered for their willingness to die defending the 
Emperor.  American Revolutionaries were romanticized for 
shedding blood in a fight for independence.  Crusaders were 
promised an expedited entrance into heaven for their 
personal sacrifice.  Fundamentalist Islamic society praises 
its warriors who sacrifice themselves in defense of their 
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religion for Allah.  Societies respect the individual who is 
able to place the needs of the group above his own desire to 
live.    
a. Iran 
The concept of martyrdom is especially revered by 
Shi’ite Muslims, dating back to the death of Husayn, one of 
the first caliphates who martyred himself.  Depending on the 
interpretation of the Koran, it is also preached by 
religious and nationalist Sunni leaders.  Ayatollah Khomeini 
prior to the Iranian Revolution revived the concept of 
martyrdom which was adopted by the Sunni Moslem Palestinian 
program.251  Stories circulated through Iran of young new 
recruits, eagerly running onto the battlefield against Iraq 
without weapons.  These recruits, recently general members 
of society and often adolescents, were eager to show their 
bravery and even sacrifice themselves.  Iranians were 
repeatedly told the virtues of sacrificing young children as 
martyrs for Allah.  Material compensation and places of 
honor were promised to families of martyrs.252  Public 
education and indoctrination began at a young age for these 
individuals.  Television programs, school curriculums, and 
religious leaders extolled the concept of martyrdom, making 
its act one of the most respected in the society.  This same 
approach was also used with Spartans and the Samurai to 
indoctrinate entire populations to seek sacrifice for the 
good of the group. 
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b. Al Qaeda 
Before 9/11, al Qaeda did not need to make strong 
appeals for recruitment.  As a safety precaution to the 
group’s long-term existence in the face of battle against 
U.S. forces, the organization disseminated videos and 
electronic material praising jihadists.  Al Qaeda 
disseminated a professional quality recruiting video in 
Muslim communities.  This video was seized by American 
authorities in the spring of 2002.  The purpose of the video 
was to attract short-term membership in the form of martyrs.  
The videotape was seven minutes long and praised the virtues 
of martyrdom for al Qaeda and Allah and showed pictures of 
twenty-seven martyrs with information of their origin and 
where they died.  A concluding segment featured twelve of 
the martyrs with a voice over stating: “They rejoice in the 
bounty provided by Allah: And with regard to those left 
behind who have not yet joined them in their bliss, the 
martyrs glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have 
they cause to grieve.”253  The video ends with contact 
information on how to join al Qaeda for the purpose of 
becoming a martyr and the Black Banner Center for Islamic 
Information.254 
c. PLO 
In areas of Palestinian influence, children are 
urged to violent actions against Israelis even when it is 
likely that they will be injured or die.  They are 
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encouraged to desire rather than fear the opportunity, 
because they will find a place in Paradise with Allah.  They 
will be revered as heroes in the land of the living since 
they have attained the highest honor in Islamic society.255  
Recent agreements between Israel and the PLO demand no 
recruitment of children as martyrs, an entire generation of 
Palestinian children, now young adults, grew up listening to 
television, radio, and school teachers profess the honor of 
martyrdom.  These influences on society are effective when 
carried out for a long period of time, over the course of 
more than one generation.  A society groomed to accept 
violence as a means of expressing devotion to a belief are 
more willing to accept missions of martyrdom.  Praise for 
martyrdom and the material rewards accompanying the act are 
the two areas that counterterrorism forces should focus on 
to break the cohesion of these supporters.  Using 
alternative explanations of the Koran for martyrdom and 
restricting the financial resources providing the material 
rewards to martyrs’ families may be one method of countering 
societies accustomed to and accepting of martyrdom. 
6. Indoctrination of Children 
Organizations which have strong influence on members of 
society focus on indoctrination of young children.  Youth 
are the most impressionable and trusting individuals in 
society.  Their early experiences will shape their futures.  
By recruiting children and exposing them to the benefits and 
goals of an organization at an early age romanticizes 
membership within that organization.  These youth may join 
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either as young children or seek opportunity when older.  
Gaining the support of children provides groups with 
longevity.  As of the year 1982, forty-one states had 
mobilized children to military activity by the age of 
seven.256  This staggering statistic is alarming not only 
because of the youth of these individuals but because entire 
generations in some regions of the world have been 
indoctrinated with violence almost their entire lives.  
Counterterrorism policies must understand that countering 
deep seated beliefs such as these will take time, be a 
gradual process, and not always result in success. 
a. Education 
Palestinian organizations may be the most fervent 
in their indoctrination of children. In 1982, the 
Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, and Lebanon 
under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, drafted children from 
age twelve into active service and children of age seven 
were part of the Palestinian intifada.257  These 
organizations were similar to Hitler’s Youth during World 
War II that enabled an entire society to allow devastation. 
  The Palestinian Authority used official textbooks, 
specifically developed teachers’ training guides, summer 
camps similar to military training camps, and television 
campaign advertisements emphasizing a message of violence, 
and escalating to advocate to children their willingness to 
self-sacrifice for Palestine and for Allah.  Palestine is 
not the only authority to aggressively target children.  The 
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United States in the late 1980’s and 1990’s began an 
aggressive anti-drug campaign across the nation and in 
schools using many of the same methods.  The unsettling idea 
is the success of the anti-drug campaign may be similar to 
results from Palestine’s aggressive campaign.   
The Palestinian campaign left no part of a child’s 
life untouched by indoctrination.  Beginning in 1948, 
Palestinian children have been educated with anti-Israel 
books printed in Egypt and Jordan.  In 1967, Israel took 
over the West Bank and Gaza.  Anti-Israel statements were 
deleted from books but secret copies were still promulgated 
and taught at UNWRA schools of the refugee camps.  In 1993, 
after signing the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority 
under Yasser Arafat, assumed control of education.  Despite 
the requirements of the Oslo Accords, the deleted anti-
Israel incitement material was immediately reinstated.258  
Excerpts from pre-2000 texts include, “The youth will not 
tire, They desire to be free or perish, We draw our water 
from death, And we will not be as slaves to the enemy.”259  
These concepts are used not only in civics texts and texts 
on Islam but in every subject taught including Arabic 
language and grammar exercises, such as the following: 
“Determine what is the subject, and what is the predicate, 
in the following sentences: The jihad is a religious duty of 
every Moslem man and woman.”260 
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b. Television, Internet, Media 
Before September 2000, during the ‘Al Aqsa 
intifada’, newspapers and television programs advocated that 
children should sacrifice their lives for Jihad in the fight 
against Israel.261  Television campaigns featured emotional 
music that is often played at funeral processions for fallen 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad shahedeen.262  A television clip 
tells seven and eight-year-old children, “The time for toys 
and games is over, throw away your toys, pick up rocks,” and 
shows this happening.263  Another clip from PATV shows girls 
of about twelve with head covers waving flags.  One girl in 
the clip proclaims,  
We must all get together, we the children, to 
expel the enemy Israel.  All we ask is that the countries 
stand by our side, to help us, we’ll go and kill them, on 
our own, murder them, shoot them all.  Just give us weapons, 
the boys and girls. We will kill them all. We won’t leave a 
single Jew here.264   
Other clips express praise for martyrdom and show 
children excited to sacrifice their lives for Allah and 
telling their parents not to cry.  In 1998, television 
programs used the song and asked children to recite , “Ask 
from us blood, We will drench you…When I wander into 
Jerusalem I’ll turn into a feda’ye [warrior who sacrifices 
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himself]…”265  Although textbooks post-September 2000, have 
been sanitized, the message is delivered and driven home by 
verbal inputs of the teacher, as outlined in Palestinian 
Authority Teachers’ Guides, without any improprieties 
appearing in printed textbooks.266 
c. Children’s Participation 
Despite agreements to remove inciting statements, 
children are still indoctrinated in this region to a life of 
violence.  Statistics taken from PATV in 2000 report that 95 
individuals out of 207 (46 percent) martyred due to 
involvement in insurgency actions were children under the 
age of 18 in a twenty-five day period.  Palestinian 
statistics quoted by Moughrabi indicate that in three 
months, 105 deaths involved children as martyrs, 
constituting 30 percent of the total number of deaths.  In a 
report with data from 30 September 2000, through 31 August 
2002, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) listed 60 attacks.  Of 
those, six were under the age of 18 (ten percent).267  
Concern over the education of children is noteworthy due to 
the theory of social movement that states, “later 
generations tend to take ideology and collective action 
further—the more intense a member’s socialization is, the 
‘stronger the impetus to act.’” 268 
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B. SOCIAL WELFARE 
1. Hamas 
Organizations go to great lengths to provide basic 
support services for members of their targeted audiences.  
Hamas gained enough popular support over time to begin 
winning elections in its region.  Hamas worked with the 
poorest sectors of society as an unofficial charity and 
social work system.269  These organizations focused on 
providing education to future, potential recruits from 
kindergarten through the university level.  Hamas also ran 
health clinics, sports organizations, and orphanages in the 
Occupied Territories.  Unofficial estimates conclude that 
Hamas spends up to sixty percent of its income on charitable 
and social service activities.270 
2. IRA 
Organizations desiring a new government or separatist 
organizations focus their social welfare support on a 
specific constituency.  The IRA is an unofficial support 
system for catholic families.  The IRA provides for and 
legally protects these families when the state government 
fails to do so.  The LTTE is similar in its services to the 
Eelam Tamils.  The LTTE provides education, health, and 
welfare services to the Eelam Tamil diaspora.271 
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3. Aum Shinrikyo 
Sometimes the services provided by organizations are 
two-fold.  These organizations use social support 
organizations as a business front for other activities.  For 
example, Aum Shinrikyo undertakes both legal and illegal 
business ventures.  Some of these overlap.  The organization 
operates hospitals and health clinics serving the public, 
but these same facilities are used by scientists who gather 
pathogen cultures for seemingly benign purposes.  
Unfortunately, Aum Shinrikyo was actually collecting these 
samples in order to test chemical agents.272  Due to the 
religious nature of the organization, the provision of 
medical services did not raise any alarms with anti-
terrorist watch groups.  In fact, Aum Shinrikyo was able to 
establish cells in the United States without raising 
suspicion.  The U.S. did not want to create tensions with 
Japan by investigating a religious organization.  Aum 
Shinrikyo slid under the radar by first establishing non-
profit organizations and then gradually opened for-profit 
businesses at the same locations involved with the 
procurement of gas masks.273  The success of this business 
venture highlights the advantage terrorist organizations 
have in relatively open, accepting countries.  These states 
are less likely to investigate suspicious activity for fear 
of offending a foreign entity or its own domestic populace. 
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4. Hezbollah 
Hezbollah, like Hamas, undertakes social welfare 
programs in order to gain the trust, respect, and support of 
the local population.  Hezbollah provides health care, food, 
education, and financial services to local populations.  The 
success of these operations is evident by the election of 
Hezbollah members to seats in the Lebanese Parliament.274  
Often at odds with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 
Hezbollah prevents its supporters from defecting or becoming 
discouraged by repairing and rebuilding homes destroyed by 
the IDF.  Hezbollah established a unit called the Campaign 
for Reconstruction Institution specifically for repairing 
damaged homes.275  Including the aftermath of IDF Operation 
Accountability in 1993, and Grapes of Wrath in 1996, 
Hezbollah repaired more than one thousand homes between 1988 
and 1991.276  In addition to providing for local villages, 
Hezbollah established a Martyrs’ Foundation.  This 
foundation financially and materially supports the families 
of deceased members of the organization.  A Resupply 
Committee gives relief to the poor.  Looking out for the 
future support of Hezbollah, the organization runs summer 
camps and soccer leagues in southern villages.  These 
athletic associations provide a service to the community but 
also allow the organization to identify talented, athletic 
youth.277  The wide range of welfare activities supported by 
Hezbollah led to growing support, even among Lebanese 
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Christians.  This growing support and demonstration of 
social responsibility allows Hezbollah to survive leadership 
changes and to evolve into a recognized (by some entities) 
political organization. 
5. Al Qaeda 
Al Qaeda has a vast network of charitable cover 
organizations established in offices around the world, 
including the United States.  Often, though, these 
charitable organizations are a front to funding extremist 
groups.278  The network of these organizations flourishes in 
countries with liberal laws leaning more towards liberty 
than security.  Some of the charities linked to Osama bin 
Laden and al Qaeda include the Saudi Arabia-based 
International Islamic Relief Organization, Qatar Charitable 
Organization , Help Africa People in Kenya, Malaria Research 
Project in Somalia, and Mercy International in Kenya.279  
Terrorist organizations operate numerous businesses, legal 
and illegal, in order to cover for the clandestine funding 
of extremist groups.  For example, in 1993, Osama bin Laden 
began operating legitimate businesses in Kenya as a gateway 
to Somalia.  One business was in the diamond industry, 
another in the fishing industry, and the third was an 
Islamic charity.  This charity, was specifically for 
“victims of American aggression.”280  The specific cause of 
a charity may provide links and information about the 
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background of the organization supporting the charity.  The 
United States and other countries encounter difficulties 
investigating these organizations which seem charitable and 
legitimate for fear of using selective targeting against 
certain religious or ethnic groups.  As a result of the 
liberal laws in many Western countries, these organizations 
continue to operate rather freely, funneling charitable 
donations to terrorist organizations.281 
C. MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES 
The Afghan Arabs understood the importance of community 
support.  After the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Sheik Abdallah Azzam used the strong bonds of 
cohesion formed by fighting a greater threat to encourage 
the remaining Afghan Arab fighters to avoid fighting against 
one another but to unite against Christian encroachment on 
traditionally Muslim territories.  He rejected internal 
Muslim fighting as fitna and only focused on those lands 
that had once been in Muslim hands, such as the Philippines, 
Palestine, and Spain, but not Egypt, Jordan, or Syria.282  
This evolution of the jihad demonstrates the principle of 
internal cohesion amongst current members increasing due to 
an outside threat.  Additionally, this example also 
highlights society’s tendency to accept a radical 
organizations so long as the organizations do not target the 
immediate society.  Later, American infidel troops on holy 
land would also cause Muslims who traditionally did not 
agree to cooperate with one another.  In this case, the 
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members of society could choose between two evils: Saddam 
Hussein or infidel Westerners.  To the people of the society 
in the Middle East, infidels were the worst of the two.  
Individuals of society are more tolerant of their own 
members than foreigners.  For this reason, uniting various 
Muslim factions increased the tolerance and support for 
extremist organizations in the region. 
More formal methods of influence on society are also 
implemented by terrorist organizations.  In 2001, in Knights 
Under the Prophet’s Banner, Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined six 
methods of influence to use against the rest of society in 
this global jihad of al-Qaeda: “(1) The United Nations.(2) 
The friendly rulers of Muslim peoples. (3) The multinational 
corporations. (4) The international news agencies and 
satellite media channels. (6) The international relief 
agencies, which are used as a cover for espionage, 
proselytizing, coup planning and the transfer of 
weapons.”283  Al-Zawahiri stresses the importance of 
mobilization of the Muslim masses.  In order to gain their 
support, al-Zawahiri advocates providing services for the 
Muslim people and taking an active role in sharing and 
alleviating their concerns.  He notes that until the members 
of al Qaeda and similar organizations take proper care of 
the masses, the people will not fully support the 
organization.  Strikingly, al-Zawahiri communicates the 
importance of members of the organization taking personal 
responsibility for providing for the people.  He warns 
members from blaming state governments for the plight of the 
people.  Casting blame on others will potentially alienate 
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the masses.  Services for the people are achieved through 
the various organizations al Qaeda and associates set up in 
order to aid local populations.  The principle behind this 
effort is that the masses will support those who provide 
their basic needs.284 
D. MEDIA COVERAGE 
Media coverage gives legitimacy to terrorist 
organizations.  By airing the causes of the groups and 
highlighting their plight or mentioning affiliated 
organizations with the groups (NGOs) the media alerts the 
public to the cause of the organization.  This publicity 
provides those who might be sympathetic with a link to more 
information.  The Hamas-funded Islamic Association for 
Palestine (IAP) in Richardson, Texas, is an example. Once 
this organization and its location is public, individuals 
sympathetic to the cause have a place to pursue their desire 
for more action.285 
A terrorist act that does not receive media attention 
loses its effectiveness.  A successful attack results in 
media coverage detailing the attack and the message of the 
organization.  Success occurs when newspapers and internet 
sites publish analyses about the organization.  The time and 
resources dedicated to these analyses symbolize the growing 
strength of the organization.  Governments and society must 
consider these organizations once the media begins to give 
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them a legitimate voice.286  Media coverage is also 
beneficial to organizations when the press analyzes ongoing 
events such as hostage situations.  Experts close to the 
government who understand the political and military context 
of the situation openly discuss possible actions for 
resolving the crisis.  These analyses give warning to the 
terrorist organizations about the possible options and 
leanings of the states’ actions.287 
1. Three Types of Audiences 
a. Uncommitted Audience 
Terrorist organizations must utilize different 
methods of propaganda and use of media on different types of 
audiences.  The three main types are the uncommitted, 
sympathetic, and active audiences.  The uncommitted audience 
consists of the general public of the country in which the 
organization operates and international public opinion.288  
Propaganda targeted at this audience is general in nature.  
It introduces the uncommitted audience to the basic aims of 
the group.  The goals of the group are often discussed in a 
way to compare the current state of affairs for members of 
the uncommitted audience to the end state of the 
organization.  Reactionary measures taken by the state in 
response to terrorist attacks represent the oppressive  
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manner of the state.  Propaganda at this level focuses on 
discrediting the state and providing an outlet for future 
support.289  
One method of attacking the credibility of the 
state is to “accuse it of unlawful and surreptitious 
actions” or claiming irresponsibility and practices of 
torture on prisoners by security forces.290  The most recent 
examples of these methods include the United States own 
internal difficulties faced after discovery of the National 
Security Agency’s surveillance programs.  Detainees held in 
Guantanamo Bay routinely claim inhumane treatment under 
custody of the United States military.  The liberal laws of 
the state allow its citizens liberties but reduce their 
security.  Terrorist organizations are aided in such 
societies where the citizens themselves begin to protest 
protective measures undertaken by the state.  Claiming 
practices of torture is a common method used to attempt to 
represent the state as the oppressor of the people.   
Historical examples include the allegations of 
torture and brutality conducted by British authorities 
against members of the PIRA since August 1971.291  The PIRA 
issued statements less than a month after their detonation 
of a bomb at the Conservative Party’s conference in Brighton 
bearing striking resemblance to today’s statements from 
Osama bin Laden.  Gerry Adams described the attack as a 
result of Britain’s occupation.  Owen Carron, elected as 
Westminster MP, condemned the violence, but stated,  
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the major part of violence is created and 
maintained by Britain.  All other violence is a 
counter to the state violence of the security 
forces.  The real terrorists are the UDR and the 
Police.292   
This effective use of the media targets the uncommitted 
audience as it transfers blame directly to the state.  
Justifications are used to explain the stance of the 
terrorist organization to the commoner.  The PIRA explained 
to the public that their constituency had long suffered from 
oppression by the British and could not settle for partial 
agreements.  The PIRA displayed confidence in their goal and 
ability to achieve it.293  Like Osama bin Laden’s messages 
of today, the PIRA announced it was ready for a long 
struggle against the moral transgressions committed by the 
British.  Al Qaeda justifies its violence to the uncommitted 
audience by discussing the need for a long-term struggle for 
religious purity in a land that was once Islamic but not 
overrun with western infidels.   
For other terrorist organizations, propaganda 
targets the uncommitted audience in order to distribute the 
organization’s ideology.  This approach is especially true 
for organizations not widely known or understood.  In the 
case of the FLQ and the kidnapping of Laporte, the simple 
act of media coverage gave more leverage to the terrorist 
organization, forcing the government to act in the open.  In 
this scenario, terrorist organizations are elevated to equal 
status as state governments.  For this reason, state 
governments are selective about the level of representatives 
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they send as emissaries to foreign states and non-state 
actors.294  The FLQ achieved one of its main goals of 
distributing its manifesto through Canadian radio during the 
kidnapping negotiations.  The kidnappings were receiving 
large amounts of press coverage and while the group 
retreated on several of its demands, it did not back down 
from demanding the distribution of its manifesto.295  This 
use of the media on the uncommitted audience was before the 
influence of the Internet.  Information read on the air 
waves that was heard in each Canadian’s household on the 
radio sent a powerful message.  A group with the ability to 
force its message onto the radio had determination, 
organization, and strength.  Uncommitted members of society 
unfamiliar with the organization or issue could be persuaded 
that the group had more power than it actually did.  These 
members of society are the most easily influenced because 
they could also come to think that a larger number of Quebec 
Canadians supported the notion of a separate Quebec than 
actually did.  This influence could have potentially 
influenced future referendums on the topic.  Again, the FLQ 
also gained possible support and shed negative light on the 
state during the negotiation process.  The state made 
illegal arrests leading to public criticism from the Quebec 
Journalists Union.  Public criticism from respected sources 
legitimized the demands of the terrorist organization.  This 
criticism even caused members of a previously uncommitted 
society to withdraw support from the state after the media 
criticized the illegal arrests.296   
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Influence of the uncommitted audience can be a 
gradual process.  Ayatollah Khomeini used subtle means to 
educate the general public about his cause.  He used audio 
cassette tapes to distribute his revolutionary sermons to 
Iran.297  Due to the subtle and gradual infiltration of his 
ideas, when he did make a physical move to remove the shah, 
the former regime was taken by surprise.  These tapes, in 
order to be effective though, needed to reach the masses and 
not just a small elite.  The uncommitted audience must feel 
that their introduction to new ideas has already been 
accepted by a majority of the remaining public. 
The media is able to convey messages to the 
general public and influence general opinion, in some cases, 
enough to change or demand policy action or change.  
Reagan’s handling of TWA flight 847’s hostages allowed 
terrorism to become a legitimate tool for negotiation.  Due 
to intense domestic pressure, the Reagan administration then 
compelled Israel to work with the terrorists for the release 
of the hostages.  In exchange for the hostages, 756 
imprisoned Shi’a were released to Hezbollah.298  Members of 
the media, while supposedly objective, can feel compassion 
for the hostages and act as an instrument on their behalf.  
A CBS White House correspondent explained the media wanted 
to force the Administration to place the hostages lives 
above foreign policy.299  U.S. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger and National Security Advisor, Zbignew Brzinski, 
explained their feelings about media coverage during a 
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hostage crisis: “The febrile television coverage afforded to 
hijackings and hostage situations involving American 
citizens complicates and undermines governmental efforts to 
obtain their release.”300  Policy options are limited when 
the event is public knowledge on television before the 
government has time to implement different options.  This 
gives adversaries an idea of what the government’s options 
are and how the public supports them.  Terrorists use the 
media to force the hand of governments to make a decision 
rather than exhausting all policy options.  Lloyd Cutler, 
counselor to President Carter during the Iran Hostage Crisis 
explains, “If an ominous foreign event is featured on TV 
news, the President and his advisors feel bound to make a 
response in time for the next evening news program.”301  The 
focus of the media is not necessarily on the causes of the 
terrorist attack, at least not initially, but on the human 
elements of the tragedy.302  The larger picture is largely 
ignored while policy-makers are pressured to find satisfying 
measures to quickly resolve the issue.  The time constraints 
pressure governments to act without being given the time to 
thoroughly analyze the situation and formulate effective 
responses.303 
Terrorist organizations use the media to target 
the uncommitted audience and to show the weaknesses of state 
governments, but the media can also be used against 
terrorist organizations.  Media coverage is easily slanted, 
but can be used to exploit the weaknesses of organizations.  
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For example, Abimael Guzman, leader of the Shining Path, was 
tracked down and captured by following his use of 
medications for medical conditions.  His capture was largely 
orchestrated by the Peruvian authorities and press to show 
Guzman as a foolish criminal.  Cameras filmed him from a 
distance to make him seem like a dangerous animal instead of 
in an intimate setting.  In the video, he appears to be 
shouting because he was unaware that the microphones were 
actually much closer to him.  By using these techniques, the 
media was able to avoid Guzman’s capture as a potential 
rallying point for Shining Path members.  Instead, their 
organization no longer appeared to be a threat and was not 
feared.304 The uncommitted audience after this point no 
longer allowed itself to be swayed by the organization. 
b. Sympathetic Audience 
The sympathetic audience consists of individuals 
already familiar with an organization’s goals.  This 
audience contains the people most likely to provide food, 
shelter, and other basic necessities to operatives for a 
night without asking questions.  This audience does not 
easily give information to authorities and contains the pool 
of potential recruits for the organization.305  The 
sympathetic audience, once determined that this set of 
people agree with the aims of the organization, need to be 
prepared to accept that the only way of achieving those aims  
                     
304 Pamala L. Griest and Sue Mahan, “Reporting Terrorism,” in 
Terrorism in Perspective, (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 
2003), 137. 
305 Wright, “The Uncommitted Audience,” 77.   
 173
is through violence.  Arguments, justifications, and pleas 
for action are more strongly worded when targeting this 
group. 
For example, Hezbollah has its own television 
station which is used to cover operations carried out by 
Hezbollah as well as to interview and brief foreign 
journalists.306  Owning a television station allows an 
organization to broadcast its own form of propaganda, 
focusing on the specific audience it chooses.  
Justifications and interviews are tailored to continue 
justifying the group’s ideology as well as providing 
sympathizers with a link to the organization as how to 
become more involved.  Hezbollah has various websites which 
focus on different parts of their overall goal.  Hezbollah 
can monitor which sites receive the most hits to determine 
what types of audiences they are attracting.  Then the 
organization can tailor its recruiting methods to the 
interests of those monitoring their websites.307 
Publications aimed at the sympathetic audience are 
more likely to be written in language that attracts the 
sympathetic reader and not the general public.  The Red Army 
Faction (RAF) used a writing style in its manifestos, 
analytical papers, and pamphlets that would only attract 
readers with left-wing interests.308  These written forms of 
propaganda targeting a sympathetic audience rationalized the 
need for violence as a retort against the oppressive actions 
of the state.  Publications highlighted instances of the 
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government sending police to stop student demonstrations, 
and the use of state surveillance preventing RAF members 
from meeting to hold non-violent meetings.  These pressures, 
explained the propaganda, left no alternative for the group 
but violence.309 
With the increasingly availability of technology 
as discussed in the previous section on means of maintaining 
cohesion within the organization, technology such as the 
Internet is another mode of communication to target 
sympathetic or curious members of society.  Al-Qaeda had an 
official, though, short-lived website containing poetry 
justifying the need for a jihad as well as critical analysis 
of American military and academic counterterrorist 
publications.310  A public website that is accessible to 
those with an Internet connection allows the general 
population as well as those with a more serious interest to 
learn more about the organization besides what is expressed 
through commercial media conduits. 
Robust terrorist organizations do not only use 
their own publications and resources as avenues of spreading 
their intent.  Setmariam, before September 11, 2001, worked 
diligently to disseminate jihadist ideology to potentially 
sympathetic audience members.  He cooperated with official, 
state-run organizations such as the Information Ministry of 
the Islamic Ministry of Afghanistan, Radio Kabul, and the 
Al-Ghuraba Center for Studies.  Within these organizations, 
he wrote and published articles and video cassettes 
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discussing and encouraging jihadist ideology.311  Note that 
these organizations, though state-run, were run by a state 
with a government, the Taliban, supportive and cooperative 
of al Qaeda.  In the future, extremist articles such as 
these should be closely monitored as to which publications 
are accepting them.  Organizations and the state which 
support those publications may be supportive or at least 
sympathetic to extremist organizations.  A society which 
only has access to one frame of mind for ideology as was the 
case in Afghanistan, has no alternative sources for beliefs 
and is more likely to accept and eventually support 
terrorist organizations.  
Terrorist and other organizations must know the 
sympathetic audience they are trying to attract for active 
support and be culturally sensitive.  For example, the PIRA, 
wanting to recruit support from American Irish, painted over 
a mural in Belfast depicting cooperation between the PLO and 
PIRA, recognizing that Americans would not want to associate 
a group in cooperation with the PLO.  By tailoring the 
speech and appeals, an organization is more likely to 
connect with a sympathetic audience that is culturally 
different.  Links in two cultures’ histories can be powerful 
means of cohesion.   The United States and Britain have 
remained close allies despite recent differences because of 
the shared history between the two cultures.  The PIRA can 
appeal to Irish Americans who still want to have a 
connection to their homeland by comparing the American 
Revolutionary War to the desire the Irish have to be 
independent from Britain as well.  These types of appeals 
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work well with diaspora populations.  The concept of a 
culture being injured and needing redemption is a powerful 
emotional appeal.312 
c. Active Audience 
The active audience includes recruits, active 
members, and incarcerated members of a terrorist 
organization.  These individuals take part in the planning, 
training, and execution of operations.  These audience 
members are self-confessed participants in the 
organization.313  Propaganda aimed at active members of the 
group serve to reinforce their beliefs, justify violence, 
and to resolve any feelings of guilt an individual may have 
over committing a terrorist attack.314  Propaganda 
reinforces cyclical violence and competition between various 
groups to become center stage in the larger organization’s 
plans.315  The participation of producing publications and 
propaganda aimed at the uncommitted and sympathetic 
audiences simultaneously reinforces the foundation of the 
active audience by reminding them of the principles and 
norms of the group and increasing their cohesion as they 
work to bring others into the group.316 
Important types of propaganda directed toward an 
active audience are receptacles for the storage of the 
organization’s knowledge.  Setmariam posted a sixteen 
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hundred page book to the Internet, The Call for Global 
Islamic Resistance.  This book focuses on the nature of 
future conflict and battles for jihadists.  The book is a 
culmination of this leader’s thinking as to how the 
international jihad should be strategically and tactically 
battled.317  This propaganda reinforces the belief in the 
jihad, encourages distant nodes to continue their fight, and 
provides a common baseline for a widespread network.  
Videotapes of Setmariam’s lectures in al Qaeda training 
camps circulate through the network.318  These videotapes 
are akin to the website postings but in a different format, 
that must be physically captured instead of technically 
intercepted in order to harm the network.  These videotapes 
are guidelines for future members of the organization to 
follow when carrying out their acts.  Again, publications 
originating from the organization’s leadership will increase 
the cohesive bonds between cells as they receive the same 
information from the training videos. 
d. Summary of Audience Types 
Each of the three audiences requires slightly 
different indoctrination in order to lead to active 
participation.  A strong organization will focus a portion 
of its resources to producing propaganda targeting each 
different audience.  Counter-terrorism strategies should 
also apply the same strategy and use an aggressive 
propaganda war in order to prevent further individuals from 
becoming sympathetic and subsequently active audience 
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members.  Providing alternatives and differing, concise 
opinions will prevent entire societies from falling under 
the influence of a single organization.  At the same time, 
counter-terrorism strategies must include cultural 
sensitivity to avoid offending individuals and leading them 
to support terrorist organizations as a more suitable 
alternative. 
E. RECRUITMENT 
Recruitment of new terrorist members into their 
organizations must be a constant operation.  While 
recruitment is constant, so is attrition.319  Members become 
too old to be of operational use, they defect to competing 
organizations, or are killed during operations. 
As mentioned previously, recruitment often stems from 
propaganda which must be tailored to the specific audience 
to include its cultural, social, and historical context.320  
Religious terrorist groups place special emphasis on 
recruitment because part of their mission is to build a 
larger base of converts to their ideology.  Part of this 
involves actively recruiting and proselytizing potential 
recruits.321  One of the basic assumptions of this thesis is 
that terrorists are difficult to profile and do not meet a 
specific profile.  Recruits, therefore, do not meet specific 
background criteria, though some circumstances in regions of 
the world do create favorable conditions for recruitment.  
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For example, Islamic terrorist organizations focus their 
recruiting on two types of individuals.  Martyrs are 
recruited from populations of little to no prospect of 
social or economic advancement.  These individuals are often 
highly devoted to their religion.  Terrorist organizations 
also recruit long-term members from the more middle-class 
members of society.  These individuals may have specific 
technical or language skills needed by the organization.  
These recruits come from all over the world and differing 
economic situations.  Diaspora communities provide excellent 
sources of potential recruits who are frustrated with their 
inability to meet raised expectations of material wealth.322 
Individuals join groups for different reasons depending 
on their background.  Some join because they view the 
organization as the only means of change.  Others join 
organization out of political or religious motivation.  
Regardless,  
Potential terrorist group members often start out 
as sympathizers of the group.  Recrutis often 
come from support organizations, such as prisoner 
support groups or student activist groups. From 
sympathizer, one moves to passive supporter.  
Often, violent encounters with police or other 
security forces motivate an already socially 
alienated individual to join a terrorist group.323   
Examples of individuals joining a terrorist organization 
from a support group include ETA personnel who were 
originally members of the support group, ‘Act Women!’  This 
feminist movement worked with the Henri Batasuna party, part 
of the ETA’s political wing.  While in support roles, the  
                     
322 Jenkins, “An Appreciation for the Situation,” 38.   
323 Hudson, 36. 
 180
 
women became frustrated with the treatment of prisoners and 
decided the best way to counteract the abuse was to join the 
ETA itself.324 
Sometimes recruitment is a formal indoctrination 
process, and at other times, it is an informal process 
either self-initiated or through personal contacts.  Common 
techniques of recruitment include initial contact between 
potential recruit and recruiting resulting in subsequent and 
more in-depth contact, and subsequent interaction leading to 
identity transformation by the recruit.325  This process 
includes the norms of group processes and cohesion as 
explained in the second section of this thesis.   
1. Models of Recruitment 
The following sections will discuss the models of 
recruitment, the net, funnel, infection, and seed 
crystal.326  These are not original ideas in this thesis but 
incorporated with factual examples to demonstrate how 
terrorist groups interact with and affect society. 
a. Net Model of Recruitment 
In the net model of recruitment, each member of a 
specific population is targeted equitably, for example, by 
being sent videotapes or reading material in the mail.  When 
recruiting is undertaken, the organization must properly 
prime the population with other propaganda so that the 
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population is ready for recruitment into the active audience 
phase.  Homogenous populations work well for the net model 
because a single approach is needed to reach a large number 
of individuals.  The net is also effective when the targeted 
population contains little to no serious resistance to the 
organization’s ideology.327   
An example of the net model would be a mosque 
headed by an imam widely recognized as an extremist. Those 
who attend are ready to receive the recruiting pitch without 
additional preparation.  This would be effective in regions 
such as the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, which 
is known to have a population sympathetic to al-Qaeda.328  
Other net models of recruitment include lengthy education 
processes.  Madrassas, responsible for the education of 
large numbers of Muslim children, mostly male, tailor 
curriculums based on the specific ideology of the madrassas’ 
leadership.  In some cases, the basics of mathematics and 
science are largely ignored.  The focus of sixteen years’ 
worth of education is on theology, recitation of the Koran, 
interpretation of Sharia Law, and even indoctrination for 
jihad.329 
The success of the net model of recruitment is 
evidenced in organizations such as the JI.  Many of the JI 
operatives apprehended began their education and training at 
facilities in Indonesia and Malaysia.  One school in 
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particular near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, 
is connected to key JI operatives.  The school is known for 
its devotion to teaching Salafism and a conservative 
interpretation of the Koran.  The lengthy religious training 
offered by these schools, Sungkar, Ba’asyir, and Pondok 
Ngruki, provided opportunities to recruit and indoctrinate 
individuals for militant Islamic activities.  This lengthy 
education allows JI to be selective in its recruitment 
process.  The students showing the most devotion and loyalty 
to both their teachers and the principles being taught are 
then more actively recruited into the organization.330 
The Taliban and al Qaeda actively recruit from 
regional mosques and madrasses using the net approach.  
Results in terms of the numbers of recruits are impressive.  
The Taliban reportedly requested Deobandi groups at 
madrassas in Pakistan to send roughly five hundred thousand 
volunteers to fight alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda 
against the Americans following September 11, 2001.  The 
request for this large number, even if it is inflated, 
demonstrates the overwhelming support for the organizations 
in the region.  Witnesses reported long lines of potential 
recruits at Pakistani madrassas near the Afghanistan border.  
The popularity of certain mosques and madrassas is 
increasing as leaders of terrorist organizations are found 
to have graduated from certain radical madrassas.  At least 
eight of the Taliban cabinet ministers in Kabul graduated 
from the same madrassa, Haqqania.  Dozens of other graduates  
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of the madrassa served as Taliban governors, military 
commanders, and other civil-service positions in the 
government.331   
The success of these graduates have increased the 
popularity of the mosque such that the number of applicants 
far exceeds the number of available spots.  In February 
1999, the Haqqania madrassa was the most popular with a 
“staggering 15,000 applicants for some 400 new places.”332  
This growth of the madrassa is not a recent phenomenon. 
Since roughly 1947, madrassas have been increasing at a 
roughly exponential rate.  In Pakistan, in 1947, roughly 137 
madrassas existed, and by 1970, there were 900.  The Soviet 
Union invasion of Afghanistan fueled the explosion of 
madrasses in neighboring Pakistan.  By 1988, 8,000 madrassas 
were registered in Pakistan along with an estimated 25,000.  
Estimates range at one million students receiving their 
primary education from these schools instead of secular, 
state-run school systems.  In some regions, the only option 
for young children, mostly male, to receive any type of 
education was to attend the local madrassa.  In the year 
2000, Pakistan contains roughly 9,500 registered madrassas 
and between 40,000 and 50,000 unregistered ones.333  These 
numbers should also be compared though with the growth of 
the population in the area and the actual number of students 
enrolled and for what length of time in the madrassas.  Note 
that not all of these schools are radical in their 
teachings.  Education at some of the more radical mosques 
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neglecting basic mathematics and science curriculums has 
resulted in extremist ideology and “created enormous 
internal concentrations of armed, trained, and indoctrinated 
irregular forces” that can be called upon using the net 
approach by larger organizations.334  These students are 
homogenous in their educational background and primed for 
recruitment, suiting this target audience to the net model 
of recruitment. 
Organizations also use the net model for 
recruitment to attract members of the general population who 
are not already being indoctrinated within educational 
institutional systems favorable to the organization.  
Written publications targeting wide audiences for 
recruitment are also effective.  In 2002, videocassette 
tapes distributed by an Islamic organization in Paddington, 
London depicted members of the Taliban decapitating Northern 
Alliance soldiers with knives.  Similar recruiting materials 
were discovered at the Finnsbury Park Mosque in London.  
This is the mosque once attended by Zacarias Moussaoui and 
Richard Reid, the alleged sneaker bomber.335  These 
materials are general in nature and distributed at mosques 
where the populations attending are likely to show little 
resistance to such recruiting techniques.  These materials 
will help recruiters within al Qaeda and similar 
organizations those individuals most sympathetic to the 
cause.  These written materials reinforce the beliefs and 
operating norms of the organization while also attracting 
and providing additional information to potential recruits.   
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In network organizations with a flattened command 
and control system, formal recruitment is more difficult, 
especially in regions that are not accepting of outward 
terrorist activities.  For these reasons, recruitment into 
large organizations like al Qaeda is largely a bottom-up 
process involving few resources.  The exception to this is 
the Tablighi group, which  
actively seeks to convert young Muslims to its 
version of Islam.  Tablighi students come to 
Pakistan to study.  Perhaps some al Qaeda 
‘recruiters’ came to the Tablighi schools to 
inspire some students to join the jihad and 
succeeded in convincing some students to take 
military training at al Qaeda camps in 
neighboring Afghanistan.  After assessment at the 
camp, the prospective candidate might have been 
formally invited to join the jihad.  But 
generally, these activities took place only in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, or perhaps Saudi Arabia.336  
This formalized process was more difficult to 
achieve following the dismantling of the Taliban and 
destruction of various training facilities in Afghanistan.  
Propaganda and recruiting videos are circulated for a two-
fold purpose in religious terrorist organizations.  The 
organization wants to gain religious converts to its beliefs 
as well as engendering support for the actual organization.  
For this reason, religious organizations can use the net 
model approach to spread recruiting propaganda through 
religious places of worship. 
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b. Funnel Model of Recruitment 
The funnel approach in recruiting is an 
incremental or phased approach used when a population is 
primed for recruitment but requires significant identity 
transformation.  This approach is characterized by phases 
such as hazing rituals, group identity-building exercises 
or, in the case of al Qaeda, validation of commitment to its 
principles demonstrated through acts of violence.337  This 
process results in some recruits leaving the recruitment 
process along the way, but those who finish the 
transformation process emerge with radically polarized and 
altered attitudes along lines desired by the organization.  
Even those who exit the recruitment process may still have 
positive benefits for the group by developing a sense of 
respect for the organization and serving as intermediaries 
for future recruits or remaining a part of the sympathetic 
audience.338 
Al Qaeda, before September 11, 2001, heavily 
recruited from madrassas in Pakistan.  Teachers, also acting 
as scouts for al Qaeda used the schools to identify possible 
candidates for training.  The recruits were then separated 
from other students and given a stronger focus on religious 
learning in small groups.  Members of these small groups 
memorized long passages of the Koran and repeated them five 
times a day as a group to develop a sense of group identity 
and cohesion.  This was the initial step in the 
indoctrination process.  The recruits were initially 
identified and then slowly separated from others to continue 
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their ideological indoctrination.339  Note that even though 
this process took place at the madrassa, it is still 
slightly different from the net approach used at madrassas 
due to the separation of these potential recruits into their 
own group.  Military instruction also prepared these 
potential recruits.  Blood initiations or rites of passage, 
were conducted as an act of sealing the youths together in 
their loyalty for one another and for Allah.  Oaths to one 
another are the most simple and conducted through spoken 
commitment.  As the process continued, the youths were 
required to mark themselves and declare their loyalty to the 
organization’s emir and eventually to the cause of the 
organization.  After final initiations, these potential 
recruits emerged as members of an “elite and holy 
fraternity…The members of the fraternity acted in absolute 
secrecy.  They were instructed not to inform their parents 
of their mission.”340  The funnel process is slow and more 
formal than other forms of recruitment.  The separation of 
recruits from society is crucial to the success of funnel 
recruitment.  This separation allows the individual to only 
experience influences from the organization.  Each step is 
incremental so that each progression of loyalty is natural 
to the recruit resulting in internalization of the group’s 
values and identity transformation. 
c. Infection Model of Recruitment 
The infection method of recruitment is used on a 
population that is difficult to reach externally with mass 
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propaganda.  Trusted agents insert themselves into a 
population and slowly gain trust and respect from targeted 
individuals.  The agent uses direct, personal appeals after 
a relationship has been established to influence the 
potential recruit.  Advantages to this approach include 
source credibility, social comparison and validation, and 
specifically tailored appeals to individuals.  This approach 
is long-term and requires time to reap benefits.341   This 
approach is most likely to work in groups such as the police 
or military, where most members are not extremists.  An 
agent may be able to recruit members who are dissatisfied 
with their jobs or who have a grudge against their 
organization or government.  The infection would be 
regionally successful in areas such as Kenya or Tanzania 
where the majority of the population is unsympathetic to al-
Qaeda but selected individuals could be recruited for al-
Qaeda operations.  In order to have widespread success, this 
approach is achieved in areas where the population has no 
strong leanings one way or the other against the 
organization and the state is not actively pursuing the 
organization. 
Following Nasser’s death, small, clandestine 
groups began meeting at universities in the 1970’s.  
Unknowingly, the infection form of recruitment began to take 
place.  The prominent organization to develop was the Jamaat 
Islamiyya in Cairo, Alexandria, and other provincial 
capitals in Upper Egypt.  Using previously discussed methods 
of social welfare approaches, Islamic student associations 
provided students with school-oriented services including 
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transportation, class notes, and summer camps.  Students who 
did not belong to this organization tolerated their spread 
because of their services they provided.  By 1977, these 
student organizations were the dominant groups on campuses.  
Islamic student associations controlled the university 
newspapers, introducing Salafist ideas to the student body 
as in Qutb’s Milestones.  As student associations slowly 
spread more radical ideas, university students became 
frustrated with the slow pace of the peace process and 
sought more extreme forms of protest, culminating in 
violence.342  Since these groups focused on jihad and a 
government coup, absolute secrecy and security was essential 
to escape Egyptian counterintelligence.  As a result, al-
Zawahiri’s group only recruited members with great caution, 
using friendship or kinship ties to protect against 
potential denunciations, such as Issam al-Qamari.343  Al-
Qamari was a member of the Egyptian military who was 
befriended by Muhammad Ulaywah whose brother, Ulwi Mustafa 
Ulaywah, was a member of al-Zawahriri’s group.  Through the 
brothers, al-Qamari eventually became the group’s major foci 
of security and military presence in the group.  His 
military position allowed him to even divert some weapons to 
the group.344   
This example demonstrates cohesion within a 
clandestine terrorist organization as well as the methods of 
influence on society.  Gradual indoctrination through social 
services and propaganda primes a population for future 
                     




recruitment or at least leads to a sympathetic and passive 
audience.  Recruitment itself is not always a formal process 
because of the difficulty of evading counterterrorist 
organizations’ intelligence services.  Cohesion within the 
group’s leadership often focuses on ties of family and 
friendship.  The infection is slow, but once it takes root, 
is difficult to deter. 
d. Seed Crystal Method of Recruitment 
The fourth method of recruitment is the seed 
crystal.  This approach targets an inaccessible population 
where agents would not be trusted and a media net would not 
convey the full message of the organization.  Self-
recruitment must occur in these situations.  After self-
recruitment occurs, then the infection process may follow.  
An individual who has experiences or personal ties with an 
organization but has not necessarily been associated with 
the group may seek out ways to become more active.  The seed 
crystal approach is utilized in states which are actively 
pursuing terrorist organizations such as the United 
States.345   
Before the infection method of recruitment took 
place in Egypt, seed crystal or self-recruitment occurred.  
In Egypt, where media coverage is highly censored, 
especially in the late 1960’s, small, clandestine groups of 
friends met and made pacts with one another to change their 
circumstances.  Al-Zawahiri is a product of one such group 
who was influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb.  In 1966, 
he, his brother, and three high school friends made a secret 
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pact to oppose the Nasser regime along the lines advocated 
by Qutb.  Usually, these groups are unconnected to a larger 
movement and fade over time, as people grow up and move on 
with their lives, but for some, circumstances permit the 
groups to continue.  In al-Zawahiri’s case, they wanted to 
be revolutionaries but did not know how to proceed.  Most of 
these groups in Egypt were made up of young, restless 
students, mostly male, who were searching for meaning.  They 
were small, disorganized, and largely unaware of each other 
because the repressive political climate of Egypt prevented 
them from advertising their existence and reaching out to 
each other.  The goal of these small groups was that after 
Nasser was removed, such groups would immediately combine, 
and an Islamic society would spontaneously emerge.346 
Without physical facilities to train at and 
without complete freedom to actively recruit individuals, 
network organizations may utilize the seed crystal followed 
by the infection modes of recruitment more now than in the 
past.  As populations are dispersed around the globe but 
still connected through technology, recruiting within 
diaspora populations may lead to the most success.  The seed 
crystal approach is often the initial method of recruitment 
or interest in diaspora populations living in states 
unsympathetic to extremist organizations.  One example of 
such recruiting is the Hamburg cell which planned the 
September 11 attacks.  The Hamburg cell consisted of eight 
friends who gradually came to know one another through 
religious studies, university studies, and as roommates. As 
the men learned about one another, they increasingly shared 
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their lives, sharing apartments, vehicles, and bank 
accounts.  Together, they reinforced their religious views.  
They prayed five times a day and followed a strict Islamic 
diet.  Conversations naturally led to topics of interest to 
young, dispersed Islamic men.  They discussed their views 
about Israel and the Middle East.  Entertainment was 
provided by watching battlefield videos and singing songs 
about martyrdom.347  These individuals fed off of one 
another and helped to keep one another in line with the rest 
of the groups’ norms.  As the members of the group 
interacted more with one another, they stopped interacting 
with members of their larger society.  The Hamburg cell is 
an example of group polarization.  Within the group, extreme 
norms, because they were accepted by the group which thought 
the rest of society was in the wrong, did not seem so 
extreme any longer.  As the eight friends from Hamburg 
prepared themselves to join the jihad, “Mohamadou Ould 
Slahi, the brother-in-law of a close lieutenant of Osama bin 
Laden and who was living in Germany, discouraged them from 
going to Grozny and suggested instead that they go to 
Afghanistan for training.”348  This example showcases the 
use of close, personal relationships in guiding, directing, 
and recruiting terrorist members.  At no point were the 
members actively recruited.  They, themselves, sought out a 
means of joining the jihad.  The Hamburg cell highlights the 
seed crystal method of recruitment because the individuals 
first formed a smaller group based on common interests and 
views.  This tight-knit group preceded formal induction into 
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a larger network.  Personal relationships strengthen 
commitment to a larger group.  These bonds between 
individuals encourage the individual person to remain 
committed to a larger cause the smaller group supports.  The 
larger organization itself will witness an increase in 
cohesion because individuals within the organization are 
already loyal to one another.  Thus, the process of group 
identity is hastened as individuals want the goals of their 
close friends and kin to succeed as well. 
e. Summary 
Different methods of recruiting require different 
types of communication.  Individuals in all societies do not 
have the same level of accessibility or knowledge of the 
organization of their interest.   
2. Four Types of Communication in Recruitment 
The four main types of communication have two factors, 
public versus private availability, and proximate versus 
mediated exchanges.   
a. Public and Proximate 
Public and proximate communication occurs when the 
greater population is accepting of the organization and 
secrecy is not needed.  A more hierarchical, rigid command 
and control process can be utilized because the organization 
does not need to evade authorities as much as in other 
societies.  Recruiting in this quadrant is conducted in a 
face-to-face manner or in smaller groups visible to the 
general public or authorities, such as in prisons, refugee 
camps, or large-scale war-time experiences.  Recruiters can 
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directly approach individuals they feel ready for active 
participation.349  Even if the larger society is opposed to 
the organization but allows the organization to hold 
meetings, this form of communication can be used, as in 
mosques located in relatively conservative Christian north 
Dallas, Texas.  This type of command, control, and 
communication is most amenable to the infection method of 
recruitment.  The recruiter, either an officially designated 
recruiter or a person knowledgeable about how to join the 
organization, has face-to-face access to the audience, with 
few restrictions.  Liberal countries with laws protecting 
freedom of speech and press are also agreeable to this form 
of communication.350 
b. Public and Mediated 
Public and mediated communication occurs when 
society is open and accepting of free speech and differing 
opinions.  This method works well when close contact with 
potential recruits is not possible but society has few 
limitations on types of solicitation.  The mass media, to 
include the Internet is included in this type of 
communication because of the lack of requirement to be in 
physical contact with one another.  Communication in this 
category includes websites that are on well-known public 
domains and do not require passwords.  Specific elements of 
a population may be targeted, such as young, single men, or 
the devout members of a religious congregation.  This method 
of communication is appropriate for either a net or seed 
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crystal approach because personal access to the target 
audience is not necessarily available.  If the seed crystal 
approach does not immediately seem logical, it is because a 
fairly open society has difficulty restricting what the 
population hears, sees, or reads.  The norms of society may 
limit large, physical gatherings of such interest, but the 
information is still available.   
Osama bin Laden’s broadcasts on al-Jazeera are one 
such example of this type of communication.  He is not able 
to directly contact supporters, but uses a mode of 
communication that does not heavily censor its material.351  
Leadership in al-Qaeda periodically releases jihadist or 
martyrdom videos and makes statements to various newspapers 
in the Arab world decrying the United States and its role in 
Iraq and Israel.  These demonstrate how the organization 
uses public channels to prime specific segments of the 
population for recruitment.352  Osama bin Laden’s 1996 
declaration of “War Against the Americans Occupying the land 
of the two Holy Places (Expel the Infidels from the Arab 
Peninsula)” is an example of a declaration that is aimed at 
both members of the organization, adversaries, sympathizers, 
and potential members of the organization.353  This 
declaration expressed the defensive nature (in 1996) of the 
jihad.  This document is one means of communicating with a 
large, widely dispersed organization.  Potential members and 
associates according to this declaration should have 
immediately understood the nature of the desired campaign to 
                     
351 Daly and Gerwehr, 82. 
352 Ibid.  
353 Sageman, “Origins of the Jihad,” 19. 
 196
remove the infidels from Muslim lands.  In February 1998, 
Osama bin Laden released another fatwa of the World Islamic 
Front declaring, “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.”354  The 
contents of this declaration are another command and control 
mechanism to communicate with the global society.  It is a 
cue to members and associates that the time has come to step 
up operations and think about more offensive strategies.  
The U.S. “occupation” of Saudi Arabia, support for Israel, 
and the killing of Iraqi children was a “clear declaration 
of war on Allah, his Messenger, and Muslims” thus allowing a 
more global jihad to take place.355 
c. Private and Proximate 
Private and proximate may be best suited to 
societies which do not condone the activities of extremist 
groups but who largely allow free speech and flow of human 
and information traffic.  The command and control structure 
in this setting must be flattened because rigid structural 
processes are more difficult.  Private and proximate 
communication may be needed in states that do not 
necessarily allow different types of groups to hold meetings 
unless approved of by the state.  Communication is held out 
of the public eye and in intimate settings.356  A place of 
religious worship which is not open to the general public 
fits this category because communications are basically held 
away from the public in this facility.  Private clinics, 
neighbors’ homes, and physical but clandestine training 
facilities like those in the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
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Malaysia serve as locations of private and proximate 
communications.  This method uses peers, often individuals 
the group is relatively close to through friendship or kin, 
increasing the likelihood of acceptance by the group and 
formation of a group identity.  Private and proximate 
communications require a less rigid form of command and 
control because a central authority does not have the 
ability to oversee the actual communications unless in the 
form of videotapes or other technology-based media.  Due to 
the flattened nature of this communication, the infection 
method of recruitment is suited to private and proximate 
forms of communication built around close bonds of personal 
trust and loyalty.  Once a group accepts the communicated 
ideas, individuals are susceptible to the funnel method of 
recruitment in using this communication technique because of 
the one-on-one interaction.357 
Small group dynamics and cohesion within these 
groups is a crucial factor for recruitment into jihad.  Marc 
Sageman supports this notion citing instances of groups of 
friends deciding to become active members of the jihad 
rather than isolated individuals.  The original founders of 
al Qaeda formed strong bonds fighting with one another in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.  Abdul Basit Karim 
(Ramzi Yousef) plotted and executed operations with both 
family and friends: his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and 
his childhood friends, Abdul Hakim Murad and Abdul Shakur.  
L’Houssaine Kherchtou testified at the East African embassy 
bombings trial that he had joined the jihad with four 
friends who had grown up and participated together in the 
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bombings in the summer of 1995.  The members of the Roubiax 
group met around the mosque and traveled to Bosnia as a 
group to fight.  Members of the 2001, failed Paris embassy 
plot also joined as a group of friends.  Hints exist that 
the Saudi mujahedin involved in the September 11, 2001, 
operations also joined in groups.  Even the Lackawanna Six, 
close Yemeni American childhood friends who underwent 
training at an al Qaeda camp, did so as a group.  The 
Casablanca bombings were carried out by friends who lived 
within two blocks of each other.358  Friendship, as an 
example of private and proximated communication, plays an 
important role in recruitment.  In Marc Sageman’s sample of 
150 terrorists, 68% of mujahedin joined as a result of 
friendship with others.  Most of them joined the jihad in 
small clusters of friends.  Kinship provided the link for 
14% of Marc Sageman’s sample.  Taking away overlap between 
the two, account for 75% of the 150 sample joining through 
either friendship or kinship ties.359 
Ph.D. scholar, Ahmet Yayla’s dissertation also 
denotes strong ties of friendship correlating to reasons for 
joining a terrorist organization.  This data was drawn from 
terrorist testimonies, some of which were written directly 
to leadership of the DHKP/C terrorist organization. The 
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Reason to Join Terrorist Organizations 




 Friend 24 32.0 35.3 35.3 
 Relative 18 24.0 26.5 61.8 
 Prison related 5 6.7 7.4 69.1 
 Organizational 
Publication 
11 14.7 16.2 85.3 
 Demonstration 1 1.3 1.5 86.8 
 Loss/Arrest of 
Close Circle 
1 1.3 1.5 88.2 
 Organizational 
Association 





2 2.7 2.9 97.1 
 Sympathy or 
Idealism 
2 2.7 2.9 100.0 
 Total 68 90.7 100.0  
Missing System 7 9.3   
Total 75 100.0   
Table 8.   Reason to Join Terrorist Organizations (From: 
Yayla, Ahmet. “Terrorism as a Social Information 
Entity: A Model for Early Intervention.” PhD diss., 
University of North Texas, 2005.) 
Note in this table that the three most referenced reasons 
for joining a terrorist organization were personal 
relationships or propaganda.  Personal relationships account 
for 61.8% of the individuals joining the organization. 
The danger of this method occurs when a recruit is 
not readily primed for formal recruitment.  In the case of 
Ishtique Parker, a South African student at Islamabad 
Islamic University, Ramzi Yousef using the alias Abdul Basit 
Karim, attempted too early to begin the funneling process.  
Initially the two met and conversed about casual topics and 
Yousef’s interest in women.  Eventually, Yousef revealed who 
he was and tried to use Parker as a courier of weapons in 
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exchange for money.  Instead of following Yousef’s 
instructions, Parker phoned the U.S. embassy and revealed 
the information.  Yousef used these same methods on 
childhood friends and kinsman with success, who having known 
each other a long time, could vouch for each other’s 
loyalty.360 
d. Private and Mediated 
Private and mediated takes place in a flattened 
command and control structure because it necessitates 
secrecy in societies not openly accepting of differing 
values.  This method includes the use of password-protected 
websites, pamphlets printed at home and secretly distributed 
to a broader base, and restricted internet chat groups.  
Since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda has made use of password-
protected websites and restricted internet chat groups.  
These methods are more difficult for intelligence and law 
enforcement to track and understand who is moving into and 
out of the organization.  This communication is effective 
when aimed at populations already primed. It may be 
effective at maintaining cohesion with current membership 
rather than gaining new recruits because of the lack of 
persuasion and the secrecy involved.361  Since 
communications are secret and conducted from a distance, 
this method of communication counter-intuitively suits the 
net approach to recruiting.  The same material is 
distributed to a primed population without necessarily 
needing physical contact.  
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3. Social Environment 
The social environment of an individual does play a 
role in the likelihood of an individual seeking membership 
in a terrorist organization.  This thesis does not seek to 
profile potential terrorists but acknowledges the 
environment a person grows up in affects the way in which 
the world is perceived as an adult.  Societies praising 
militant leaders encourage children to emulate these people 
as adults.  While membership in an organization increases 
through personal ties with family and friends already in the 
organization, membership does not always necessarily pass 
from father to son.  Younger brothers though, often follow 
the older sibling into the organization.  When fathers do 
already belong to an organization and the son joins, the son 
tends to join the more militant wing of the organization.  A 
child who grows up in a relatively accepting society towards 
violence is accustomed to its risks and less threatened by 
them, especially when cultural identity is stronger than 
personal identity.  More often than not, as evidenced by 
earlier examples, individuals know their recruiter before 
actually being recruited into an organization.  These 
generalizations are based on two particular studies, but due 
to the small number of interviewees in each study, this 
thesis is not discussing the actual numbers associated with 
these findings.362  For the purpose of this thesis, the 
social context of an individual is important to 
understanding the best approach and communication method for 
recruitment either into or away from terrorist 
organizations. 
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4. Informal Recruitment 
Recruiting as an informal process is an effective way 
to bring committed members to an organization who sought out 
membership themselves.  For example, involvement in al 
Qaeda, despite earlier discussion of madrassas’ 
effectiveness, is largely a bottom-up process of 
recruitment.  Al Qaeda does not specifically dedicate large 
resources to recruiting.  This organization is well known 
enough not to need to unlike smaller organizations but 
members like the Hamburg cell have a pattern of seeking out 
involvement themselves.  These organizations are dangerous 
because of the intensity with which potential members seek 
out and compete for the respect of a formal organization’s 
recognition.  Al Qaeda’s membership from areas located near 
its bases in Afghanistan and Sudan is small, potentially 
indicating that exposure to ideology is not enough, and thus 
social bonds must play a larger role in group dynamics.363   
As cited examples demonstrate, current attacks are 
committed by cells which did not attend formal training from 
terrorist organizations.  These cells receive instructions 
from horizontal links between the central staff leadership 
and the individual nodes.  The attacks of July 7 and 21, 
2005, in London and Istanbul and the Casablanca attacks in 
2003, demonstrate the concept of distant nodes conducting 
attacks with links difficult to trace to the larger 
organization itself.  One view is that the central 
leadership of al Qaeda is losing its influence and ability 
to command and control distant elements of its network. Even 
if this is the case, distant nodes are still conducting 
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lethal attacks.  If this is the case, then these smaller 
groups may prove even more difficult to counteract because 
less robust organizations have fewer trails to follow.  
Large organizations like al Qaeda in this situation may 
claim responsibility for attacks that fit their strategy 
without having had actual contact with the cell executing 
it.  Claiming responsibility creates an informal process of 
induction into the organization by members of the executing 
cell. 
5. Formal Recruitment and Indoctrination 
When an organization gains enough power and acquires 
physical facilities to conduct training, formal processes of 
indoctrination and membership often develop.  Al Qaeda is an 
example of one such organization in that began as an 
informal organization based on personal bonds forged during 
combat.  Al Qaeda evolved into a formal structure operating 
in the Sudan and Afghanistan and subsequently devolved into 
a network organization relying again on personal ties albeit 
reinforced through technology.  As an organization grows in 
size and leadership seeks to formalize the norms of a group, 
one should expect a more rigid command and control system as 
well as a more formal process for recruiting and membership.  
One reason for a formal process of recruitment and 
indoctrination into an organization is to strengthen the 
cohesion within the organization, such as when the 
leadership of al Qaeda was quarreling over the type of jihad 
to pursue.  Other reasons include decreasing the likelihood 
of a recruit leaving the organization or to strengthen and 
centralize power within the organization.   The 
participation in an illegal act by the recruit reinforces 
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the recruit’s commitment to the group and minimizes the 
desire of the individual to leave the group.364  The formal 
process of recruitment often involves a formal swearing of 
allegiance to the group and its leader or a probationary 
period when the recruit is tested.365  Formal training camps 
provide recruits already committed to the cause with 
practical knowledge about weaponry, survival, surveillance, 
tactics, assassination, etc.  Formal training in camps 
provides opportunities for reinforcing indoctrination and 
exposing members to jihadist situations.  Training also 
enables members to interact with external groups that 
possess needed knowledge and skills.  The sharing of 
training camps and expert instructors create opportunities 
for collaboration with other regional militant groups.366 
The formal process of recruiting for al Qaeda mainly 
occurred after Osama bin Laden’s 1996 fatah announcing a far 
jihad and ended with the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.  Part 
of the formal indoctrination conducted in Afghanistan camps 
involved a recruit pledging baya, a formal oath of loyalty, 
to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.367  Baya includes fasting, 
self-castigation with a whip of chains, and oral recitation 
of doctrine.  Jama al-Fadl described his process to becoming 
an official member of al Qaeda before September 11, 2001: 
“All members of the organization were asked to sign 
agreements that they would devote their lives to the 
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submission of all creation to the will of Allah.”368  Simply 
attending a training camp for the jihad did not equate to 
automatic membership.  During these years, only between ten 
and thirty percent of the recruits attending training camps 
were invited to join the jihad.  The competition to join 
increased the fervor of the young recruits, eager to display 
their enthusiasm and commitment to the group.369  This 
competition results in a smaller but more intense 
organization with congruent ideology.  Setmariam joined the 
jihad during the more formal years of organizational 
structure as leadership was vying for power within the 
group.  Setmariam trained under Sayyid Qutb in Afghanistan.  
Qutb asked his recruits, including Setmariam, “Are you 
Muslim Brotherhood members?”  Setmariam states that all of 
the new members replied, “Yes.”  He continues explaining his 
formal indoctrination:  
‘Then the trainer while pointing at his neck, 
‘you will all get slaughtered, do you approve of 
that?’ Then we all happily and joyfully said, ‘We 
approve Sir.’  He then turned to the chalkboard 
and wrote the title of his very first lecture: 
‘Terrorism is a duty and assassination is a 
Sunnah [an action ordained by the Prophet 
Muhammad].’370   
This formal indoctrination process increases group cohesion 
as it takes place in a group.  Members were encouraged to 
answer as a group.  Therefore, a person who was not sure of 
his own beliefs, would be encouraged to go along with the 
group in this situation.  The prospect of self-sacrifice for 
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Allah is glamorized and desensitized in this group training.  
Publicly acknowledging commitment to a group will increase 
one’s internal and external commitment because now that 
person feels accountable towards the larger group.  In the 
world following the fall of the Taliban and stricter anti-
terrorism measures, this formal training process is much 
more difficult to achieve.  Developing a strong sense of 
commitment for the jihadist cause and loyalty to the 
organization will become increasingly difficult as 
communications are indirect. 
Other organizations before the international community 
focused on anti-terrorism measures, used formal 
indoctrination processes.  In regions where an organization 
also has political power, such as the Hamas and Hezbollah, 
formal indoctrination processes may still occur, with 
priming occurring early in childhood.  Hezbollah members 
undergo multiple interviews while observed by other members 
behind mirrored windows.371  Members initiated into the URA 
received little indoctrination before beginning an odyssey 
to various cities and training areas.  The URA demanded 
oaths of its members, asking them, “Are you determined to 
act like a soldier?  Are you determined to die, are you 
determined to do this absolutely?”372  These questions are 
similar to those asked of Setmariam joining the jihad.  
Recruitment into JI was divided into two different types.  
The first involved religious education and the second 
involved more direct recruitment for identifying potential 
recruits committed to jihad.  The recruitment process could 
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take up to eighteen months.373  Each organization has its 
own methods of inducting members in a formal process.  
Formal processes test the recruits and provide a layer of 
operational security to the group.  Face-to-face interviews 
and illegal acts of violence ensure that the group is not 
being infiltrated by agents of the state.  Formal processes 
of indoctrination also increase group cohesion and more 
quickly bring about a sense of group identity. 
F. LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT 
With the above mentioned influences on members of 
society, an organization may also negatively influence the 
support of a population.  People who are not especially 
interested in a group’s political aims may fear government 
counteraction.  This situation occurs when a strong 
government is in power and does not hesitate to use its 
power on its own population.  A terrorist organization 
cannot force people to care about a cause.  If a person’s 
basic needs are met in daily life, then a group which 
harasses a population and seemingly causes trouble may lose 
popular support.  Sometimes even primed populations can 
withdraw their support if the government expresses a 
willingness to intervene and punish individuals 
participating in terrorist organizations.  A state must be 
careful not to enact too harsh of measures against the 
entire population without showing good cause because then 
the population may support the organization for reasons 
previously explained.374  Governments may offer supporters 
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of a terrorist group a better alternative. This tactic may 
not be successful against religious or ideological terrorist 
organizations which view their end-state in non-material and 
non-physical forms.  Reform movements, increased spending, 
and creation of jobs in underserved areas are all tactics 
that can undermine the sources of terrorist violence.  They 
can also result, however, in increased instability and a 
heightened sense of opportunity—situations that in the past 
have led to more terrorist acts.  Populations may lose 
interest in terrorist groups’ aims over time if the group 
does not evolve its strategy and tactics to keep pace with 
the changing environment of the world.  The groups’ aims may 
become outdated or irrelevant due to other world 
happenings.375  Marxist terrorist groups experienced this 
type of loss of popular support.  Just as a government may 
use oppressive means to coerce its citizens, a terrorist 
group can alienate possible supporters with its own attacks.  
Terrorist organizations selecting targets offensive to the 
general population they are trying to attract may lead 
ultimately to disenchantment with the group and increased 
support for the state.  While terrorist groups must be 
selective about their targets to prevent defections and the 
loss of popular support, this example also highlights why 
the U.S. must take care not to allow human rights 
infractions to occur to those under our watch.  These 
infractions will deter support by the state’s own citizens 
as well as internationally.  Additionally, these infractions 
may also incite sympathetic audiences to take a more active 
role in terrorist organizations.  In order to succeed, 
                     
375 Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 28. 
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terrorist organizations must be culturally cognizant of 
their constituents and avoid actions repulsive to these 
populations in order to maintain long-term support. 
G. SUMMARY 
Terrorist organizations not only focus on internal 
norms but on creating positive external societal norms.  The 
more tolerant society is of an organization’s operations, 
the more successful the organization will be in fulfilling 
its goals.  Passive or supportive local populations in areas 
of dense terrorist operations allow organizations to operate 
more freely.  These populations, if societal norms are 
positive toward the organization, may provide the 
organization with resources and potential recruits. 
Terrorist organizations utilize four main avenues to 
create societal norms: indoctrination of local populations 
to include children, mobilization of the population through 
formal methods and the media, providing social welfare 
services, and recruiting methods.  Successful terrorist 
organizations prime local populations before actively 
pursuing their commitment and membership.  Indoctrination 
occurs at all levels of society.  Education, literature, 
music, and politics are aspects of indoctrination.  After 
the population is properly indoctrinated with the group’s 
ideology, the organization seeks to mobilize the entire 
population.  This step is crucial because not all components 
of society will entirely accept the aims of the 
organization.  Successful terrorist organizations will 
tailor media messages to different types of audiences to 
engender the largest support base.  Simultaneously, 
organizations providing social welfare services to members 
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of the general population and the organization soften the 
attitudes of the people toward the organization.  After 
these steps are achieved, recruitment is more likely to be 
successful.  International terrorist organizations cannot 
use the same recruiting techniques in differing parts of the 
world.  Populations receive recruiting pitches differently 
depending on the type of priming in each region.  These main 
influences on society demonstrate the necessity for 
successful terrorist organizations to understand the 


















This thesis is a brief exploration into normative 
command and control processes, particularly those that 
emphasize cohesion and are utilized by terrorist 
organizations.  Moreover, applying the open systems 
perspective, this thesis suggests that these normative 
command and control processes do not form a closed system 
that is used only within the terrorist organization.  
Instead, it argues that terrorist organizations both affect 
and are affected by the society in which they operate, and 
that these groups use normative command and control 
processes to do so.   
Terrorist organizations must adapt to fit their 
environment if they are to succeed.  Adaptive structures and 
processes suit this need.  These organizations often begin 
as loose affiliations of like-minded individuals who 
eventually form a network based on reciprocity.  Over time, 
the organizations grow, strengthen, and become more rigid in 
their structure.  This rigid structure is often accompanied 
by a passive or supportive society.  At this stage, the 
regulatory and societal lenses are appropriate for studying 
terrorist organizations.  The regulatory lens, for example, 
explores how power, decision authority and resources are 
distributed across terrorist organizations, particularly as 
vested in formalized rules and work  proceses.  The societal 
lens, on the other hand, explores why society allows these 
organizations to develop and under what conditions such 
development takes place.   
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Yet when society tightens security measures against 
terrorist groups that have evolved into rigid, sustainable 
organizations with highly formalized work processes, 
terrorist groups display a tendency to return to a network 
structure with a dispersed command and control structure, 
held together through a strong ideology.  Distribution of 
power, decision rights, and resource allocation is less 
clear within these network organizations.  In both 
structures, however, the normative processes that encourage 
group cohesion remain, revealing that normative command and 
control mechanisms within terrorist organizations may be 
constant even when societal pressures cause significant 
shifts in the regulatory command and control mechanisms.  
The normative perspective is thus the one lens that can be 
used to study the interactions of terrorist organizations 
with society throughout the entire lifecycle of the 
organization. 
Empirical evidence of this conclusion is rife.  In both 
hierarchical and network organizations, such as Marxist 
Revolutionary Groups, Shining Path, and the Abu Sayyaf 
Group, relying on rigid regulatory processes as the 
foundation for a command and control structure was not 
successful.  These groups were each organized differently 
and with varying objectives.  The common theme between these 
three groups, however, is that the organizations’ cohesion 
disappeared after the removal of the group’s leadership or 
when disagreements arose over acceptable tactics.  
Conversely, Tanzim al-Jihad members succeeded in eventually 
becoming mujahedin against the Soviet Union and then leaders 
in al Qaeda.  This organization lacked a clear command and 
control structure and members were arrested, but individuals 
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in the group maintained a strong ideology.  This ideology 
persisted as the members eventually formed al-Qaeda despite 
operating under varying regulatory pressures.  The empirical 
evidence that suggests that terrorist organizations ascribe 
to characteristics of Mintzberg’s missionary organizations.  
Missionary organizations rely on norms instead of regulatory 
rules to form the basis of their organizational structure, 
organizational processes, and command and control 
mechanisms. 
Moreover, due to dynamic interactions between society 
and the organization, the normative lens is appropriate for 
examining how terrorist organizations cause society to 
become either more tolerant or intolerant of their actions.  
Fortunately, the processes of group cohesion as a mechanism 
of norming are well documented.  Additionally, factors of 
cohesion are well understood. 
Unfortunately, however, linking these factors of 
cohesion to how a group operates in the larger society is 
not well addressed in the contemporary terrorism studies 
literature.  Yet, understanding the mechanisms linking a 
group to its external environment provides an insight as to 
how to combat the command and control mechanisms of these 
groups.  The norms of influence used to maintain cohesion 
within the group may also be related to how the group 
attempts to influence the greater society.  The PLO, for 
example, uses social services, cooperation, competition, and 
heavy indoctrination on both its own members and those of 
society in order to maintain cohesion.  The gradual 
indoctrination of the general population primes the 
uncommitted audience to become desensitized to the violent 
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operations of the group and simultaneously attentive to the 
social services provided for the population, such as soccer 
camps.  The positive feedback the organization receives from 
the population regarding these services establishes a norm.  
The population of the region will not resist the 
organization so long as the organization provides the 
community with some desired social service.  These 
allowances on behalf of each actor create a symbiotic 
relationship difficult to break.  Understanding these 
unwritten practices of terrorist organizations is important 
to encouraging members of society to resist these 
contributions.  Thus, this thesis is a first step toward 
understanding the normative command and control processes 
within terrorist organizations in an attempt to discover how 
these organizations seek to create norms in the societies in 
which they operate. 
Future research concerning the normative command and 
control influences within terrorist groups and their effect 
on society need three approaches.  Broad overviews on 
specific normative influences such as this thesis, studies 
on individuals within terrorist organizations, and studies 
examining specific interactions between organizations and 
the societies they operate within and where they conduct 
operations would provide a clearer framework of the 
normative command and control influences in terrorist 
organizations.   
Instead of focusing on the regulations and operations 
of terrorist organizations, the communication structure 
needs research.  Communications provide ideological and 
operational instruction.  Examining the mediums of 
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communication and the frequency of interaction with 
different ranking members of an organization would provide 
information about how an organization maintains its cohesion 
and executes operations.  Are these communications 
drastically different between hierarchies and networks?  
What type of information is typically shared between group 
members?  How much communication and interaction do group 
members have with non-group members, and how do these 
interactions affect the formation of shared norms? 
The media should be studied from two perspectives: the 
way the media influences a terrorist organization and how 
terrorist organizations specifically tailor their operations 
for use by the media.  The frequency of attacks following 
broadcast terrorist messages on al-Jazeera or the size of an 
attack needed for international television and radio 
stations to send reporters or provide information on the 
event are two possible research areas.  The use of different 
types of media should also be studied to understand the 
direction terrorist groups are moving in terms of spreading 
their messages and recruiting support, resources, and 
members. 
Terrorist organizations thrive in regions of tolerance 
towards violence.  A possible research area could examine 
the content of children’s education in violent regions and 
compare this to levels of support or passivity for terrorist 
organizations.  Are regions educated in violent doctrine 
more accepting of terrorist organizations and their 
operations?  Do these regions have more members in terrorist 
organizations?  
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An analysis of the types of social welfare provided by 
terrorist organizations should be undertaken to document the 
exact steps an organization takes to garner support.  Are 
individuals of society expected to participate or donate to 
the organizations in any way for the services provided?  
Where are the services located in relation to operations’ 
headquarters, training facilities, or execution of 
operations?  State governments could use this study to 
improve upon these services provided to their populations as 
a way of drawing support away from the terrorist 
organization. 
Individuals within terrorist organizations, when 
possible, should be questioned about their specific reasons 
and process of joining an organization.  Items addressed 
should include the specific triggers the individual 
experienced for joining a terrorist organization since not 
all members of society exposed to the same level and type of 
indoctrination actually become active members.  Interviewing 
U.S.-born or other allied nation-born terrorists is 
important to understanding why these individuals joined 
organizations located far from their homes.  This approach 
is necessary for understanding how to deter future terrorist 
organizations and abundant locally operating terrorists 
within the U.S.  Terrorists who approach the U.S. or other 
allied-nation renouncing their membership or loyalty to an 
organization should be questioned as to what specifically 
caused the member to become disenchanted with the 
organization. 
Finally, specific studies of the normative command and 
control influences within specific terrorist organizations 
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are needed to combat the operations of these groups.  These 
studies should not only focus on the organization, but the 
culture of the society from which these groups recruit 
resources and members.  Do the laws of society accommodate 
terrorist organizations’ ideology and/or operations?  What 
type of government is in power in both the headquarters or 
training location and place of attack execution?  For each 
major terrorist group in operation, the specific elements of 
cohesion should be thoroughly investigated in order to find 
the vulnerabilities of each group.  Each terrorist 
organization is structured slightly differently and operates 
in a different manner.  Therefore, the specific mechanisms 
of cohesion are likely to also differ within each terrorist 
organization.  In order for counter-terrorism policies to 
succeed, in-depth analyses for each organization are in 
order to understand how to combat these groups domestically 
and abroad. 
This thesis and follow on research should be combined 
to create a framework for the life cycle of terrorist 
organizations based on the normative perspective of command 
and control influences.  Put simply, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the regulatory command and control 
processes of terrorist groups (e.g., decision rights, 
resource allocation, communication patterns) are significant 
impacted by external environmental factors.  Terrorist 
groups adapt their decision and communication structures to 
their environment, and they do so quickly and easily.  
However, the normative command and control processes (e.g., 
group cohesion, ideological underpinnings) of terrorist 
groups seem to survive and remain relatively constancy 
despite outside pressures. Studying normative command and 
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control systems, then, offers the potential of understanding 
the ‘deep structure’ of terrorist organizations over the 
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